



Daily Report

Central Eurasia

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Meeting of CIS Defense Ministers in Moscow

Patrikeyev Dismissed After Report

LD1904115395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1129 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—The border troops "are unable to reliably cover the state border with Afghanistan," commander of the Commonwealth peace-making troops in Tajikistan Colonel-General Valeriy Patrikeyev told a meeting of the Council of Commonwealth Defence Ministers in Moscow today. The report was delivered before the Council decided on Patrikeyev's dismissal from the commander post.

In the opinion of Patrikeyev, the conflict in Tajikistan will aggravate if the Commonwealth states do not pull together efforts to settle the republican situation in the near future. He called on the Commonwealth states to render military, financial and technical assistance to Tajikistan.

Speaking of the reasons for the escalation of combat operations in Tajikistan, Patrikeyev noted that "fragile balance" in the republic was broken in April by the Tajik government's decision to increase its military presence in Gorno-Badakhshan. In his words, the command of Gorno-Badakhshan self-defense units estimated the introduction of additional border units to the area as a violation of the Tehran truce agreement reached by Dushanbe and the opposition.

In the words of the general, the Tajik leadership is "still prone to settle the Gorno-Badakhshan problem by force."

Patrikeyev noted that the Movement for Islamic Revival of Tajikistan, which is in opposition to Dushanbe, has made use of the situation and started combat operations on the border. The opposition is preparing its units for more combat on the border and inside Tajikistan, he said.

Asked by Russian defense minister Pavel Grachev about the strength of the Tajik armed forces, Patrikeyev said it is 11,500 men.

Commenting on these words, Grachev noted: "What kind of armed forces they are with a strength of 11,000? Does the republic have no recruits?" After that correspondents were requested to leave the meeting.

According to the report of an Interfax correspondent, the meeting agenda includes settlement of the Abkhazian conflict and deepening of military-technical cooperation.

Commonwealth Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya told the meeting about a proposal of Boris Yeltsin to hold a joint meeting of the Council of Defense Ministers, the Council of Foreign Ministers and commanders of Commonwealth border troops headquarters on April 21 in Moscow to discuss the only issue - situation in Tajikistan.

The meeting is attended by military delegations from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Representatives of Ukraine, Turkmenistan and Moldova are present as observers.

Grachev: More Tajik Troops Needed

LD1904111395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0733 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Apr—A regular sitting of the Council of CIS Defense Ministers started in Moscow today. "Its main aim is to create conditions favorable for ensuring our states' security," Defense Minister Pavel Grachev said opening the sitting. It is taking place in the headquarters for coordinating military cooperation between the CIS countries.

The Russian defense minister described the situation in Tajikistan as a priority issue. He said that the lion's share of efforts to stabilize the situation in the republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border should be made by Tajikistan's armed forces.

Col Gen Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the collective peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan, gave a report on the military and political situation in the republic. He said that the Tashkent treaty mechanism on collective security can be brought into play. The CIS countries might provide not only military but also economic and financial help to the republic, the general said. He stressed that the collective peace-keeping forces should be increased to 16,000 troops. According to Valeriy Patrikeyev, the united command of the peace-keeping forces is currently being maintained by Russia's share of the contributions alone.

The session is continuing.

Forces To Stay in Tajikistan Until End of Year

LD1904170395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1546 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—A meeting of the CIS Defense Ministers' Council has decided to extend the CIS peacekeeper mandate in Tajikistan until the end of 1995. However, the decision remains subject to approval by the CIS leaders, CIS Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya told journalists Wednesday.

According to Korotchenya, "no one objected to the decision in principle." He supposed that "special opinions" voiced at the meetings will be removed at the joint meeting of the CIS defense and foreign ministers and border troop commanders in Moscow on April 21, proposed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Korotchenya said the April 21 meeting may also discuss the extension of the mandate of CIS peacekeepers in

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Abkhazia, due to expire on May 16. At the same time, he remarked that Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze had to submit a relevant written application to the CIS Heads-of-State Council for the decision to be made. "So far, no such application has been submitted, but we hope for the Georgian Foreign Minister to bring the document to the joint meeting on April 21," he said.

Answering journalists' questions, Korotchenya said that the 1992 treaty on collective security signed by a number of CIS states "did not work as it should." He added that strengthening military cooperation in the CIS is one of the most pressing issues, against a background of NATO expansion plans.

Korotchenya did not rule out that some CIS states would not apply for NATO membership.

Grachev Speaks on Lessons of WWII

MM2004083895 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 95 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Maryukha: "CIS: Security and Stability on the Agenda"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A routine session of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth countries has been held at the Staff for the Coordination of Military Cooperation among the CIS member states.

All the CIS flags were represented in the council—by ministers or their deputies—and the Republic of Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine participated in the session as observers.

Addressing the gathering, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, who was chairing the council session, pointed out that the lasting significance of the victory of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition for postwar Europe and the whole world was confirmed at the international scientific conference "The Lessons of World War II and the Significance of the Victory Over Fascism," held in Moscow the previous day. The victory, won at a high price, was achieved by pooling countries' efforts in the face of the threat from the "brown plague," despite differences in their political systems. The courage and heroism of the people of what was still then a united country, Pavel Grachev emphasized, will remain forever in our memory and will continue to be the basis of patriotic work to educate new generations in the CIS member states.

Army General Grachev particularly noted the presence at the session of Army General Sagadat Nurmaghambetov, minister of defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan—a participant in the last war, a hero of the Soviet Union, and a people's hero of Kazakhstan. This, the oldest of the ministers, also made what contribution he could to the victory.

"The lessons of World War II are topical even today," Pavel Grachev emphasized. "When adopting decisions

on the tasks of building national armed forces, the CIS countries' ministries of defense attach paramount significance to them. From session to session we build up our efforts to create conditions for the reliable joint ensuring of our states' security."

The agenda of this session includes 13 main questions and several reports and other less significant questions. First of all, the members of the CIS countries' Defense Ministers Council began examining the question of the situation in the Republic of Tajikistan. This was occasioned by the fact that the opposition's spring offensive, according to Colonel General Valeriy Patrikeyev, commander of the Collective Peacekeeping Force in Tajikistan, who delivered the report on this question, could help to spread the conflict unless measures are taken by the Commonwealth countries. This in turn will lead to combat operations on a larger scale, although war is already essentially being waged on the Commonwealth's southern borders.

At the same time, according to Gen. Patrikeyev, the peacekeeping force is in a very complex financial position—this month there could prove to be no funds even for the servicemen's pay. Only Russia is transferring funds to their accounts, and also Tajikistan—as the party most interested in achieving peace on its own land. At the same time, however, as the defense ministers of a number of Commonwealth countries pointed out, little has been done in Tajikistan itself to create its own armed forces: The Army has 11,500 men, and the formations which have been created—two motorized rifle brigades, four battalions, and spetsnaz—are undermanned.

Moving on to examine the purely military aspects of the questions under discussion, the council adopted a decision not to discuss them in the presence of the press, although it was stated that the military men campaigning for a high degree of security for their countries have no special secrets. During the closed part of the session a decision was adopted, in connection with the expiry of his second term in office, to replace the commander of the Collective Peacemaking Force in Tajikistan. It was proposed to appoint Lieutenant General Valentin Bobryshev as the new commander. The other questions being examined include measures to settle the conflict in Abkhazia, the Coordinating Committee for Air Defense Questions under the Defense Ministers Council, the creation of a Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the CIS Armed Forces and Military Technical Committee, and a plan for realizing the concept of collective security.

At the end of the session Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation minister of defense, expressed satisfaction with the work done—agreement was reached on practically all questions. Col. Gen. Viktor Prudnikov explained in a brief conversation that in such a specific matter as the creation of united air defenses, for example, they have already proceeded to organizational measures which do not yet require additional financial expenditure.

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Grachev Speaks on Lessons of WWII

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As for disagreements, they are of a purely "technical" nature—to whom, for example, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is to be subordinate. It is up to the experts to settle them. To all appearances, the military will submit finally agreed documents to the May meeting of the CIS heads of state.

Replying to journalists' questions, Pavel Grachev did not overlook the problem of reforming the Russian Armed Forces. At present, he emphasized, there is no question of creating a civilian Ministry of Defense or reducing the Army to 800,000 men. It is simply that certain forces seem to need to destabilize the situation in the Army whenever the Army is recovering from one more shakeup.

A meeting of the CIS countries' foreign ministers is planned for 21 April. In accordance with an initiative from the Russian Federation president, supported by a number of Commonwealth heads of state, the commanders of border troops are also being invited to this meeting. Naturally, the meeting will discuss not only the concept for guarding the Commonwealth's external borders, on which the defense ministers have, on the whole, arrived at a single opinion, but also the situation in Tajikistan.

Kozyrev Warns Tajik Representatives in Moscow Talks

LD1904182095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1638 GMT 19 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A meeting of representatives of the Dushanbe authorities and the Tajik opposition began in Moscow on Wednesday. The Tajik governmental delegation is headed by first vice-premier Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev and the opposition delegation is headed by first deputy chairman of the Movement for Islamic Revival of Tajikistan Akbar Turajonzoda.

The meeting attended by special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Tajikistan Ramiro Piriz Ballon will focus on two items—cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan border and organization and holding of the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks.

Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev opened the meeting and urged the sides for the soonest peaceful political settlement of the conflict.

At the same time, he stressed that Russia "will not tolerate the death of its servicemen on the Tajik-Afghan border." He said that in case of further combat operations of the Tajik opposition the Russian and Commonwealth border troops stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border will use "all means available to protect the Southern boundary of the Commonwealth."

"We will use all means available to ensure political and democratic process in Tajikistan," stressed the minister.

In the words of Kozyrev, "a program of political arrangements for Tajikistan" has been elaborated on the instruction of the Russian President. The minister, however, did not disclose the program details.

He stressed the important role of the United Nations and the Security Council in inter-Tajik settlement and said that the Russian side "counts on greater participation of international organizations" in Tajik settlement.

The opposition delegation launched a strong protest against the speech of Kozyrev.

A document passed over to Interfax by the opposition delegation head says that "Mr. Kozyrev used the right of individual estimation of the recent events in Badakhshan and threatened with the use of all Russian military ways and means."

The opposition hopes that "pronouncements of Andrey Kozyrev do not express the political opinion of the Russian state."

"We consider it inadmissible under current conditions and in such an atmosphere to continue consultations in Moscow and reserve the right to address personal representative of the United Nations Secretary General Ramiro Piriz Ballon with a request to consider proposals of other states for holding the inter-Tajik political dialogue," stresses the statement.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has offered to hold a regular round of inter-Tajik talks in Almaty.

Tajik Opposition 'Strongly Protested' Kozyrev Warning

LD1904140995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1319 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—The Tajik opposition delegation strongly protested the speech made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev at the talks between Tajik factions that started in Moscow Wednesday [19 April].

A document made available to Interfax by Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy leader of the Tajikistan Islamic Revival Movement who heads the opposition delegation, states that Kozyrev threatened the use of the entire Russian military might in the aftermath of the latest events in Gorno-Badakhshan.

The document described these threats as inconsistent with the spirit and goals of the political consultations and his position as unacceptable and offending to the opposition delegation as representatives of the sovereign and independent people of Tajikistan.

The opposition officials expressed the hope that Kozyrev's remarks do not reflect the political views of the Russian state.

The document says that the consultations cannot be continued in Moscow in this environment and that the

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As for disagreements, they are of a purely "technical" nature—to whom, for example, the Chiefs of Staff Committee is to be subordinate. It is up to the experts to settle them. To all appearances, the military will submit finally agreed documents to the May meeting of the CIS heads of state.

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Kozyrev Warns Tajik Representatives in Moscow Talks

LD1904182095 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1638 GMT 19 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] A meeting of representatives of the Dushanbe authorities and the Tajik opposition began in Moscow on Wednesday. The Tajik governmental delegation is headed by first vice-premier Mahmadsaid Ubaydullayev and the opposition delegation is headed by first deputy chairman of the Movement for Islamic Revival of Tajikistan Akbar Turajonzoda.

The meeting attended by special representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Tajikistan Ramiro Piriz Ballon will focus on two items—cease-fire on the Tajik-Afghan border and organization and holding of the fourth round of inter-Tajik talks.

Russian foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev opened the meeting and urged the sides for the soonest peaceful political settlement of the conflict.

At the same time, he stressed that Russia "will not tolerate the death of its servicemen on the Tajik-Afghan border." He said that in case of further combat operations of the Tajik opposition the Russian and Commonwealth border troops stationed on the Tajik-Afghan border will use "all means available to protect the Southern boundary of the Commonwealth."

"We will use all means available to ensure political and democratic process in Tajikistan," stressed the minister.

In the words of Kozyrev, "a program of political arrangements for Tajikistan" has been elaborated on the instruction of the Russian President. The minister, however, did not disclose the program details.

He stressed the important role of the United Nations and the Security Council in inter-Tajik settlement and said that the Russian side "counts on greater participation of international organizations" in Tajik settlement.

The opposition delegation launched a strong protest against the speech of Kozyrev.

A document passed over to Interfax by the opposition delegation head says that "Mr. Kozyrev used the right of individual estimation of the recent events in Badakhshan and threatened with the use of all Russian military ways and means."

The opposition hopes that "pronouncements of Andrey Kozyrev do not express the political opinion of the Russian state."

"We consider it inadmissible under current conditions and in such an atmosphere to continue consultations in Moscow and reserve the right to address personal representative of the United Nations Secretary General Ramiro Piriz Ballon with a request to consider proposals of other states for holding the inter-Tajik political dialogue," stresses the statement.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has offered to hold a regular round of inter-Tajik talks in Almaty.

Tajik Opposition 'Strongly Protested' Kozyrev Warning

LD1904140995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1319 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—The Tajik opposition delegation strongly protested the speech made by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev at the talks between Tajik factions that started in Moscow Wednesday [19 April].

A document made available to Interfax by Akbar Turajonzoda, first deputy leader of the Tajikistan Islamic Revival Movement who heads the opposition delegation, states that Kozyrev threatened the use of the entire Russian military might in the aftermath of the latest events in Gorno-Badakhshan.

The document described these threats as inconsistent with the spirit and goals of the political consultations and his position as unacceptable and offending to the opposition delegation as representatives of the sovereign and independent people of Tajikistan.

The opposition officials expressed the hope that Kozyrev's remarks do not reflect the political views of the Russian state.

The document says that the consultations cannot be continued in Moscow in this environment and that the

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opposition reserves the right to ask Ramiro Piriz Ballon, the UN secretary general's special envoy in Tajikistan, to consider invitations made by other countries where a political dialog between Tajik factions could be held.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev had earlier suggested holding the next round of talks in Almaty.

Further on Tajik Opposition Protests

LD1904201395 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent Aleksandr Kheberov] The first day of the inter-Tajik consultations in Moscow began with surprises right from the start. First of all, the mediators managed to get the opposition and Tajik Government delegations to the negotiating table; this had been in doubt as late as yesterday. Secondly, the consultations were broken off today before they had hardly managed to begin. The opposition delegation left the room where the meeting was taking place. The reason was Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's statement that attacks on Russian servicemen in Tajikistan would not remain unanswered.

[Begin recording] [Video shows the delegations arriving for the talks. Tajik opposition delegation head Haji Akbar Turajonzoda shakes hands with the government delegation.] [Kozyrev] And we will use all, I emphasize all, means at our disposal in full conformity with the UN statutes and international law. We are talking about a state border, we are talking about border guards who are protected by an internationally recognized agreement, and there is no justification whatsoever for their death.

[Turajonzoda] We cannot work in such an atmosphere. We want to be respected, we want to be taken into consideration, we want to be accepted as the competent representatives of part of the population of Tajikistan. [end recording]

[Kheberov] The opposition representatives have sent an official protest to the Russian Foreign Ministry but it is not ruled out that the consultations will be continued nonetheless. At any rate, on the eve of the consultations, one senior Russian diplomat, envisioning such an incident, said that at the end of the day passions will cool and then normal conversation will begin. However, the opposition says that they will take part in the Moscow consultations only if the Russian Government gives an appropriate explanation.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 20 Apr

LD2004062195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0606 GMT 20 Apr 95

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 20 (ITAR-TASS)—IZVESTIYA runs a commentary under the headline "Is Kozyrev Becoming A 'Powerful' Minister?"

in connection with the speech made by the Russian foreign minister at Tuesday's meeting of Russia's Foreign Policy Council. The speech, according to the newspaper, "was marked by Kozyrev's sensational statement that Moscow may use all means, right up to the use of an armed force, to protect the Russian-speaking population in the ex-Soviet republics."

The newspaper notes that ever since the notorious Stockholm speech, not a single pronouncement by the Russian minister of foreign affairs attracted so much attention. But, while in December 1992 in the Swedish capital Kozyrev was only putting up a show posing as a national-patriot and 40 minutes later turning his remarks into a joke, this time he was frighteningly serious, the newspaper observes.

"The minister, it seems, is getting new allies. Kozyrev's remarks at the foreign policy council meeting evoked approval from General Aleksandr Lebed, his irreconcilable opponent, who was elected the chairman of the congress of Russian communities last week," the newspaper writes.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI carries a detailed account of Andrey Kozyrev's speech made at the Krasnaya Presnya Court in Moscow on Wednesday. He made a statement about the suit filed against him and the NTV Television Network by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia.

Zhirinovskiy disagreed with an evaluation of his views in Kozyrev's remarks in the Itogi analytical TV programme on January 23, last year, and regards them as "not corresponding to reality."

At that time, Kozyrev described Zhirinovskiy's views as fascist ones.

When speaking in court, the minister corroborated his estimate by detailed arguments. The plaintiff decided against appearing in court while his defence lawyer was trying to hinder the minister's speech but failed in the attempts. The consideration of the case is to be continued on September 5.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on inter-Tajik consultations which were interrupted in Moscow on Wednesday.

The newspaper points out that if "the leadership of Russia does not work out flexible forms of its policy in central Asia, it will have to quit the region, which is a zone of vital interests to Russia".

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on Russian-Ukrainian talks.

Commenting on the results of Russo-Ukrainian talks held in Moscow, the newspaper emphasises that "new and new tough versions of a solution being suggested by Ukraine to the Black Sea Fleet issue do not bring a date of the Russian president's visit to that country nearer in any way.

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IZVESTIYA carries an interview with Boris Saltykov, Russian minister of science and technology policy, who is upbeat about research financing.

Saltykov told the newspaper that this year 2.5 percent of the budget's expenditure has been assigned for science and research financing will be not less than three percent beginning from 1996. This scope of funding will keep on irrespective of restructuring or a reduction in the number of institutes and laboratories. "So, I look into the future with a certain share of optimism," the minister emphasised.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA runs a law "on state regulation of tariffs on electrical and thermal power in the

Russian Federation". The newspaper's commentary stresses that this law is not a departure from market-determined principles.

The press runs reports about preparations for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

TRUD reports that the U.S. President has booked a room at the four-star Radisson-Slavyanskaya Hotel in Moscow for May 9-10. The price of the room is 900 dollars daily. The newspaper notes that "all maids who will clean his room know English".

Clinton Visit Seen Humiliating to National Pride

MK1904153095 Moscow **MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA** in Russian 19 Apr 95 p 4

[Unattributed report in the "Facets of the Century" column: "The Master of the Russian Ranch"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Why is President Clinton coming here? Hardly to rejoice sincerely in the Great Victory won by the Soviet people. If this were so, Russia would have been invited to the wide-ranging festivities on the anniversary of the Allied landing. After all, this landing operation was exclusively the result of decisive actions by the Russian front. The West does not like to recall a not very pleasant episode when the second front was finally opened, which by that time was more important for the Allies themselves, and the supreme commander issued an order to stop the advance on the eastern fronts. As a result, the Germans, repositioning their forces, struck on the British-U.S. landing force, pressing it against the edge of the coast. It was only after personal pleas by Winston Churchill that Stalin resumed military operations, and the Allied Forces began their "triumphant march of the victors."

But if it is not a recognition of the Russians' decisive role in routing the Nazis, what is it then? Maybe personal sympathies between Clinton and Yeltsin? But we saw the true value of presidential friendship from the example of Gorbachev and Bush, when the ousted Soviet president, the day after his ouster, tried, out of naivete, to get in touch with his U.S. "friend," to complain about the perfidy of his associates, but could never track him....

The arrival of the U.S. master and the piety surrounding the American's visit will some day be studied by posterity from the pages of a national humiliation chronicle. Because the main thing about the coming of Clinton, from whom not even a quarter-kopeck piece can be expected, is the definition of Russia's political prospects. The Yeltsin regime undoubtedly suits the United States. The question is how to prolong it in the future without breaking the traditions of democracy, so dear to the American soul. Russian recklessness has, to put it mildly, befuddled and somewhat confused the Americans. Now Clinton is to decide whether elections in Russia are to be—with the obligatory successful outcome, or whether, indeed, after scratching the back of his head, he will decide that it is better to shelve this puzzle. So, pre-election passions are simmering, until they reach a certain heat mark, when they are cooled by vague answers from those in obsequious expectation.

Little Hope Seen for Effective NPT

MM1904133295 Moscow **ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA** in Russian 19 Apr 95 First Edition p 7

[Report by Vadim Alekseyev: "Heavy To Move Around, Dangerous To Discard. Conference on Nuclear Weapons Opens in United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From the viewpoint of the "nuclear five" (Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and China), the problem is simple and obvious: In the interests of humankind the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must be extended indefinitely. Simply in order to ensure—and this system has been tested for 25 years—a nuclear balance whereby no one ever has even the intention to press the "nuclear button." Of course the aspiration of the "five" is an ideal. As we know, an unattainable ideal. Why?

Time has proved to be the main factor here. In the 25 years of the existence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] the "nuclear five" have expanded. Both covertly and overtly. For example, India has tested a nuclear device in the Rajasthan desert; and, according to the constantly cited data of the CIA, Pakistan and Israel possess nuclear weapons. Furthermore, there are around 20 countries which are called "threshold" countries, that is, countries which are on the verge of making a nuclear bomb. And given that the DPRK, Yemen, and Venezuela have stated categorically that they are not going to sign the treaty—and India was not even intending to go to New York—then it works out that even if the NPT is signed, this will mean absolutely nothing: Most of the nonsignatories possess nuclear weapons. So this is scarcely a question of non-proliferation. The weapons have already proliferated.

The danger is that all the time it is now getting easier even for private individuals to make an atom bomb. And the developed countries are worried that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorists. How this could happen in the United States has already been described by Tom Clancy in his new novel "The Sum of All Fears."

The fact that the "nuclear five" are continuing to improve their weapons is leading to a situation whereby a number of countries have been feeling seriously aggrieved. How can it be: Some have weapons and are improving them, whereas others are not supposed to do this. Hence the confrontation: First of all, disarm yourselves, and then demand this of others.

The NPT came into force 5 March 1970. It now includes 173 countries. It was concluded for 25 years, with the idea that when this period of time expired, a conference of the participating countries would be convened which would resolve whether or not to prolong the treaty indefinitely. This is the main and only question. This is why the participant countries have now gathered in New York—and we will learn the result 12 May.

On the eve of the conference the traditional polls were conducted in order to sound out the possible results of this forum. It transpired that the treaty would be extended by a majority of votes (on the basis of the 86-1 formula). This is encouraging. But in that case the main question is whether the nuclear minority will submit to the nuclear/nonnuclear majority. After all, the world has changed a great deal in the past 25 years. And evidently

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the question lies elsewhere: How can these changes be reasonably assessed? In this respect it is sensible to recall that the United States is actively elaborating a concept for various military options if it does not prove possible to settle the problem of nuclear nonproliferation by other means....

However it turns out, the future of the NPT depends not on whether the nuclear powers find levers for pressuring those who refuse to join the treaty in its present "open-ended" version. After all, the question is to what extent the NPT will rely on the new democratic world order based on multipolarity, reliable regional security systems, and the democratization of the UN General Assembly. Because scientific and technical progress is embracing more and more countries, and this is leading to a situation whereby it will soon be possible to speak of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons only from a theoretical viewpoint.

So the treaty will most likely be signed by a majority of votes. But it will not actually function. And so the world will be deprived of its main instrument of stability. Because so far matters have always confined themselves to local wars with the use of conventional weapons....

Russia Presses for Prolongation of NPT in New York

LD2004141295 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1354 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By Valeriy Sevryukov and Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 20 (ITAR-TASS)—Russia resolutely advocates an indefinite and unconditional prolongation of the nuclear weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the conference currently held in New York.

"With this in view, the Russian side is prepared for active and constructive cooperation with other states in order to achieve this goal meeting the interests of the whole mankind", spokesman for the Russian foreign minister Grigoriy Karasin said on Thursday.

"We cannot back the move for a vote by secret ballot on this issue", the Russian diplomat emphasised. He described the NPT accord as "an instrument of international public law" and a set of mutual obligations. The parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be aware of each other's stance with respect to the fate of the accord. This is the only basis for mutual trust in the future, Karasin stressed.

The voting procedure is also of importance for security matters, including in the regional context, the spokesman went on to say. Everybody seems to be naturally concerned with the stand taken by neighbouring countries with respect to the treaty and, therefore, to the problem of nuclear weapons non-proliferation on the whole, he noted.

This is also a matter of reliability of conditions ensuring peaceful co-existence in the nuclear sphere with non-nuclear states, the Russian diplomat added. "We think it a responsibility of every government, to the world public opinion and to its own people, to announce openly and unambiguously its position on the Non-Proliferation Treaty", Karasin said.

Lebed Warns NATO of Possible Repercussions If It Expands

MS1904090995 London THE TIMES in English 19 Apr 95 p 10

[Report incorporating interview with Lieutenant-General Aleksander Lebed, by Carey Schofield, in Moscow, date note given; "Moscow General in Warning to Nato"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow—Lieutenant-General Aleksandr Lebed, the commander of the Russian 14th Army in Moldavia [Moldova] who is widely tipped as a candidate in next year's Russian presidential elections, has given Nato a stark warning not to expand eastwards.

Russia "will no longer turn a blind eye to British and French nuclear weapons if Nato proceeds with its expansion plans", he said in an interview in Moscow.

He said the Russian parliament might not only refuse to ratify Start 2 (the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in its present form but might demand renegotiation to include European nuclear weapons unless it could be reassured that the drive to expand Nato had ceased.

"If Nato expands, Russia will be justified in adopting the doctrine of graduated deterrence," he said. Such a strategy would involve resorting to a limited nuclear response if conventional defence failed. This would represent a departure from the current Russian policy of "no first use".

"An enlarged Nato would clearly be more powerful than Russia," General Lebed said. "Our thinking would have to reflect that. Expansion would clearly necessitate greater investment in the military."

He conceded that Nato posed no threat to Russia's security in the immediate future but added: "Who can say what developments may take place in Europe over the next 20 years?"

Although he has gone further, in outlining the possible repercussions of Nato enlargement, than any other senior Russian general, his anger is not out of step with mainstream general staff thinking. Many of the top military in Moscow are seething with fury over their Government's indecisive reaction to Nato expansion plans.

Morale within the Russian army has plummeted over the past few years, as officers have watched the prestige of the military collapse.

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Grachev Says CFE Treaty 'Needs Amending'*LD1904153695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1416 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Apr, (ITAR-TASS)—The treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, CFE, needs amending, Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev told correspondents at the headquarters for coordinating CIS military cooperation today after the sitting of the CIS Defense Ministers's Council.

According to Grachev, "it is extremely difficult to implement the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe." "One should proceed from the fact that the treaty was not signed by the states that emerged from the Soviet Union and by Europe's new states, for instance, in former Yugoslavia," the minister stressed.

In his view, "perhaps, either the treaty should be amended or a new one should be drawn up."

In Grachev's opinion, "actions have been stepped up now to expand NATO." "Since NATO is a military and political alliance and its principal actions are based on force the following questions arise: what limitations can be envisaged, against whom is this alliance being expanded?" the Russian minister remarked. "The military and political situation in the territories of many states, including Russia, considerably changed these days", Grachev states. According to his assessment, it will be impossible to solve a number of really serious issues, in particular, in North Caucasus and Chechnya, if one follows this treaty blindly.

"These points make us—military men—ponder and recommend our politicians to find a reason for returning to the consideration of the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, and if not to freeze it then at least to review it taking into account the opinion of the new states", the minister concluded.

No 'Legal Status' for CIS, Baltic, PRC Borders*LD1804185895 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1524 GMT 18 Apr 95*

[By Anna Bakina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 18—"Part of the Russian state border does not have a legal status. Russia has legal borders only with Norway, Finland, Poland, Korea and Mongolia. The legal status of the borders with the Commonwealth republics and China has not been introduced," head of the Russian Federal Service of Geodesy and Cartography Nikolay Zhdanov told ITAR-TASS. The official is attending the sixth session of the Interstate Council for Geodesy, Cartography, Land-Survey and Distant Earth Probing.

In the words of Zhdanov, delimitation and demarcation of borders is a most important problem. The borders must be "closed on terrain", the documents should be

passed over to the United Nations, and the "borders may be open again as it was done in Europe" if the integration policy continues.

Much is still to be done in the sphere of cartography. All maps of the former Soviet Union issued for more than 70 years will have to be printed anew, and Russian regions are lacking even the old maps. The service has issued four million copies of new Russian maps, maps of highways and railroads. This year maps of constituent members of the Russian Federation will be completed.

As for collection of information, the service is planning to use the satellite system in detection of coordinates. Until recently Russian specialists used the U.S. Navstar system, now they will use the Russian Glonass. The nineteen satellites have been launched, and the service still has to start the operation of ground-based observation facilities.

This work has been done for over a decade. St. Petersburg and the Swiss Laika firm are working to create a Russian satellite system for detection of coordinates. In the opinion of Zhdanov, this system will start to function in two or three years.

The creation of digital data banks is another step forward in Russian geodesy and cartography. Russia already has six geo-information centers to be the core of the geo-information control system. A similar system can be used in organization of state power.

'Active Contacts' With PRC Leaders in May-June*MM1804141995 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 95 p 3*

[ITAR-TASS report: "Russia-China: Season of Contacts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow 17 April—May and June promise to become a season of active contacts between the leaders of Russia and China. PRC Chairman Jiang Zemin, who will arrive in Moscow for the ceremonies to mark the 50th anniversary of the Victory, will open a series of mutual visits scheduled for the next two months. It is expected that the Chinese leader will spend two to three days here, and the program for his visit, according to preliminary outlines, will include an address to representatives of the Russian public.

According to the sources in the Russian Foreign Ministry, a routine sitting of the Russian-Chinese Intergovernmental Commission for Trade-Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation may be held before the end of May with the participation of Vice Premiers Oleg Davydov and Li Lanqing. "We reckon that the dates and specific content of the visit by PRC State Council Premier Li Peng will be determined during the process of the preparations for the sitting," one diplomat said.

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At first it was believed that Li Peng might visit Russia in May. However, in connection with the imminent arrival of Jiang Zemin, the visit by the Chinese premier will most likely take place in June, particularly since in accordance with established practice in the PRC, the country's two top leaders cannot visit the same country within the space of one month.

Chinese Authorities Hold Suspected Killers of Border Guard

LD2004102795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0924 GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VLADIVOSTOK, April 20 (Interfax-Eurasia)—Chinese authorities have detained three border trespassers, suspected of killing on April 12 Captain Sergey Dashuk, chief of the Shkolnaya border post in the Pacific border district, the district's press service reported to Interfax on Thursday.

At an earlier meeting with Russian representatives, held at the Kraskino pass in the Khasan region (the Primorye territory, Far East), a Chinese border troops official pledged an early investigation of the incident in keeping with Chinese laws.

During the detention of the three Chinese on April 12, they opened gun fire on a Russian border convoy, led by Dashuk and killed him. Two Chinese were forced back to China, and the third one was wounded and taken into custody. Later, he ran away from the Shkolnaya border post. It is not known how he managed to do so.

Panov Sees 'Substantial Progress' in Russian-Japanese Ties

LD1904141395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1321 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov, in charge of relations with the countries of the Far Eastern region, categorically disagrees with assertions stating that Russian-Japanese relations are experiencing a period "of relative stagnation."

"How can one speak about any stagnation if a representative Russian delegation headed by State Duma speaker Ivan Rybkin is to go to Tokyo on April 27? Political dialogue between our countries is going on," Panov declared in an interview with Interfax Wednesday.

In his words, "there is substantial progress" in the economic sphere. "We have practically coordinated the issue stating that the Japanese party would grant a beneficial semi-government loan to the Russians Federation amounting to \$400 million. In addition there are substantial advances in the implementation of the Sakhalin-1 project providing for joint development of oil and gas fields," Panov said.

He reported that the second round of the Russian-Japanese negotiations on fishery would take place in the near future. "It is likely to be held in Moscow in the first half of May," Panov said.

He found it difficult to say what stands behind assertions in the Japanese press about a kind of "a Russian trace" in the activity of the religious sect Aum Shinrikyo. "I can say quite definitely that there is no proof of the presence of such a trace," he noted.

Panov expressed regret due to repeated violations of the Russian-Chinese border by China's citizens. "This is a seasonal phenomenon. Poachers always become more active in spring on the border. We demand to punish the guilty and meet complete understanding on the part of the Chinese authorities," Panov said.

Moscow on U.S. Efforts To Prevent Cooperation With Iran

NC2004112895 Moscow Voice of Russia World Service in Persian 1500 GMT 19 Apr 95

[Commentary by Sergey Viktorov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed listeners. There is evidence of extraordinary irritation in the United States regarding Iran's nuclear program. Efforts are being made to disrupt Tehran's cooperation with other countries in the field of production of nuclear energy.

However, Washington has not been able to convince Moscow to refrain from honoring its agreement with Iran on completing construction of the nuclear energy power plant in Bushehr and to provide it with a nuclear reactor. We may recall that in the recent talks in the Russian capital, Warren Christopher was clearly made to understand that Russia does not have any intention of canceling this deal. It was probably for this very reason that during his visit to India, President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani which is one in a (series of meetings) of other Iranian figures, expressed confidence that Russia would follow through on its commitments regarding the nuclear deal signed with Tehran.

As far as is known, the White House has decided to influence the PRC, another country cooperating with Iran in the production of nuclear energy. Warren Christopher used the opportunity of the presence of PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at the inauguration of the session of the signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] to request that he not provide Tehran with a nuclear reactor.

In the course of his meeting with his PRC counterpart, the U.S. secretary of state expressed his concern on the proposed delivery of two PRC-made nuclear reactors to Iran would have dangerous repercussions for the entire international community. In addition, Christopher addressed a short news conference in New York and defended his stance by presenting other arguments. He did not even try to conceal the extraordinarily negative

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stance of U.S. officials toward Tehran. According to him, the United States considers Iran a country which supports terrorism in the Near East.

The U.S. secretary of state accused Iranian officials of trying to disrupt the peace trend in the region and trying to manufacture weapons of mass destruction. Christopher said: For this reason, no country should enter into nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Despite this, PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen categorically rejected Christopher's reasoning. He stated that neither international law nor international accords prohibit cooperation for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He added that Beijing respectfully views the U.S. stance but considers its actions to conform with international norms.

Meanwhile, observers state that despite receiving an extremely firm negative response from Moscow and Beijing, the Americans will not remain passive regarding their call for the abrogation of the nuclear accord with Iran. Therefore, the Russian and PRC Governments and experts will hear more on this topic from Washington's emissaries. At least, Qian Qichen accepted the proposal that in the summer, PRC and U.S. experts will discuss the issue of the delivery of a nuclear reactor to Tehran.

Jordan's King Invites Yeltsin to Economic Conference

LD1804181695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1427 GMT 18 Apr 95

[By Aleksandr Zhudro]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 18 (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin received a letter from Jordanian King Husayn, inviting him to attend an international conference on economic development and cooperation in the Middle East due to be held in Amman this autumn.

Russian Foreign Ministry senior spokesman Grigoriy Karasin told reporters that Yeltsin in his letter to Husayn stressed "special importance of economic development of the Middle East" which was given momentum by the last year's economic conference in Casablanca.

Yeltsin's letter expresses confidence that Russia will make a major contribution to the Amman conference.

The president highly praised Jordan's motivation for a comprehensive and fair settlement in the Middle East. He also confirmed that Moscow is set on expanding its relations with Jordan.

Swedish Prime Minister Calls For Reforming UN

LD1904125795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1226 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Vladimir Suprun]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Visiting Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson addressed students and professors of the Moscow Institute of International Relations today as co-chairman of the independent international commission for global government and cooperation which specialises in studying the role played by the United Nations in the world politics.

Carlsson said the commission's main tasks were to study new directions on international cooperation in the post-Cold War world, the building of a new world order in international relations and the adoption of a new style of relations between countries.

On the basis of its analysis of the present world realities and development trends, the commission which brings together prominent figures from a number of countries including Russia has worked out specific proposals for reforming and democratising the U.N. Activity aimed at creating first of all a new global security system, Carlsson said.

The commission proposes an amendment to the U.N. Charter, which would enable the Security Council to act in situations where the security of the population of an individual country is disturbed to a degree which necessitates the world community's reaction.

He said the interpretation of the principle of self-determination needs modification to avert the actual threat to territorial integrity of a country.

The Swedish prime minister came up with an initiative to establish an economic security council as the new main body of the United Nations. The council of that kind would provide an important tool for settling grave economic crisis and would play a key role in coordinating economic aid programmes for economies in transition.

The economic security council would be able to hold meetings at a high political level. It will bring together the leading economic powers and the states representing different regions along with influential regional organisations.

Ingvar Carlsson also proposed reforming the U.N. Security Council by appointing five new permanent members—two from the developed industrialised countries and one from each of the developing regions—Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

As concerns the number of rotating members of the U.N. Security Council, it should be increased from 10 to 13, Carlsson said. This would make the U.N. Security Council more effective and democratic, and increase the number of member-countries supporting its resolutions.

Rybkina, Carlsson Discuss Relations

LD1904184695 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1456 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Apr—State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkina told visiting Swedish Prime

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Minister Ingvar Carlsson at a meeting today that Russia and Sweden should further develop cooperation between their parliaments, trade, and economic relations.

Speaking about Russian-Swedish relations, for his part, the Swedish prime minister stressed that they could be developed further. "Our visit will give a new impetus to the further development of bilateral good-neighborly relations."

At the meeting Rybkin told the head of the Swedish Government about the legislative activity of the State Duma and the parliamentary corpus aimed at settling the military conflict in Chechnya. "I am against the use of force," he stressed.

According to the press center of the Russian parliament's lower house, on the subject of the forthcoming elections, Rybkin noted that "they will take place and the State Duma is actively preparing for the election campaign."

Swedish Premier Pleased With Talks

LD1904213395 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 2010 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Dmitriy Gorokhov and Valeriy Sevryukov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 20 (ITAR-TASS)—Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson said his visit to Moscow gave him an opportunity to discuss with the Russian leadership not only bilateral relations, but also the situation in Europe and the world as a whole.

Carlsson stressed that the talks were particularly important because the two sides could exchange on cooperation and ways to boost trade between the two countries. The Russian market has become more open and flexible and bodes well for the future, he said.

The premier pointed out that Russia's future will largely depend on the results of the upcoming elections which have to lay a foundation for further democratisation of society.

Carlsson said he was pleased with the agreement on the protection of investments, which, he said, meets Russia's long-term interests, and expressed the hope that bilateral economic ties will develop positively and rapidly.

He noted that time has come for Sweden to invest in Russia, adding that if it waits too long other countries may take its place.

At the same time, the premier admitted that there still some problems in bilateral relations, "historic problems." "We do not have full background of (Raoul) Wallenberg. That is important for us," he said, referring to the Swedish diplomat who saved hundreds of Hungarian Jews during World War II and was arrested by the Soviet secret police in 1945.

Carlsson also touched upon the problem of illegal immigrants from third countries who arrive in Sweden through Russia and asked the Russian authorities to

tighten control over the movement of such people. The sides agreed to set up a joint commission to deal with this problem.

Another sore spot was the Chechen conflict. The Swedish prime minister pointed out that the recognition of common values will strengthen peace and help avoid such conflicts in the future.

"It is extremely important to get political, peaceful solutions, and that civilian people do not suffer," he said. Carlsson noted that the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has the opportunity to monitor the situation in the region.

He stressed that one may always try to isolate the country which he thinks is making a mistake. But a better policy would be to tell that country about it through an open dialogue, thus facilitating democratic and constructive processes.

Speaking about NATO's expansion eastward, the Swedish premier said Sweden has no plans to join NATO.

He recalled that Sweden is a non-aligned country and is not a member of the Western European Union, where it acts only as an observer.

"It is up to any individual country to decide its own security policy ... Up to them and up to NATO," he said.

Communist Deputies Meet Yugoslav Leaders in Belgrade

LD1904074895 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English* 0714 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Government officials of the Union Republic of Yugoslavia expressed gratitude to the Russian parliament and its Communist faction for the efforts aiming to secure the lifting of sanctions against Yugoslavia.

The gratitude was expressed in the course of meetings in Belgrade between a delegation from the Communist Party group in the State Duma led by Leonid Petrovskiy and SRY [as received] ministers, members of the leadership of Serbia's ruling Socialist Party, and members of the parliaments of the Union Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

Participants in the meeting expressed mutual interest in strengthening contacts at the inter-party and interparliamentary levels, as well as in the further expansion of cooperation between Russia and Yugoslavia.

The delegation of Russian Communists also met the leaders of the Union of Communists, whose unofficial head is the wife of Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, Mirjana Markovic. The meeting brought to light the commonality of views on the causes of the Yugoslav crisis and ways of its settlement.

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Rybkin Comments on Meeting With Ukraine's Marchuk*LD1904123395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1053 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)— A Ukrainian Supreme Council delegation will arrive in Moscow on 25 April to meet State Duma deputies, Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin told the deputies today. Issues, in particular, those on which Moscow and Kiev have different views, will be discussed in the course of the meeting.

Talking to deputies on the meeting with acting Ukrainian Prime Minister Yevgeniy Marchuk, which took place on Tuesday, the speaker said that he confirmed Russia's position: "The Crimea is an internal problem of Ukraine, however, it should be solved taking into account the will of the peoples who are living in the peninsula".

Ivan Rybkin told the guest that Russia does not see anything wrong in Crimean residents' desire in getting Russian citizenship.

Touching upon the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, chairman of the State Duma, said that "if there is a lack of wisdom to keep its integrity, it will not be able to resist the Turkish fleet, which is being strengthened."

Visit Seen Yielding Few Results*MK1904114095 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 19 Apr 95 pp 1,3*

[Report by Petr Stolyarov: "Visit by Ukraine Prime Minister. Friendship Seems To Be There, But There's Still No Treaty on It"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The shadow of standoff between Kiev and Simferopol continues to hover over Russian-Ukrainian relations. The words from Yeltsin, who is back from vacation, to the effect that Moscow will be ready to sign a treaty of friendship between Russia and Ukraine only when it makes sure Kiev observes the interests of the people of Crimea, is yet another in the string of statements by Russian officials voicing concern over the developments surrounding Crimea. Nor have the "emergency measures" taken by Ukraine President Leonid Kuchma so far yielded any result: Although Yevhen Marchuk, whom he sent to Moscow, did meet yesterday with nearly all Russian leaders, he does not seem to have been able to persuade his interlocutors that Kiev's actions in regard to Crimea violate no "internationally recognized human rights standards."

This situation, however, must have upset the Russian president no less than it did the Ukrainian premier. Meeting with Yevhen Marchuk yesterday, Boris Yeltsin expressed his "great distress" in connection with the fact that Russia could not after all agree with "dear [rodnaya] Ukraine." The president is especially depressed, in his words, by the fact that he has no way to go ahead with an

official visit to Kiev owing to the fact that a number of important problems of bilateral relations remain unsolved. For his part, Marchuk ventured the hope that in the course of the present talks the sides may after all succeed in agreeing on all the moot points that prevent the signing of a broad-scale Russian-Ukrainian treaty—in particular the problems of the Black Sea Fleet, of border demarcation, and of dual citizenship.

In the meantime, Marchuk's talks with First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets, which opened the Ukrainian visitor's itinerary, gave no special cause for optimism. The discussion of the first question—division of the Black Sea Fleet—revealed considerable differences in the sides' positions. Whereas Marchuk presumed that the present talks may solve the Black Sea Fleet problem "by 95 percent," Admiral Kasatonov, first deputy commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, who took part in the meeting, described Ukraine's concessions in this matter as secondary and the Ukrainian approach as being on the whole "discriminatory and unacceptable for Russia." Nor was it, to all appearances, possible to agree on the questions of borders and dual citizenship: It is perhaps this circumstance that prompted Soskovets' suggestion that these problems be excluded from the general treaty and formalized in a separate agreement after the treaty has been ratified, which would remove one of the main obstacles to Yeltsin's visit to Kiev.

It seems, however, that they will not let the visitor go back home totally empty-handed: work on other agreements to be signed together with a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership is moving along much more successfully. In particular, the Ukrainian premier proposed to sign, within the framework of the current visit, an agreement on legal assistance and to initial a document on forming joint financial-industrial groups (whose Russian godfather is the self-same Soskovets). Ready for signing are also other agreements on cooperation in the field of economy, science, and culture, which would hardly cause special differences.

Adding another fly to the ointment of Russian-Ukrainian relations yesterday was Andrey Vavilov, Russian first deputy finance minister. In his words, Ukraine fully honors the terms of the agreement on restructuring its debts to Russia signed by Soskovets in Kiev recently. This made the co-author of this document rather happy: the first vice premier noted that as a result of the agreements he signed, "payments are regularly coming from Ukraine for the first time in two years."

One of course can argue (something that is indeed taking place stormily in the State Duma) about how timely the reaching of the agreements on Ukraine debt restructuring was for Russia. At any rate, the IMF granted a credit to Ukraine after some hesitation, and understandings with the IMF indeed provided for debt agreements (with Russia, among others). The point of the present stage in the Russian-Ukrainian talks presided over by Soskovets is that understandings with Kiev are no longer

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a single "package" primarily because such bitter things as the Black Sea Fleet, debts, and dual citizenship (flatly rejected by Kiev) have been taken out of it. That is to say, all the things that Moscow, which is in a clearly heavier economic weight division, could have used as certain levers of pressure. Time will tell if this is going to help strengthen friendship with "dear Ukraine." But if one is to follow such logic, Yeltsin would have to take back his tough words on settling relations between Simferopol and Kiev as being an essential condition for holding the summit.

Aide Comments on Yeltsin-Marchuk Meeting

LD1904142995 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1347 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Dmitriy Ryurikov, assistant to the Russian president, replied to questions by ITAR-TASS here on Wednesday [19 April] concerning the results of a meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, which was held in the Kremlin on Tuesday. Here are questions and answers:

Q: Could you describe in greater detail how the meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Yevhen Marchuk was held?

A: The meeting lasted about 40 minutes. Its tonality—complete frankness. Yeltsin clearly intimated: non-compliance of the Ukrainian side at the talks on the Black Sea Fleet and the way of conducting talks do not conform to the spirit of relations between friends and neighbours.

Q: Is there any headway on the political treaty? Is it possible to regard this document as agreed upon?

A: The president repeatedly analysed differences between the sides on territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. He painstakingly examined all arguments and decided that Kiev's proposal can be adopted according to a wording: The sides "confirm inviolability of borders". The president put it frankly that if Ukraine had apprehensions over the Crimea because of this wording, they are futile: Russia has no territorial claims to Ukraine.

Today's compromise is a serious step to meet Ukraine halfway, the president stressed.

Q: What was the sides' agreement on the Black Sea Fleet?

A: No understanding has been reached so far. Yeltsin frankly appraised the Ukrainian side's approaches to the question of the fleet. "We now agree, then disagree, now take decisions, then reject them because of this position," he said. "Friends and neighbours do not behave like this. It is necessary to respect your partner after all."

The president also spoke rather sharply about the situation when the Ukrainian side, signing the agreement on restructuring debts, refused to take a constructive approach to Russia's proposals on the Black Sea Fleet.

He called this an attempt to outwit, "to trap" Russia. "This will not do, it is necessary to behave honestly", he said.

"We, for instance, do not intend to trap Ukraine with anything." The president remained dissatisfied with proposals brought to Moscow and noted that the Russian position recorded in the previous agreements on the fleet, is just, objective and moral. Russia will not depart from them. Sufficient number of agreements was concluded on the fleet, and it is difficult to count the number of expert meetings. But there is no headway.

Yeltsin suggested that Ukrainian side should draw conclusions, and if there is no movement to meet Russia halfway, Moscow will evidently review the understandings on economic and financial issues, reached with Ukraine.

Black Sea Fleet Issue Still Bodevils Ties With Ukraine

MM2004092495 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 20 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[Report by Vasilii Starov: "No Sign of Visit Yet. Moscow-Kiev: Still Not Moving Toward Each Other"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that the reception in Moscow at the highest level for acting Ukrainian Premier Marchuk coincided with the latest intra-Crimean complications has confirmed yet again that Russia is reluctant to stand charged of any interference in the neighboring state's internal affairs. It is another matter that the same day Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev toughly confirmed our readiness to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the near abroad by every means, up to and including force. The question now is: Whom can Russia formally place under its protection in Ukraine?

Indeed, despite substantial progress in coordinating purely economic problems with the Marchuk delegation (and it was very representative!) a number of questions were by tradition either left "up in the air" once again or diplomatically placed outside of the planned main inter-state agreement.

In particular, Ukraine made no bones about dismissing the dual citizenship option—as agreed between Russia and Turkmenistan, for instance—while at the same time showing no understanding for the special model developed by Russia and Kazakhstan. We would recall that Moscow and Almaty agreed to a flexible system for residents of the neighboring countries to acquire citizenship by resettling—even temporarily—from Kazakhstan to Russia and vice versa.

As a result, this problem was left to one side and will probably be covered by a special agreement in the future. This means that Russia, which confirmed through its president its attention to human rights—not least in the Crimea—still retains some room for maneuver.

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Incidentally, it is not just different approaches to the citizenship problem that is stopping Boris Yeltsin from flying to Kiev. Once again both government delegations could not get to grips with the problem of the Black Sea Fleet destroyers, which have proved impossible to divide up for a few years now.

This time too no formula for resolving the Fleet conundrum was found following the Ukrainian acting premier's visit to Moscow. And to a certain extent this Fleet dead end was officially confirmed. The Russian Fleet leadership was not embarrassed to talk about direct discrimination against Russian interests. Once again the 18-month-old option of dividing up the Fleet fairly—50-50—was mooted. But it is still not certain that this option will be adopted in the final draft. For this reason it is quite likely that Marchuk's visit was not the last but maybe the penultimate step on the road to achieving a Russian-Ukrainian summit, and O. Soskovets may have to travel to Kiev once again.

For the same reason the Ukrainian prime minister's assumption that the Russian president could be in Kiev before 10 May probably seems overly optimistic. It was clearly no accident that Marchuk himself added to this prediction the rider that it was a profoundly subjective view.

Incidentally, the history of relations between the newly independent states contains many examples of direct contacts between heads of state making it possible to achieve decisive "breakthroughs." That is why for many observers the stance taken by Russian President Boris Yeltsin was particularly noteworthy. Yet, greeting Yevgeniy Marchuk, the president stressed yet again his sincere sadness about the "stagnation" in Russian-Ukrainian relations:

"We have reached agreement with Belarus, we have reached agreement with Kazakhstan; but we cannot reach agreement with dear Ukraine, with which we have lived in harmony for so many centuries and millennia. This is all the more annoying given that the presidents on both sides support this process. I have not even been able to make an official visit, because a number of issues remain unresolved."

Summing up the results of the talks, Boris Yeltsin stressed that the Russian side, taking account of the repeated insistent requests and wishes expressed by the Ukrainian leadership, could agree to the proposed formula for a political agreement on territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders. This, the Russian president noted, would be a major step in the direction of our partner which should be properly assessed. And Russia is not "giving away" anything—the formulas in such cases may differ, but the main thing is that common sense and goodwill be in evidence.

In principle the sides could have once again, at least verbally, confirmed their goodwill—which, however, has not always been backed up over the past few months by

a readiness to make mutual concessions or to compromise. Consequently, the delay in concluding the agreement that has been caused by somebody's uncompromising attitude can only exacerbate old and somewhat dulled contradictions. And we must assume that there is a growing realization of this in both Moscow and Kiev.

'Sharp' Tajik Reaction to Kozyrev Remarks Explored

LD1904203795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1927 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Yuriy Kozlov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—A Russian Foreign Ministry official expressed "extreme surprise" at the Tajik opposition delegation's sharp reaction to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's remarks at the intra-Tajik talks in Moscow on Wednesday.

The official said the delegation "called the very continuation of the talks in Moscow in question."

At the same time, Kozyrev only outlined Russia's approach towards peace settlement in Tajikistan and gave his assessment of the situation in the region, a statement issued by the Foreign Ministry said.

Having denounced military actions against CIS border guards which had resulted in heavy casualties, Kozyrev called for an immediate end to such provocations and warned that their continuation would meet an adequate response with the use of all necessary means.

The Russian foreign minister also stressed that escalation of hostilities will lead nowhere. Russia sees no alternative to a negotiated settlement in Tajikistan, he added. Kozyrev urged both sides to resume dialogue and confirmed that Russia and other CIS states will do their best to support the negotiating process.

The ministry official also recalled that after agreement had been reached in principle to hold the talks in Moscow "without any pre-conditions," the opposition's chief negotiator Ali Akbar Turajonzoda made several attempts to put forth a number of conditions.

"In this connection, the question arises whether the opposition's demarche is yet another excuse to avoid a discussion of the substance, primarily an immediate cessation of hostilities," the ministry's statement said.

The Russian Foreign Ministry considers such manoeuvres "unacceptable and inappropriate" and urges the opposition to "be constructive and start a serious discussion of all issues at the negotiating table."

"On the whole, responsibility for the negotiating process lays on both Tajik sides for they should and can find ways to resolve the problems confronting their country," the statement said.

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"As regards the Russian side, it consistently and firmly advocates the resolution of the conflict exclusively by political means on a mutually acceptable basis and with respect for the vital interests of the people of Tajikistan," it said.

The peace talks broke up in disarray earlier today after the Tajik opposition delegation led by Turajonzoda walked out of the room.

"Using his right to appraise the latest developments in Badakhshan, Mr. Kozyrev threatened to use all Russia's military power. We consider these threats inappropriate for the aims and spirit of political consultations", Turajonzoda said in a statement.

The statement also said that Russia had not created "elementary conditions for normal and safe work" of the negotiating parties.

The opposition believes it "inadmissible to proceed with the talks under such conditions" and reserves the right to appeal to the talks organiser, U.N. special envoy Ramiro Piriz Balloa, to consider invitations from other states to host the intra-Tajik negotiations, according to the document.

Meanwhile a representative of the Tajik opposition told ITAR-TASS that his delegation "is ready to resume consultations, if the Russian Government presents appropriate explanations".

Kozyrev Use of Armed Force Statement Viewed

MM1904151595 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 95 pp 1, 3

[Report by Konstantin Eggert and Maksim Yusin: "Kozyrev Becoming 'Power' Minister?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A session of the Russian Foreign Policy Council which did not presage any special surprises was marked by a sensational statement by Andrey Kozyrev: Moscow could employ every means, right up to the use of armed force, to protect the Russian-speaking population in the former Soviet republics.

Not perhaps since the time of the scandalous Stockholm speech has a statement by the Russian foreign minister attracted such attention. But whereas in December 1992 in the Swedish capital Kozyrev merely played a part, portraying himself as a national-patriot, and 40 minutes later turned his statement into a joke, this time he was frighteningly serious.

Even Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma committee for international affairs, who traditionally holds tougher positions with regard to the countries of the near abroad, preferred to distance himself from the Foreign Ministry chief's statement. "Our state's forces are becoming smaller and smaller and there is an increasing number of power ministers," he said in an interview with the EKHO MOSKVY radio station.

"It seems that Kozyrev has completely forgotten his own arguments which he used so convincingly just a couple of years ago in disputes with the national-patriots. At the time he fought for a system of interstate treaties reliably defending the rights of Russians in the near abroad," Sergey Yushenkov, chairman of the State Duma defense committee, noted in a telephone conversation with IZVESTIYA. "The foreign minister's speech complicates relations with the West still further when they have already been aggravated because of the war in Chechnya. Whereas previously it was customary to speak of 'two Kozyrevs'—the liberal and the great-power supporter—now only one is left: The one who threatened the world from the rostrum in Stockholm."

The minister seems to be acquiring new allies. Kozyrev's speech at the Foreign Policy Council generated approval from his recent implacable opponent, General Aleksandr Lebed, who last week was elected chairman of the congress of Russian communities.

The Foreign Ministry has already begun to receive news of perplexed and sometimes angry responses abroad. One could understand from a talk with Grigoriy Karasin, director of the information and press department, that Kozyrev did not deliver a specially prepared speech. The words which have met with such a wide response were heard during the debates and were essentially a form of thinking aloud. In the diplomat's opinion, the Baltic countries, which took the minister's statement to be aimed at themselves, need not be worried: Matters will hardly reach the point of the use of the Russian army to protect the national minorities in Latvia and Estonia whose political rights have been infringed. Theoretically the use of armed force is possible only if there is a direct threat to the lives of Russians in any neighboring state.

It is characteristic that the minister, who could not fail to predict the response to his statements, has not made such explanations. And he seems deliberately to have given a pretext for the most diverse interpretations. If you wish you can include among the targets of future acts of intimidation Ukraine, which is oppressing the Russians in Crimea, and Kazakhstan, not to mention the Baltic republics.

It looks as though Kozyrev, who recently stated the desire to run for parliament again, has already begun his election campaign and his words are intended mainly for domestic consumption. The model of a democrat and "Westernizer," Andrey Vladimirovich probably believes, will not secure him the electorate's votes and so he is offering the public the more fashionable mask of a guardian of great-powerdom.

Among the "patriotically" minded section of society there is a widespread opinion that Russia should defend its compatriots as resolutely as the United States, which unhesitatingly sent troops to Grenada and Panama as soon as a threat to Americans' lives arose. Here one fact of some importance is overlooked: Washington is acting for people who have U.S. passports and can justify its

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actions from the viewpoint of international law. While Kozyrev proposes defining compatriots along ethnic lines: The overwhelming majority of those whom the minister intends to defend with the aid of the army are not Russian citizens. If this approach prevails in the Kremlin then conflicts which will make the wars in the Balkans pale into insignificance could break out over the expanse of the former USSR.

Foreign diplomats accredited to Moscow greeted with alarm the new trends in Russian foreign policy. "The reasons for the toughening of the Foreign Ministry's line are not entirely comprehensible to us, considering that there is an official program, with which everyone is familiar, for protecting compatriots abroad," IZVESTIYA was told by the adviser to the embassy of one EU country. Another Western diplomat believes that Kozyrev has made a professional blunder by making such a risky statement just days before the arrival in Moscow of the heads of the biggest powers and the official visit by U.S. President Bill Clinton.

His own department was also ambivalent about Kozyrev's statements. "The minister chose an extremely bad time for his rejoinder," a high-ranking diplomat who wishes to remain anonymous believes. "For instance, positive advances had now emerged in our relations with the Baltic states. But now, after such incautious words, the atmosphere will probably deteriorate. It is also surprising that Andrey Vladimirovich has drawn no distinction between the concepts of 'citizens' and 'compatriots.'"

Kozyrev Reiterates Warning on Russians Abroad

LD2004123095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1159 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By Andrey Kirillov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 20 (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev reiterated on Thursday his stance that Russia may use force "in exceptional cases" to defend compatriots abroad.

Speaking to reporters, Kozyrev, at the same time, rejected all accusations of new imperialism in Russia's foreign policy.

"We favour peaceful solutions and oppose the gunboat diplomacy. But in exceptional cases, when there is no other way to defend our compatriots, Russian citizens in the first place, we, like any other state, have the right and may use force", the minister said.

"Why then do we need the Armed Forces for", Kozyrev added.

According to the Russian minister, there is nothing new about his statement, from the viewpoint of international law. He referred to a hypothetical situation when pirates attack a Russian vessel in the Indian Ocean, as an example of such an "exceptional situation".

Further on Kozyrev Statement Reiteration

LD1904184595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1827 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Lyudmila Yermakova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev confirmed on Wednesday his recent warning that Moscow may use force to protect the rights of Russians living abroad.

Speaking at a naval party in the Kremlin, Kozyrev said that his remarks were "neither a slip of the tongue, nor a pre-election ruse."

"I do not support the gunboats (diplomacy), I am far from policy from the position of strength, but many examples exist when other states sent and are still ready to send their battleships to protect their citizens, far from their native coast", the minister said.

The use of force shall not be excluded from a store of means to defend our compatriots abroad, he reiterated adding that "if lives of our citizens are under menace from terrorists or some other forces, I am sure, our Armed Forces, including the navy will be able to defend them."

Ministry Spokesman on Reaction to Statement

LD2004100395 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0910 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 20 Apr—It is hard to understand the excessive emotions of a number of states and mass media regarding the legitimate determination to act in defense of compatriots' interests expressed during recent appearances by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev, a senior Russian Foreign Ministry representative told the ITAR-TASS correspondent today.

The use of armed force in a number of specific situations falls entirely within the framework of international practice and is widely used by many countries, including the United States and France, he noted. That is why such a reaction to the minister's statements is not entirely comprehensible.

There seems to be a desire to classify Russia as one of the poorly developed states, "junior partners," with no right to their own voice or to a reasonable position, the Foreign Ministry representative said. Russia will continue in the future to undertake all possible measures and actions to defend the interests of the Russian-speaking population abroad, he stressed.

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Moscow Laments West's View of Chechnya Reconstruction

LD1904115295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1130
GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 19 (INTERFAX)—Moscow is disappointed with the West's reaction to Russia's efforts to restore the Chechen economy.

In an interview with INTERFAX Wednesday, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's European Cooperation Department Yuriy Ushakov expressed surprise that the recent decision to send to Chechnya an OSCE mission is considered by the West as "something usual".

"When the decision was under discussion, leaders in all capitals, including in the countries of the European Union, said that Moscow's consent to receive the OSCE mission is an important step, a signal of the beginning of a new period, including within the context of improving our mutual understanding," he said.

According to Ushakov, Moscow's consent to receive the OSCE mission "symbolizes Russia's openness and readiness to allow foreign representatives into the zone of

internal conflict." "This was a difficult decision. For the first time, a large power agreed to take such a step, which creates an important precedent," he said.

"Russia feels keenly about the Chechen crisis and is doing everything possible to resolve it as early as possible and enter into a new stage, the restoration of Chechnya," said the diplomat. Unfortunately, the West ignores this obvious circumstance. Naturally, such a reaction causes Moscow's disappointment."

Ushakov is sure that "Russia's consent to receive the OSCE mission is also a great step in terms of the OSCE's growing role in European matters".

The diplomat noted that Russia not only had taken a political decision but ensured the possibility of the earliest beginning of the OSCE mission's activities by its practical actions. "The head of the OSCE group, Sandor Mesaros, has already visited Chechnya. Premises and all other necessary things were found for him in Groznyy. In other words, great progress is evident. It is counterproductive to ignore it and continue the criticism against Russia," he said.

Political Issues

Gaydar on NATO, Chechnya, Yeltsin

BR1904081195 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE
in Danish 18 Apr 95 p 8

[Report on interview with Yegor Gaydar, leader of Russia's Choice, by Flemming Rose in Moscow; no date given: "Gaydar: NATO No Threat to Russia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—Yegor Gaydar, the architect of Russian reforms three years ago and now leader of the largest group in the Russian parliament, is convinced that an expansion of NATO does not represent any threat at all to Russia. The 39-year-old Gaydar also understands the wish of the countries of Eastern and Central Europe to become NATO members and in this way be admitted to the exclusive club of stable Western democracies.

"You have to have a stunted consciousness or be a total idiot to be able to believe that countries like Denmark or Norway could begin an aggressive crusade against Russia. A regular feature of the second half of the twentieth century is that efficient and successful democracies do not start wars. They can be drawn into wars by others, but they do not start them themselves," Yegor Gaydar said in a conversation with BERLINGSKE TIDENDE.

Gaydar will arrive for his first visit to Denmark on Friday [21 April] and he will take part in a conference on European security and defense policy arranged by "Europe 2000."

However, despite NATO's peaceful intentions toward NATO Gaydar is convinced that NATO does not have the key to the solution to the threats to international security in the shape of regional wars and conflicts, terrorism, and the like. According to Gaydar, the war in Bosnia has demonstrated with all the necessary clarity NATO's limitations and the need for new thinking.

"I am convinced that the question of NATO expansion will be exploited in the internal political battle in Russia and this will not make life easier for me and those who share my views in an election year. Our political opponents will use NATO expansion to spread hysteria and xenophobia among the Russian population. I think that in their deliberations our partners in the West and in Eastern Europe should remember that the democrats are not the only actors on the political stage in Russia."

[Rose] What do you think would be the best new security order in Europe, if NATO—as you say—has carried out its mission and outlived itself?

[Gaydar] If the aim is the stabilization of Russian democracy, then we have to start work on establishing new defense alliances, alliances which are independent of the traditional confrontation between East and West and which are able to meet the new security challenges

we are facing. I do not want to name organizations and forums, but am talking about a basic logic in developments. [Gaydar ends]

Last fall Yegor Gaydar published the book, "State and Evolution." In it the Russian economist and reform politician outlines Russia's historic dilemma on the threshold of the 21st century. According to Gaydar, Russia has never been part of the democracies and market economies of the West which are founded on private ownership, because power and property have always been identical in Russian society.

Private ownership has never been inviolable in Russia and this has been the large country's eternal misfortune. On the contrary, those in power have always been free to confiscate and redistribute valuables and property as they saw fit—without any consideration of the rights of the individual.

Gaydar stressed that the decisive historic battle in Russia will be fought over private ownership. The outcome of this battle will determine whether or not Russia becomes a stable democracy.

[Rose] Will the right of ownership be enshrined in predictable legislation which guarantees the individual's rights, or is there a risk of a shift in power which would mean the undermining of the right of ownership and which would therefore give rise to new historic turbulence and revolutions?

[Gaydar] The political, social, and parliamentary struggle will turn on this axis for at least 10 years. We have won a great victory in the adoption of a civil code which for the first time sets private and public ownership side by side. On the other hand we have not succeeded in adopting laws on securities, on guarantees for shareholders, and on the right to the private ownership of land.

So far the legal system has always been anti-private. Our historic task is to turn the whole of the legal system around so that the rights of private owners are guaranteed.

[Rose] How do you see the outcome of this battle?

[Gaydar] We are not guaranteed a victory, but we are not doomed to defeat either. If we avoid new historic dislocations, discontinuity, and social disasters, the wheels of history will undoubtedly turn and we will be able to establish the necessary institutions to safeguard private ownership. But I repeat: This is a long-term historical prospect.

If in the next elections we have a victory for those political forces which do not want to preserve the democratic institutions and which distance themselves from private ownership and the market economy, there is a real danger of a setback.

[Rose] Will the Russian democrats come together in the next election?

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[Gaydar] I believe that the chances of this are greater than in the previous election in December 1993 when no one took the national socialist and communist threat seriously. Today there is a greater awareness of this danger and this increases the chances of the democrats marching in step.

[Rose] What role has the war in Chechnya played for developments in Russia?

[Gaydar] The war in Chechnya is a violent blow to the prospect of stable democracy in Russia. The war has been a great danger to Russia's strategic interests which are directed toward integration with the Western world. The Council of Europe's rejection of Russia is a splendid illustration of this. You do not behave in the way that Russia has behaved in Chechnya, if you want to be a member of the Council of Europe.

On the other hand, since the start of the year the government has realized the hopelessness of a half-hearted policy of reform and this gives rise to hopes of real economic and financial stability in 1995. According to our calculations, in the second half of 1995 inflation will fluctuate between 2 and 4 percent a month. [Gaydar ends]

Gaydar regrets the fact that the Russian media coverage of the war in Chechnya is not critical, as it was in the first phase of the bloody events. He believes this is linked to two circumstances.

[Gaydar] First, it is a consequence of the authorities' consistent pressure on the media which has not been brutal or had the character of an ultimatum, but which little by little has made itself felt. Second, the changed media picture is linked to the working conditions of the press itself.

In the first phase of the war when Dudayev still controlled most of Chechnya, journalists could work on that side of the front and see the Chechens' defensive war for themselves. As the Russian troops have gained the upper hand and the press have seen events from Russian tanks and the other side of the front, the picture has changed. It is psychologically understandable that your own place on the battlefield influences evaluations and emphases.

[Rose] How much has the war cost?

[Gaydar] That is difficult to say, because there are no reliable statistics to measure this. But it has not had any decisive influence on the national budget, even though there have been a number of indirect negative effects. We had high interest rates in December and January. We saw panic on the money markets in the same period and a promised loan from the IMF was delayed.

[Rose] How big is the Russian defense budget today?

[Gaydar] In 1994 the defense budget amounted to 4.3 percent of GNP. That is the maximum that the Russian economy can manage at present, and it would of course be a good thing if the money were being used sensibly,

but it is not. When I joined the government three years ago, defense spending was 12 to 13 percent, so we have succeeded in reducing military spending by two-thirds.

[Rose] What is your assessment of Yeltsin. What has happened to him since he stood at the head of Russia's democrats three years ago?

[Gaydar] Yeltsin is a politician first and foremost. He has an acute perception of what is on the move in society. Of course, he himself has influence over the mood, but he is also influenced by it.

I believe that the election result in December 1993, when it was shown that an adventurist politician like Zhirnovskiy could win over 20 percent of the vote, had a great influence on Yeltsin's reorientation.

It made him adjust his political course. Yeltsin's change of course is therefore largely a reaction to the falling popularity of democracy in Russia. Nevertheless I believe that Yeltsin's belief in certain democratic principles is genuine.

I know that after the start of the war in Chechnya he was under great pressure to bring the press to heel and cancel the forthcoming elections. However, he said no to this and this gives cause for a little optimism.

New State Security Law

MM1304140995 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 95 pp 9-10

[Russian Federation Federal Law No. 40-FZ "On Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation" adopted by the State Duma 22 February 1995, signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, and dated 3 April 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Chapter I. General Provisions

Article 1. Federal Security Service [FSB] Organs and Their Mission

FSB organs are a component part of the forces safeguarding Russian Federation security and within the bounds of their remit safeguard the security of the individual, society, and the state.

The president of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation direct the activity of FSB organs.

Article 2. The System of FSB Organs

FSB organs represent a unified centralized system, which includes:

the Russian Federation FSB;

directorates (departments) of the Russian Federation FSB for individual regions and components of the Russian Federation (territorial security organs);

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directorates (departments) of the Russian Federation FSB within the Russian Federation Armed Forces, troops, and other military formations, and also within their organs of command and control (security organs within the troops).

Territorial security organs and security organs within the troops are directly subordinate to the Russian Federation FSB.

FSB organs have under their jurisdiction enterprises, educational establishments, research, expert, and military-medical establishments and subunits, military-construction subunits, special training centers, and also special-purpose subunits.

The creation of FSB organs not envisaged by this Federal Law is not permitted.

The creation of organizational structures and the activity of political parties and mass public movements which pursue political objectives, as well as political campaigning and the conducting of election campaigns is prohibited in FSB organs.

Article 3. The Russian Federation FSB

The Russian Federation FSB is a federal executive organ.

The Russian Federation FSB creates territorial security organs and security organs within the troops, directs them, organizes their activity, issues normative acts within the bounds of its remit, and directly implements the main avenues of FSB organs' activity.

The structure and organization of the Russian FSB's activity are determined by the Statute on the Russian Federation FSB, ratified by the president of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation FSB is headed by the director of the Russian Federation FSB with the status of a federal minister. The military rank of army general corresponds to the post of director of the Russian Federation FSB.

Article 4. The Legal Base for the Activity of FSB Organs

The Russian Federation Constitution, this Federal Law, other federal laws, and other normative legal acts adopted by federal organs of state power form the legal base for the activity of FSB organs.

The activity of FSB organs is also implemented in accordance with the Russian Federation's international treaties.

Article 5. The Principles Governing the Activity of FSB Organs

The activity of FSB organs is implemented on the basis of the following principles:

legality;

respect for and observance of human and civil rights and freedoms;

humanity;

the unity of the system of FSB organs and the centralization of their administration;

secrecy [konspiratsiya], a blend of public and private methods and means of activity.

Article 6. Observance of Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms in the Activity of FSB Organs

The state guarantees observance of human and civil rights and freedoms during FSB organs' performance of their activity. The limitation of human and civil rights and freedoms is not permitted save in cases envisaged by federal constitutional and federal laws.

A person who thinks that FSB organs or their officials have violated his rights and freedoms is entitled to appeal to a higher FSB organ, the prosecutor's office, or a court regarding the actions of the aforesaid organs and officials.

State organs, enterprises, establishments, and organizations, irrespective of their form of ownership, as well as public associations and citizens have the right in accordance with Russian Federation legislation to obtain explanations and information from FSB organs should their rights and freedoms be limited.

State organs, enterprises, establishments, and organizations, irrespective of their form of ownership, as well as public associations and citizens are entitled to demand compensation from FSB organs for physical and emotional damage incurred as a result of actions taken by FSB organs' officials in the course of their official duties.

Information obtained in the course of FSB organs' activity about a citizen's private life, information pertaining to his honor and dignity, or information which may be detrimental to his legitimate interests cannot be reported by FSB organs to anyone whatsoever without the voluntary consent of the citizen, save in cases envisaged by federal laws.

Should the personnel of FSB organs violate human and civil rights and freedoms the leader of the relevant FSB organ, the prosecutor, or the judge is obliged to take steps to restore these rights and freedoms, provide compensation for the damage incurred, and institute proceedings against the culprits as envisaged by Russian Federation legislation.

Officials of FSB organs who have abused their authority or engaged in ultra vires activity are accountable as envisaged by Russian Federation legislation.

Article 7. Protection of Information on FSB Organs

Citizens of the Russian Federation who are employed for military service (work) in FSB organs and also who are given access to information about FSB organs undergo a

procedure clearing them for access to information which constitutes a state secret provided that Russian Federation legislation makes no provision for any other procedure. This procedure includes a pledge not to divulge this information.

Citizens of the Russian Federation with access to information about FSB organs which constitutes a state secret are accountable for the disclosure of the aforesaid information as envisaged by Russian Federation legislation.

Documents and materials containing information regarding the personnel of FSB organs and people who are providing or have provided them with confidential assistance, as well as information regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and means by which FSB organs carry out counterintelligence, intelligence, and operational-investigative activity shall be kept in FSB organs' archives.

FSB organs' archive material which is of historical and scientific value and which is declassified in accordance with Russian legislation shall be transferred to Russian State Archive Service archives for storage in accordance with the procedure laid down by Russian Federation legislation.

Chapter II. The Main Avenues in the Activity of FSB Organs

Article 8. The Activity of FSB Organs

The activity of FSB organs is implemented in the following main avenues:

counterintelligence activity;

crime-fighting.

Intelligence activity and other avenues in the activity of FSB organs are defined by this Federal Law and other federal laws.

Video and audio information systems, film and photographs, and other technical and other systems—technical and otherwise—may be used to document the activity of FSB organs and its results.

The activity of FSB organs and the methods and systems employed by them must not be hazardous to human life and health or harmful to the environment.

Article 9. Counterintelligence Activity

Counterintelligence activity is the activity of FSB organs within the bounds of their remit to detect, avert, and suppress intelligence and other activity on the part of foreign states' special services and organizations and also individuals aimed at damaging Russian Federation security.

The following are grounds for FSB organs to carry out counterintelligence activity:

a) the existence of information regarding signs of intelligence and other activity by foreign states' special services and organizations and also by individuals aimed at inflicting damage on Russian Federation security;

b) the need to protect information which constitutes a state secret;

c) the need to observe (monitor) people who provide or have provided FSB organs with confidential assistance;

d) the need to ensure their own security. The list of grounds for counterintelligence activity is exhaustive and can only be changed or supplemented by federal laws. In the process of counterintelligence activity FSB organs can use public and private methods and systems, the special nature of which is determined by the conditions of this activity.

The procedure governing the use of private methods and systems in counterintelligence activity is determined by Russian Federation FSB normative acts.

The implementation of counterintelligence activity pertaining to the secrecy of citizens' correspondence, telephone conversations, mail, cable, and other communications is permitted only on the basis of a court ruling in accordance with the procedure envisaged by Russian Federation legislation.

The implementation of counterintelligence activity pertaining to the inviolability of a citizen's abode is permitted only in cases laid down by federal law or on the basis of a court ruling.

In order to obtain a court ruling entitling them to implement counterintelligence activity in cases envisaged by Parts 6 and 7 of this article, FSB organs submit at the court's request official documents detailing the grounds for their implementation of counterintelligence activity (save official-operational documents containing information regarding people who provide or have provided FSB organs with confidential assistance and also regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and systems used to implement counterintelligence activity).

The court ruling entitling FSB organs to implement counterintelligence activity and the materials which provide the grounds for the adoption of the aforesaid ruling shall be stored by FSB organs in accordance with the procedure laid down by this Federal Law.

An FSB decree regarding the implementation of counterintelligence activity and the court ruling on it, as well as the operational case materials, are submitted to Prosecutor's Office organs solely in cases where the Prosecutor's Office is conducting checks in accordance with oversight procedure on materials, information, and appeals by citizens, which it has received and which attest to FSB organs' violation of Russian Federation legislation.

Information regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and system used in the implementation of counterintelligence activity constitutes a state secret.

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Article 10. Crime-Fighting

FSB organs, in accordance with Russian Federation legislation, implement operational-investigative measures to detect, avert, suppress, and expose espionage, terrorist activity, organized crime, corruption, illegal arms and drugs trafficking, smuggling, and other crimes, whose investigation [doznaniye] and preliminary examination [sledstviye] are ascribed by law to their jurisdiction, and also to detect, avert, suppress, and expose the activity of illegal armed formations, criminal groups, individuals, and public associations which aim to forcibly change the Russian Federation constitutional system.

FSB organs may also be assigned other tasks in the sphere of crime-fighting by federal laws and other normative legal acts.

The activity of FSB organs in the sphere of crime-fighting is implemented in accordance with the Russian Federation Law "On Operational-Investigative Activity in the Russian Federation," Russian Federation criminal and criminal-procedural legislation, and also this Federal Law.

Article 11. Intelligence Activity

Intelligence activity is implemented by FSB organs within the bounds of their remit and in collaboration with Russian Federation foreign intelligence organs with a view to obtaining information regarding threats to Russian Federation security.

The procedure for and conditions governing collaboration between FSB organs and Russian Federation foreign intelligence organs are laid down on the basis of corresponding agreements between them or joint normative acts.

The procedure for conducting intelligence measures, as well as the procedure governing the use of secret methods and systems during the implementation of intelligence activity, is laid down by Russian Federation FSB normative acts.

Information regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and systems used for the implementation of intelligence activity constitutes a state secret.

Chapter III. The Authorities of FSB Organs**Article 12. The Duties of FSB Organs**

FSB organs are obliged:

a) to brief the president of the Russian Federation, the chairman of the Russian Federation Government, and, on their instructions, federal organs of state power and also Russian Federation components' organs of state power on threats to the security of the Russian Federation;

b) to detect, avert, and suppress intelligence and other activity by foreign states' special services and organizations and also by individuals aimed at damaging the security of the Russian Federation;

c) to procure intelligence information in the interests of safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation and enhancing its economic, scientific-technical, and defense potential;

d) to detect, avert, and suppress crimes, whose investigation and preliminary examination are ascribed by Russian Federation legislation to the jurisdiction of FSB organs; to investigate people who have committed or are suspected of having committed the aforesaid crimes;

e) to detect, avert, and suppress acts of terrorism;

f) to formulate and implement in collaboration with other state organs measures to combat corruption, illegal arms and drugs trafficking, smuggling, and the activity of illegal armed formations, criminal groups, individuals, and public associations which aim to forcibly change the constitutional system of the Russian Federation;

g) to safeguard within the bounds of their remit security within the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Russian Federation Border Troops, the Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs Internal Troops, the troops of the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency under the Russian Federation president, the Russian Federation Railroad Troops, the Russian Federation Civil Defense Troops, and other military formations, security within their organs of command and control, and also within internal affairs organs, federal tax police organs, federal government communications and information organs, and Russian Federation customs organs;

h) to safeguard within the bounds of their remit the security of defense complex, nuclear power, transport, and communications facilities, the vital services of major cities and industrial centers, and other strategic installations, as well as security in the sphere of space research and top-priority scientific developments;

i) to safeguard within the bounds of their remit the security of federal organs of state power and Russian Federation components' organs of state power;

j) to participate in the formulation and implementation of measures to protect information which constitutes a state secret; to monitor the safekeeping of information which constitutes a state secret by state organs, troop formations, at enterprises, in establishments and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership; to take steps in accordance with prescribed procedure regarding citizens' access to information which constitutes a state secret;

k) to implement in collaboration with the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service measures to safeguard the security of Russian Federation establishments and citizens abroad;

l) to implement within the bounds of their remit and in collaboration with the Russian Federation Border Troops measures to ensure the protection of the Russian Federation State Border;

m) to ensure in collaboration with internal affairs organs the security of foreign states' missions in the Russian Federation;

n) to participate within the bounds of their remit and in conjunction with other state organs in safeguarding the security of sociopolitical, religious within, and other mass measures conducted in the Russian Federation;

o) to register and keep a centralized record of radio data and radio emissions produced by electronic transmitters; to detect in the Russian Federation radio emissions produced by electronic transmitters whose operation poses a threat to the security of the Russian Federation, as well as radio emissions produced by electronic transmitters used for illegal purposes;

p) to participate, in accordance with Russian Federation legislation, in resolving matters pertaining to the adoption and renunciation of Russian Federation citizenship, the entry to and exit from Russian Federation territory of Russian Federation citizens, foreign citizens, and stateless persons, and also the procedure governing foreign citizens' and stateless persons' sojourn on Russian Federation territory;

q) to maintain the mobilization readiness of FSB organs;

r) to train cadres for FSB organs and retrain and boost their skills.

Article 13. The Rights of FSB Organs

FSB organs have the right:

a) to establish confidential relations of cooperation with people who consent to do so;

b) to implement operational- investigative measures to detect, avert, suppress, and expose espionage, terrorist activity, organized crime, corruption, illegal arms and drug trafficking, smuggling, and other crimes whose investigation and preliminary investigation are ascribed by Russian Federation legislation to the jurisdiction of FSB organs and also to detect, avert, suppress, and expose the activity of illegal armed formations, criminal groups, individuals, and public associations which aim to forcibly change the Russian Federation constitutional system;

c) to infiltrate foreign states' special services and organizations which conduct intelligence and other activity aimed at damaging the security of the Russian Federation and also criminal groups;

d) to conduct the investigation and preliminary examination of crimes which are ascribed by Russian Federation legislation to the jurisdiction of FSB organs and to use detention centers in accordance with Russian Federation legislation;

e) to carry out cipher work in FSB organs and also to monitor the observance of secrecy in the handling of coded information by cipher subunits of state organs, enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership (except for Russian Federation establishments abroad);

f) to use for official purposes communications systems belonging to state enterprises, establishments, and organizations and, in urgent cases, to nonstate enterprises, establishments, and organizations and also Russian Federation public associations and citizens;

g) to use in urgent cases means of transportation belonging to enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership or public associations (except for means of transportation which are exempted from such use by Russian Federation legislation) for the prevention of crimes, the pursuit and apprehension of people who have committed or are suspected of having committed crimes, for the transportation of people in urgent need of medical assistance to medical establishments, and also for transportation to the scene of an incident. At the request of the owners of the means of transport FSB organs shall compensate them in accordance with prescribed procedure for expenditure or damage incurred;

h) to freely enter citizens' residential and other premises, plots of land belonging to them, the grounds and premises of enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership in the event of there being sufficient grounds to believe that a crime is being or has been committed there—a crime whose inquiry and preliminary investigation is ascribed by Russian Federation legislation to the jurisdiction of FSB organs—and also, in the event of their pursuing people suspected of committing the aforesaid crimes if delay may place citizens' lives and health in jeopardy. FSB organs shall notify the prosecutor within 24 hours of all such cases of entry into residential and other premises belonging to citizens;

i) to inspect citizens' and officials' identity documents should there be sufficient grounds to suspect them of committing a crime;

j) to carry out the administrative arrest of people who have committed offenses involving the attempted or actual infiltration of the grounds of special-regime installations under special guard, closed administrative-territorial formations, and other installations under guard and also to check these people's identity papers, obtain explanations from them, conduct personal checks on them, and confiscate their possessions and documents.

k) to submit to state organs, the administrations of enterprises, establishments and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership, and also to public associations submissions demanding that they take

action to eliminate the causes of and conditions promoting threats to the security of the Russian Federation and the perpetration of crimes whose inquiry and preliminary investigations are ascribed by Russian Federation legislation to the jurisdiction of FSB organs;

l) to receive free of charge from state organs, enterprises, establishments and organizations regardless of their form of ownership the information needed to perform FSB organs' assigned duties save cases where federal laws prescribe a special procedure for the receipt of information;

m) to set up in accordance with the procedure laid down by Russian Federation legislation the enterprises, establishments, organizations, and subunits needed to perform FSB organs' assigned duties and safeguard the activity of the aforesaid organs;

n) to set up special-purpose subunits for the performance of FSB organs' assigned duties;

o) to conduct criminal and other examinations and research;

p) to have external relationships with foreign states' special services and law-enforcement organs, exchange operational information and special technical and other systems with them on a reciprocal basis within the bounds of FSB organs' remit and in accordance with the procedure laid down by Russian Federation FSB normative acts; to conclude, in accordance with established procedure and within the bounds of their remit, Russian Federation international treaties;

q) to send official representatives of FSB organs to foreign states by agreement with those states' special services or law-enforcement organs with a view to boosting the effectiveness of international crime-fighting;

r) to implement measures to safeguard their own security, including preventing foreign states' special services and organizations, criminal groups, and individuals from using technical systems to infiltrate information constituting a state secret, which is protected by FSB organs;

s) to authorize the personnel of FSB organs to possess and carry standard-issue weapons and special means;

t) to use the documentation of other ministries, departments, enterprises, establishments, and organizations to conceal the identity of FSB organs' personnel and the departmental affiliation of their subunits, premises, and means of transportation;

u) to conduct scientific research into problems of Russian Federation security;

v) to assist enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership in the formulation of measures to protect commercial secrets;

w) to train cadres on compensation terms or free of charge for foreign states' special services and the security services of enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership, provided that this does not contravene the principles governing the activity of FSB organs.

FSB organs are prohibited from using the rights which they have been granted to perform duties for which federal laws do not make provision.

Article 14. Use of Weapons, Special Means, and Physical Force

The personnel of FSB organs are allowed to possess and carry regulation-issue weapons and special means. They have the right to use physical force, including combat tactics, as well as weapons and special means in cases and in accordance with procedure envisaged by Russian Federation legislative and other normative legal acts for militia personnel.

Article 15. Collaboration With Russian and Foreign Establishments

FSB organs perform their activity in collaboration with federal organs of state power, Russian Federation components' organs of state power, enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership.

FSB organs can use the potential of other forces engaged in safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure laid down by federal laws.

State organs, as well as enterprises, establishments, and organizations, must assist FSB organs in their performance of their assigned duties.

Individuals and corporate entities in the Russian Federation who provide postal communications services and all kinds of electronic communications, including scrambled [telekodovoy], confidential, and satellite communications systems, must, at the request of FSB organs, include additional equipment and software in the hardware and also create other conditions necessary for FSB organs to implement operational-technical measures.

With a view to performing the tasks of safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation servicemen of FSB organs can be assigned to state organs, enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership with the consent of their leadership and in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Russian Federation president and still remain on military service.

Collaboration between FSB organs and foreign states' special services, law-enforcement organs, and other organizations is established on the basis of the Russian Federation's international treaties.

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Chapter IV. The Forces and Means of FSB Organs

Article 16. The Personnel of FSB Organs

FSB organs shall be staffed (including on a competitive basis) by servicemen and civilian personnel. FSB servicemen (except for drafted servicemen) as well as civilians appointed to servicemen's posts constitute the personnel of FSB organs.

A citizen of the Russian Federation who is able, by virtue of his personal and professional qualities, age, education, and state of health, to perform his assigned duties may be a member of FSB organs.

Servicemen in FSB organs perform military service in accordance with Russian Federation legislation on the performance of military service, mindful of the special features laid down by this Federal Law because of the specific nature of the tasks which they are performing.

The number of FSB organs' servicemen and civilian personnel (minus the personnel of research, military-medical establishments and subunits and the personnel engaged in the running, protection, and maintenance of FSB organs' official buildings and premises) shall be fixed by the president of the Russian Federation. The number of servicemen and civilian personnel employed at research and military-medical establishments and subunits and personnel engaged in the running, protection, and maintenance of FSB organs' official buildings and premises shall be fixed by the director of the Russian Federation FSB within the limits of the budgetary appropriations allocated to the Russian Federation FSB.

The powers of FSB organs' officials to employ incentives and impose disciplinary penalties on servicemen under their jurisdiction and also to promote, appoint and discharge servicemen (except for servicemen standing in for superior officers) are laid down by the director of the Russian Federation FSB.

Contracts covering military service through the age of 65 can be concluded with servicemen employed in FSB organs who are highly skilled specialists and have reached the maximum age for military service, in accordance with the procedure laid down by the director of the Russian Federation FSB.

The duties, rights, and privileges of FSB organs' civilian personnel are laid down by Russian Federation legislation.

The personnel of FSB organs are guided in their official activity by federal laws and cannot be bound by the decisions of political parties, public movements, and public organizations.

The personnel and civilian personnel of FSB organs are prohibited from engaging in entrepreneurial activity and also from assisting individuals and corporate entities in this kind of activity. The personnel of FSB organs are not entitled to combine military service with other paid activity apart from scientific studies, teaching, and other

creative activity provided that it does not hamper their performance of their official duties (save in cases where this is a matter of professional necessity).

Article 17. Legal Protection of FSB Organs' Personnel

When performing their official duties FSB organ personnel are representative of federal organs of state power and come under the state's protection. No one is entitled to interfere in their official activity except for state organs and officials empowered to do so by federal laws.

Hampering a FSB staffer's performance of his official duties, insults, opposition, violence, or the threat of using violence against the aforesaid staffer in connection with his performance of his official duties will entail penalties laid down by Russian Federation legislation.

The life, health, honor, dignity, and property of a member of FSB organs and his family are protected against criminal encroachments in connection with his performance of his official duties in accordance with the procedure envisaged by Russian Federation legislation.

When an FSB staffer is carrying out his official duties he cannot be taken into custody, arrested, searched or have his possessions, private transport, or the transport used by him searched without the presence of an official representative of FSB organs or a court ruling.

Information regarding the personnel of FSB organs who have performed (or are performing) special missions in foreign states' special services and organizations or in criminal groups can be made public only with the written consent of the aforesaid staffers and in cases envisaged by federal laws.

Article 18. Social Protection of the Personnel of FSB Organs

The length of service accrued by servicemen in FSB organs who are highly qualified specialists prior to their entering military service may be counted in their required period of service for pension purposes and for the payment of the percentage length-of-service allowance in accordance with the procedure laid down by the director of the Russian Federation FSB.

The time that the personnel of FSB organs spend performing special missions in foreign states' special services and organizations or in criminal groups shall be counted above the normal rate for payment of pensions, promotions, and payment of the percentage length-of-service allowance in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Russian Federation Government.

The pay for military rank and official salaries (wage rates) of servicemen and civilian personnel of FSB organs shall carry a 25- percent supplement for service (work) in FSB organs.

FSB servicemen who are entitled to a length-of-service pension and who continue their military service are paid a monthly allowance in addition to their pay of 20-50

percent of the pension that they could have been paid. The procedure and conditions governing the payment of the aforesaid allowance are determined by the director of the Russian Federation FSB.

FSB servicemen throughout the Russian Federation enjoy the right to free travel on all categories of city, suburban, and local public transport (apart from taxis) and in rural areas on passing transport (apart from private transport) on presentation of their official identification.

FSB servicemen safeguarding the security of transport installations have the right to free travel on trains, river-going and sea-going ships, and aircraft during the performance of their official duties.

The personnel of the FSB who use private transport for official purposes are paid monetary compensation in accordance with the procedure and at a rate laid down by the Government of the Russian Federation.

The servicemen of FSB organs shall have telephones installed in their place of residence within a period not exceeding one year from the date of their application.

Servicemen and civilian personnel of FSB organs, families of contract servicemen (wives, husbands, children aged under 18, and dependents), and also the children of civilian personnel aged under 18 are provided with free medical assistance at military-medical establishments.

FSB servicemen are provided with medical assistance, including supplies of medicines, medical goods, and false teeth manufactured and repaired (except for those made from precious metals) at other ministries' and departments' healthcare establishments from Russian Federation FSB funds. At the same time the money which FSB organs send to healthcare establishments under different departmental affiliation for the provision of medical assistance for servicemen are excluded from taxable income.

The time that FSB servicemen spend undergoing medical treatment in connection with injuries, contusions, or disablement sustained in the performance of their official duties is unlimited save on the submission of incontrovertible evidence regarding the possibility of their recovering their ability to perform military service.

The rights and privileges of FSB servicemen and their families envisaged by Sections 9 and 10 of this article extend to citizens who have been discharged from military service after attaining the maximum age for military service, on health grounds, or in connection with staff organization measures and whose overall length of military service including above-rate pensionable service totals 20 years or more, and also members of their families.

Article 19. People Who Assist FSB Organs

FSB organs can recruit individuals with their consent to assist in the performance of FSB organs' assigned duties

on a public and private (confidential) basis, including as nonstaff personnel. The authorities of a nonstaff member of FSB organs shall be determined by normative acts of the Russian Federation FSB.

People who assist FSB organs have the right:

- a) to conclude a contract with FSB organs on confidential cooperation;
- b) to receive explanations as to their tasks, duties, and rights from the personnel of FSB organs;
- c) to use documents which conceal their identity for security purposes;
- d) to receive rewards;
- e) to receive compensation for damage to their health or property sustained in the process of their assisting FSB organs.

People who assist FSB organs are obliged:

- a) to observe the terms of the cooperation contract or agreement concluded with FSB organs;
- b) to carry out the instructions of FSB organs designed to implement their assigned duties;
- c) to eschew the deliberate provision of unobjective, incomplete, false, or slanderous information;
- d) not to divulge information which constitutes a state secret and other information of which they become aware in the process of assisting FSB organs.

The use of confidential assistance on a contract basis from deputies, judges, prosecutors, lawyers, minors, clergymen, and official representatives of officially registered religious organizations is prohibited.

Information on people who assist or have assisted FSB organs on a confidential basis constitutes a state secret and can only be made public with the written consent of these people and in cases envisaged by federal laws.

Article 20. Information Support for FSB Organs

In order to perform their activity FSB organs can formulate, create, and use information systems, communications systems, and data transfer systems, as well as information protection systems, including cryptographic protection systems without license.

The existence in information systems of information on individuals and corporate entities does not constitute grounds for FSB organs to take steps which limit the rights of the aforesaid persons.

The procedure for recording and using information on offenses which have been committed and which pertain to matters of safeguarding the security of the Russian Federation, as well as information pertaining to the intelligence and other activity of foreign states' special services and organizations and individuals aimed at

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damaging the security of the Russian Federation, is laid down by normative acts of the Russian Federation FSB.

Article 21. Arms and Equipment of FSB Organs

FSB organs shall elaborate, develop, acquire, and use arms and equipment without license, including special technical and other means, and acquire and use the combat weapons in the arsenal of FSB organs by decision of the Russian Federation Government as well as other official and civilian weapons and their munitions.

The sale, transfer, export from and import to the Russian Federation of arms systems and equipment, including special technical and other means, firearms, and ammunition, which may be used in the activity of FSB organs, shall be carried out by them in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Article 22. Financial and Material-Technical Support

FSB organs shall be funded by federal budget funds.

FSB organs shall be provided with material-technical support from centralized Russian Federation resources and also by acquiring the requisite material-technical systems from enterprises, establishments, and organizations irrespective of their form of ownership.

Plots of land and property belonging to FSB organs (including buildings, structures, and equipment) created (or being created) or acquired (being acquired) using federal budget funds and other means constitute federal property. FSB organs shall be exempted from all forms of land charges on the plots of land which they occupy.

FSB organs can have an official housing stock formed in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Enterprises, establishments, and organizations, which have been or are being created to ensure the activity of FSB organs, shall carry out their activity without licenses and shall not be liable to privatization.

Chapter V. Monitoring and Oversight of FSB Organs' Activity

Article 23. Monitoring the Activity of FSB Organs

The president of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation, and judicial organs shall monitor the activity of FSB organs within the bounds of their remit laid down by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal constitutional and federal laws.

Deputies (members) of the Federation Council and deputies of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly State Duma are entitled, in connection with their work as deputies, to obtain information regarding the activity of FSB organs in accordance with the procedure laid down by Russian Federation legislation.

Article 24. Oversight by the Prosecutor's Office

The Russian Federation general prosecutor and prosecutors empowered by him oversee FSB organs' implementation of the laws of the Russian Federation.

Information regarding people who provide or have provided FSB organs with confidential assistance and regarding the organization, tactics, methods, and means of implementing the activity of FSB organs shall not be the subject of oversight by the prosecutor's office.

Chapter VI. Final Provisions

Article 25. On the Rightful Heirs of FSB Organs

The Russian Federation FSB and its subordinate organs are the rightful heirs of the Russian Federation Federal Counterintelligence Service and its organs.

The servicemen and civilian personnel of Russian Federation counterintelligence organs are considered to be performing military service (working) in FSB organs in the posts they hold without recertification and reappointment and also without organizational- staff measures.

Article 26. The Entry into Force of This Federal Law

This Federal Law enters into force from the day that it is officially published.

The Russian Federation Law "On Federal Organs of State Security" (VEDOMOSTI SYEZDA NAROD-NYKH DEPUTATOV ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII I VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII, 1992, No. 32, Article 1871; 1993, No. 33, Article 1308; No. 36, Article 1438) shall be deemed invalid from the day that this Federal Law is enacted.

The Russian Federation president is asked and the Russian Federation Government instructed to bring their normative legal acts into line with this Federal Law.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] The Kremlin, Moscow, 3 April 1995
No. 40-FZ

Real Effects of New State Security Law Belittled

MK1404112595 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 14
Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Aleksandr Kudakayev in the "Special Services" column: "Security People Have Been Guaranteed a Free Ride on the Metro. The Law on the Federal Security Service Will Give Them Greater Self-Confidence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The adoption of the law on the Federal Security Service [FSB] puts an end to the numerous transformations and renamings of what was once called the KGB. Since 1991 state security activity

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has been regulated only by various presidential and government documents and the law "On Operational and Investigative Activity."

True, in effect all norms of the new law correspond to the earlier documents, and there is no question that it introduces anything new into FSK-FSB activity. The sole exception is yet another exchange of ID cards. It is known from reliable sources that some officers of territorial state security bodies have not as yet exchanged their Federal Security Agency (AFB) cards, although since that time they have worked for the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs (MBVD), the Security Ministry (MB), and the FSK.

Furthermore, the provisions of Article 13 of the new law may become a subject of friction between the FSB and the Federal Government Communications and Information Agency (FAPSI). This article gives the FSB the right to oversee the secrecy of encrypted information at enterprises regardless of ownership status. Meanwhile, under a recent presidential edict, the FAPSI received substantial rights in controlling encrypted communications and providing encryption services both for state and other types of organizations. True, the possible friction will emerge in narrow departmental spheres of activity, which, however, are not devoid of commercial interest.

In principle, the chief advantage in the state security establishment's getting "its own" law lies in the fact that FSB officers can now at least have an illusion that their position in the legal sense has stabilized. In the period when the Lubyanka [KGB headquarters] was being repeatedly renamed, and officers were joking that they did not know each morning what their department would be called in the evening, Yasenevo (SVR), with the Law on Foreign Intelligence, lived without any storms or upheavals. Now FSB officers will not have to worry, say, that they can be deprived of a free ride on the metro. Before, however, they also traveled free of charge, but they enjoyed that right under a corresponding Ministry of Railways instruction, which the railway men could have changed at any opportune moment.

The law has given a nice present personally to FSK-FSB Director Stepashin, because now he can expect a presidential edict newly conferring upon him the military rank of army general. It will be recalled that in the past the KGB chairman was an army general. Since that time the country has become smaller and there are not so many subordinates, but the rank is just as high. The number of other state security generals should also be expected to increase.

Grachev Denies Reports of His Impending Dismissal

LD1904202295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1902 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—Russia's Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has

called reports of his coming dismissal and radical cuts in the Armed Forces as "one more attempt to destabilize the situation."

"The moment things straighten out in the armed forces and the tendency for stable development makes itself felt, certain forces raise the notorious army issue," he told Interfax on Wednesday.

It is not surprising that new articles on the subject emerge prior to parliamentary elections, he said. "Some would like to stir up emotions in the Armed Forces and picture the president and prime minister as statesmen capable of wanton cuts in the Armed Forces," he went on to say.

The goal of such articles is to disorganize the officers and generals corps, he continued. He also denied reports about the Russian leaders' plans to turn the Defense Ministry into a civilian organization, i.e. to appoint a civilian to the post of defense minister.

Grachev also denied assertions that the Russian authorities are planning to remove the General Staff from the Defense Ministry and subordinate it to the president.

Grachev believes that if reorganization of this kind is possible in general, it is a matter for the future, "of course if there is any need to do so at all."

He stated that the Russian leadership has no plans to cut the Armed Forces to 800,000 men (the level quoted by leaders of individual parties and public movements.)

"Such rumors and speculations should be treated calmly because as a rule they are unfounded and are being spread by unprofessional people," said Grachev.

Kozyrev Reiterates Statement on LDPR in Court

LD1904120795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1140 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Hearings in the case "Zhirinovskiy v. Kozyrev" in Moscow's Krasnopresnenskiy court today had to be adjourned as the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia [LDPR] who filed the suit against the Russian foreign minister failed to turn up.

Zhirinovskiy felt offended by Andrey Kozyrev's statement concerning the LDPR's philosophy and ideology. Kozyrev made the statement in the course of his appearance on the Sunday television programme "Itogi".

According to Zhirinovskiy's lawyers, the LDPR leader is now in Cyprus. The court heard a statement by the defendant and adjourned until September 5.

Andrey Kozyrev told the court that, judging by his book "The Last Leap to the South", Zhirinovskiy professed views that were consonant with the ideology and practice of fascism. Kozyrev confirmed his viewpoint aired during his television appearance.

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The minister said he considered himself "entitled to speak about the danger of such ideology" as long as Russia's democratic Constitution guaranteed his right to do so.

Kozyrev also noted that as the leader of the Russian Foreign Ministry, he had "repeatedly handled official complaints from foreign states of direct threats and insults made by Zhirinovskiy against them".

"Politicians like Zhirinovskiy provide ground for specific groups abroad to suspect Russia of imperial ambitions and fan fears and suspicions of it, as well as to call for its isolation on the international scene or to curtail business ties with the country".

Now that the world is getting ready to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the great victory over fascism, we often speak about the need to learn the lessons of history, Kozyrev said. "To my mind, one of the lessons is that not a single country is proof against the danger of fascism. Fascism has many faces and is capable of mimicry. But it invariably poses in the "pro-patriotic" wrappings," Kozyrev said. "This is why it is so important in conditions of a democratic country to call a spade a spade and to call fascism what it is," Kozyrev said.

According to Andrey Kozyrev, the LDPR leader displayed his contempt of court by failing to appear. "As concerns myself, I respect the court, and, unlike Zhirinovskiy, I chose to appear at the hearings in order to comply with law and justify my assessment of the Zhirinovskiy ideology," Kozyrev said.

The press service of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia released a statement which repeatedly called Andrey Kozyrev's statement on television "a slander". The statement said that the minister of foreign affairs acted "extremely bravely by appearing in the court" for the simple reason that Vladimir Zhirinovskiy was abroad at the time.

Media Issues

Yeltsin Edict on Media Coverage of Victory Anniversary

LD2004093595 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1630 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (ITAR-TASS)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an edict "On information support for the festive events devoted to the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Fatherland War 1941-45" which says, among other things:

"In order to assist the media in covering the festive events devoted to the 50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Fatherland War 1941-45:

1. To set up a provisional joint press center (described below as press center) within the structure of subdivisions of the information directorate of the Russian

presidential administration, the Russian Foreign Ministry's press center, and the Ostankino television technical center.

The head of the information directorate of the Russian presidential administration is in charge of operational management of the press center.

Expenses related to the activity of the press center should be paid out of the federal budgetary funds earmarked for implementation of the program for preparing and holding celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of victory and other memorable dates of the Great Fatherland War of 1941-45.

2. The Russian Government is to take steps to provide the press center with communications facilities.

3. In conjunction with the Russian Foreign Ministry the Russian presidential administration is to provide the necessary organizational and technical and other conditions for the work of the Russian and foreign media and the holding of news conferences, briefings, and other events.

In conjunction with the Russian Foreign Ministry the information directorate of the Russian presidential administration is to insure accreditation for Russian and foreign journalists.

4. The Russian Federal Television and Radio Service, the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company, and the "Russian Public Television" share-holding association should insure television and radio broadcasts of the festive events devoted to the 50th anniversary of victory in the Great Fatherland War of 1941-45.

5. The Russian Government and the federal bodies of executive authority are to take required measures to assist the media in covering the festive events devoted to the 50th anniversary of victory in the Great Fatherland War of 1941-45.

6. To recommend the bodies of state power of the constituent subjects of the Russian Federation to take measures to insure coverage by the relevant media of the festive events devoted to the 50th anniversary of victory in the Great Fatherland War of 1941-45 to be held in the Russian Federation's constituent subjects.

Federal Assembly

Navy Chief, Lawmakers Discuss Fleet Problems

WS1804104595 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 13 Apr 95 p 1

[Report on interview with Russian Navy Commander Feliks Gromov by Russian State Duma deputy; recorded by MOLOD UKRAYINY special correspondent Bohdan Kushnir; place and date not given: "The Black Sea Fleet Through the Eyes of Russians"; passages in boldface are remarks by Kushnir]

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[FBIS Translated Text] Feliks Gromov came to the State Duma to attend the "governmental hour" scheduled every Friday. We believe that the deputies' questions and the admiral's answers enable us to learn about the contrary opinions on the Black Sea Fleet (BSF)—a bone of contention between Ukraine and Russia; to learn about the arguments of the other side, not readily available in the media of both states.

[Deputies] What is the situation of the BSF, by whom is it financed, and how does the future of the BSF look?

[Gromov] Regarding the financial issue, the BSF is at the same level as the other Russian fleets, such as the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet, and the Pacific Fleet. However, allowances to the personnel are being paid with approximately one month delays. I should inform the esteemed deputies that the debt of the Navy to the military-industrial complex for 1994 amounted to some 600 billion rubles [R], and for municipal services (water, gas, heating, and electrical power)—around R300 billion. We closed the year with such a debt. The BSF has a similar debt. The BSF's situation is considerably worse, given that taxes and payments imposed on the BSF by the Ukrainian administration are the same as for a foreign fleet or a commercial structure. Some 40 percent of the BSF budget is allocated to repay the overdue taxes. For instance, the BSF's budget for 1994 amounted to R188 billion. Around 40 percent of the sum was used to pay taxes. This is the situation of the BSF.

[Deputies] What do you think about the idea—supported by certain politicians—of uniting the BSF? Which means—two military doctrines, two different military doctrines, two different orientations, but one Fleet? And the second question: Can you provide us with your vision of the development of the situation in the Fleet in connection with the approved budget?

[Gromov] I think that a united BSF under an incomprehensible command would be an incomprehensible structure. For instance currently, when the Fleet is under the command of two presidents, all issues have to be resolved together with the Ukrainian side, even the issue of transporting cargo from Novorossiysk to Batumi for the Transcaucasian region.

Therefore the Fleet should be under one banner—the banner of the state which it represents; the Fleet is an instrument, the state's political instrument. It is a state structure; therefore, there cannot be any united Fleet. There is no evidence of such experience in world practice.

About the budget. If the budget remains unchanged for another year it will lead the Fleet to a catastrophic condition. The number of ships with overdue inter-repair intervals will increase. The use of such ships will be dangerous for both their crews and the state. Reductions of ship crews will have to be conducted.

[Deputies] How much time is left before the BSF becomes inoperative and Turkey will initiate expansion

within the Black Sea area? How much time do we have in reserve to amend the situation?

[Gromov] I think that for all of us there is not much time left. The BSF's combat readiness is as follows: In 1994, the BSF ships won four out of 20 prizes awarded by the Navy's chief commander. This year, they won three. Thus, some elements of the BSF's combat readiness still exist; further lingering, however, may lead to a catastrophe. We repair the ships of our Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Fleets; we take various measures to maintain their combat readiness. We cannot however, repair ships whose status is unknown.

[Deputies] We have received a telegram that all BSF telephones have been disconnected. Is this true?

[Gromov] This is a similar situation to the one when the strategic command center in Moscow Oblast has been cut off from electric power. I should say that the city's [not specified] telephones have been disconnected due to debts, the amount of which I already mentioned. This might happen any time on Russian territory, too.

[Deputies] What according to you, could be done by the State Duma to save the Navy's bases on the Black Sea?

[Gromov] The Navy's primary base was in Sevastopol. The entire development of the Navy was based on it. There is no need to have strategic bases in the continental part of Ukraine (spreading from Mykolayiv, Odessa and further to the west) in the current situation. We are disbanding our units located there. I think that we should save Sevastopol as the primary base of the Russian Fleet on the Black Sea. It is necessary to take into account that we have been investing in this base for 200 years, and we had in no way prepared the Russian shore (I mean Novorossiysk and Tuapse, where there are no naval bases). I hope that the esteemed deputies understand what should be done.

[Deputies] The media have reported that certain special groups instructed by the Ukrainian command, have tried to seize several BSF ships. What is the end of the story?

[Gromov] I do not know anything about it. There have recently been no serious excesses or attempts to seize the BSF's ships.

[Deputies] It was agreed with the former Ukrainian president that 15 to 17 percent of the ships will be transferred to the neighboring state [Russia]. What is the reason for Ukraine's current hard stance?

[Gromov] Ukraine's current tough approach is caused by the relocation of the BSF's onshore troops and aviation. That was a countermeasure to oppose the relocation of those forces, to be more specific—marines who, side by side with landing ships and the naval rocket aviation on Crimea's soil [as published]. How can this be explained? Obviously, it can be explained by the entire process of political changes currently under way in Ukraine and the CIS states in general.

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[Deputies] Do you not think that navigating the Black Sea costs us and our budget a lot of money?

[Gromov] This is a rhetorical question. The Fleet's situation is determined by the Russian law "On Defense." I think that we have received exactly what we planned. The rest is a matter of time.

We will cite fully one of the last questions asked by A. Zavyagin, member of the Liberal Democratic Party [LDPR] faction: Mr. Admiral! Is it not dangerous to the safety of Russia if we have only one naval base in Sevastopol in wartime? Have you—the military commanders—really forgotten the war's experience, and especially the U.S. Fleet's defeat at Pearl Harbor? Why then, are you leaving Mykolayiv, Izmayil, and Odessa? These are, after all, Russian cities! General, why do you not protest? Why do you not point out to the president or the government that this is not correct with regard to Russia's safety? Well, these are my questions; my heart is bleeding. The plundering of a Russian Fleet and the collapse of the state are under way. Meanwhile for you, soldiers, everything is wonderful: The situation on the Baltic Sea is wonderful, on the Black Sea is wonderful, in Sevastopol—which does not belong to Ukraine, since it was subordinated to the [Russian] Federation when it was transferred by Khrushchev—it is wonderful, too.

[Gromov] I have just said that not everything is wonderful here. The question that you have asked me, you should ask yourself. This is the only answer I can provide.

The deputies' attempts to provoke a frank discussion to hear the admiral's private opinion, were all in vain. The Russian Navy commander expressed only the official point of view. Asked about his own viewpoint, he answered indifferently: "I have my private opinion but this is not a confession."

State Duma Declares Amnesty To Mark Victory Anniversary

LD1904162995 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1240 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—A resolution "On Amnesty on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" was adopted by the Russian State Duma, parliament's lower house, today. The document, supported by 305 deputies, with two votes against and two abstentions, will concern 300,000 people.

The amnesty will free about 30,000 prison inmates whose imprisonment terms are minor or who are first-time offenders. The remaining 270,000 will have their criminal proceedings stopped, Viktor Mironov, an initiator of the amnesty, member of the Stability group and deputy head of the Duma security committee, told Interfax.

The amnesty is valid for participants in World War II regardless of their crimes. The only exception is murder or grave felony. This category includes about 70 people. The war veterans not eligible for this category will have their prison term cut.

The amnesty will also concern handicapped persons of the first and second categories, women over 55, women with under-age children or pregnant, and men over 60.

In the opinion of experts, the amnesty will not aggravate the crime situation.

Federal Assembly Chronology: Late Dec 94 - Feb 95

95P50100

[FBIS Media Note] [Introduction] This FBIS Media Note contains a topical listing of major decisions, discussions, and actions made by or taken on behalf of the Russian State Duma and Federation Council. Further textual material is available in the 1995 editions of the FBIS Daily Report (DR) "Central Eurasia" or in other cited sources. The citation provides DR listings and page numbers or media source and date at the end of each entry. Items that have been entered under more than one topic heading are marked with an asterisk (*). A list of abbreviations and their expansions follows the chronology. Duma in recess from 28 January through 7 February to afford deputies time to meet with their constituents (30 Jan 95, 24).

FOREIGN POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL

U.S. and Europe

13 Jan 95 - Duma ratifies the friendship agreement between Russia and Hungary (17 Jan 95, 19)

18 Jan 95 - Duma adopts an appeal to Lithuania's Seimas to find "a mutually acceptable way out" of the planned deportation of a group of Russian nationals in permanent residence there (RIA, 18 Jan)

9 Feb 95 - Council ratifies friendship agreement with Hungary and trade agreements with Sweden and Switzerland (10 Feb 95, 14)

CIS

11 Jan 95 - Duma rejects the proposal of Deputy Tsiku (CPRF) to denounce the 1990 resolution which ratified the agreement abolishing the USSR (11 Jan 95, 29)

10 Feb 95 - Duma commissions the CIS Affairs Committee and the International Affairs Committee to look into the Russian-Ukrainian friendship and cooperation agreements signed in Kiev on 8 February (13 Feb 95, 28)

Near East and Asia

13 Jan & 9 Feb 95 - Duma ratifies the friendship agreement between Russia and Vietnam (17 Jan 95, 19); on 9 February Council ratifies agreement (10 Feb 95, 14)

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General

30 Dec 94 - Council approves a federal law "On the Russian Federation's International Treaties" (4 Jan 95, 19)

MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES

*11 Jan 95 - Speaker Rybkin reports to the Duma on his 11 January meeting with President Yeltsin: both Rybkin and Yeltsin agreed that military reform needs to be speeded up; Yeltsin claims that the Duma did not properly supervise the budget and finances, and therefore he would sign a decree to create such a supervisory body; Yeltsin also feels that the Duma has failed to ensure the observance of human rights and one of its priorities should be to pass a law on the human rights commissioner (12 Jan 95, 35)

13 Jan 95 - Duma rejects Russia's Choice draft law "On Publishing of Information About Servicemen Killed, Wounded, and MIA During Active Military Service" (17 Jan 95, 19)

*13 Jan 95 - Duma adopts an amendment to the law "On Defense" which states that "the use of the Russian armed forces in tasks not related to their assigned role shall be done only on the basis of a decree of the Russian president approved by the Federation Council"; if additional funding is needed it shall be issued on the basis of federal law (17 Jan 95, 19, 30)

13 Jan 95 - Duma rejects a CPRF proposal to include on the agenda changes in the structural hierarchy in the armed forces because Yeltsin has instructed Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Security Council Chairman Lobov to formulate such proposals (17 Jan 95, 19)

*13 Jan 95 - Duma approves a federal law giving more guarantees and compensation to servicemen serving in the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Tajikistan; the law will be retroactive to 26 November 1994 when the Chechen conflict began (vote: 280 for) (17 Jan 95, 28)

18 Jan 95 - Zhirinovskiy addresses Duma on presence of "armed units from foreign states" in Moscow; Duma backs his proposal to hear a report of the Interior Ministry and the FSK on the situation in Moscow (18 Jan 95, 24)

18 Jan 95 - Duma rejects on the first reading the draft constitutional law on state of emergency drawn up by the Security and Legislation Committees (vote: 210 for; constitutional laws require passage by two-thirds or 300 votes; RIA, 19 Jan reports vote count as 218-31, 10 abstentions); deputies disagree with the law's provision permitting using the army for the maintenance of a state of emergency and for giving the president the right to institute a special administrative body, thereby limiting or suspending the powers of local executive and representative authorities (20 Jan 95, 18)

20 Jan 95 - Council decides to submit to the Duma a constitutional bill to amend Article 102 to state that the

armed forces can be used inside the country only with agreement of the Council; Article 102 currently requires Council approval only for the use of the armed forces outside of Russian borders (23 Jan 95, 21)

*20 Jan 95 - Duma approves a death penalty for large-scale violence, death, or severe damage done by illegal armed units; it also adopts corresponding changes and additions to the Criminal Code and Criminal Code of Practice (23 Jan 95, 21)

25 Jan 95 - Duma adopts a proposal of Deputy Gerber (Russia's Choice) that it hear the FSK report on the Soros Foundation in February (vote: 241 for, 4 abstentions) (26 Jan 95, 40)

25 Jan 95 - Duma passes on the second reading the federal law "On the Procedure of Provision by the Russian Federation of Military and Civilian Personnel for International Peacekeeping Activities" (RIA, 25 Jan)

24 Feb 95 - Duma instructs the Committee on Defense and Security to file a complaint with the Procurator General's office in connection with the 22 February television statements by neo-Nazi Aleksey Vedenkin that he was ready to kill various deputies; the Duma also instructs its legal department to file a suit against the Russian Radio and Television Broadcasting Company for airing a program on fascism during which Vedenkin voiced his intentions (24 Feb 94, 24)

POLITICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES

*10 Feb 95 - Duma passes on third reading a law on the civil service (vote: 289-2) (13 Feb 95, 28)

Executive Branch Relations

*11 Jan 95 - Rybkin reports to the Duma on his 11 January meeting with Yeltsin: both Rybkin and Yeltsin agreed that military reform needs to be speeded up; Yeltsin claims that the Duma did not properly supervise the budget and finances and therefore he would sign a decree to create such a supervisory body; Yeltsin also feels that the Duma has failed to ensure observance of human rights and one of its priorities should be to pass a law on the human rights commissioner (12 Jan 95, 35)

13 Jan 95 - Duma rejects a proposal by Deputy Tropin (DPR) to request Yeltsin to appoint Duma Deputies Lukyanov and Zhirinovskiy to the Security Council (13 Jan 95j 14)

18, 20, 25 Jan 95 - On 18 January the Duma rejects a proposal by Deputy Ponomarev (Russia's Choice) to consider the issue of dismissing Minister of Defense Grachev (18 Jan 95, 24); on 20 January accepts proposal of Deputy Lakhova (Women of Russia Party) to consider the dismissal on 25 January (vote: 230-44, 2 abstentions) (20 Jan 95, 17; RIA, 20 Jan); on 25 January Duma rejects petitioning Chernomyrdin to proceed with the censuring activities (vote: 121-47, 3 abstentions) (30 Jan 95, 24)

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19 Jan 95 - Council rejects a no-confidence vote in the president (vote: 61-54, 9 abstentions) and another in the government (vote: 66-55, 7 abstentions) (90 votes are needed for passage) (20 Jan 95, 16)

19 Jan 95 - Council rejects a proposal to ban its chairman from participating in the Security Council and another to cease Council participation in the Agreement on Civic Accord (20 Jan 95, 17)

20 Jan 95 - Duma rejects on the first reading a draft constitutional law "On the Government of the Russian Federation," submitted by Yeltsin, on the grounds that the law did not define the various relations between levels of government and a number of the assigned powers are in violation of the constitution; recommends a conciliation commission be set up to update and redraft the laws (vote: 127-58, 15 abstentions; 300 votes required for passage) (RIA, 20 Jan)

10 Feb 95 - Duma rejects a proposal by Deputy Bratishchev (CPRF) for deputies to have "a direct dialogue" with Yeltsin on 16 February when he delivers his annual message to the Assembly (vote: 141 for) (10 Feb 95, 13)

16 Feb 95 - Yeltsin delivers his annual state of the nation address to the Assembly; the speech includes statements on the situation in Chechnya, the implementation of military reform, social stability, economic reform, foreign policy relations with the West and the U.S., NATO expansion, and mass media's relations with the state institutions of power (16 Feb 95, 8; 17 Feb 95, 28; 21 Feb 95 supplement)

24 Feb 95 - Duma accepts proposal by Deputy Gordeyev (CPRF) and tasks the Ethics Commission to look into television statements by First Deputy Prime Minister Chubays that the CPRF was the only Duma group that voted in favor of cutting subsidies to miners; Duma also votes in favor of sending a message to the Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company requesting airtime for the CPRF to reply (24 Feb 95, 23)

Internal Legislative Issues

11 Jan 95 - Duma rejects a proposal by Deputy Bulavinov of the parliamentary group Union of 12 December to dissolve the Duma (vote: 29 for) (11 Jan 95, 29)

13 Jan 95 - Duma confirms the appointment of Deputy Zhirinovskiy (LDPR) to the Defense Committee (13 Jan 95, 19)

13 Jan 95 - Duma establishes the position of whip to maintain order (vote: 274-23, 2 abstentions) (RIA, 13 Jan)

*17 Jan 95 - Council's Security and Defense Committee rejects including on the agenda as a separate item Deputy Romanov's motion to dismiss Chairman Shumeyko for his stance on Chechnya; Committee Chairman Shirshov said that the issue of Shumeyko can be discussed within the framework of the role of the Council which is already on the agenda (18 Jan 95, 25)

*20 Jan 95 - Duma rejects a resolution on Acting Prosecutor General Ilyushenko's request to open proceedings against Deputies Gaydar, Yushenkov (both of Russia's Choice), and Marychev (LDPR) for organizing illegal rallies in December against Russia's policy in Chechnya (vote: 31 for) (RIA, 20 Jan)

8 Feb 95 - Duma Deputy Zhirinovskiy (LDPR) states his faction will not participate in the work of the Duma until Minister of Internal Affairs Yerin and Rybkin resign for failure to ensure the personal safety of murdered Deputy Skorochkin (8 Feb 95, 20); Duma accepts putting a discussion of Yerin's dismissal on the agenda (vote: 281-4, 1 abstention), but rejects including Rybkin; Duma also rejects idea of creating a bodyguard service to protect its members (9 Feb 95, 21); as a result of the vote the LDPR faction declares it will not attend plenary meetings, but will only participate in parliamentary hearings, committee-related work, and engaged in activities with constituents (9 Feb 95, 22)

Political Parties and Political Life

24 Jan 95 - Yeltsin vetoes 23 December Duma approved law "On Meetings, Rallies, Demonstrations, Marches, and Picketing" on the grounds that the Duma's preparation of the law was incomplete; Yeltsin proposes various amendments to be considered during the re-examination, some deal with restricting the areas and times of these events (26 Jan 95, 39)

27 Jan 95 - Duma Deputy Travkin announces he is quitting the DPR because of his belief that the DPR has changed its operating philosophy (27 Jan 95, 30)

Judicial and Legal Reform

18 Jan 95 - Duma rejects on second reading the law "On Combating Organized Crime"; the 144 amendments introduced since the first reading in November failed to receive the required number of votes; law is sent back to committee (RIA, 18 Jan)

18 Jan 95 - Duma endorses changes to law "On Citizenship of the Russian Federation" which extends the procedure for obtaining citizenship to 31 December 2000 (RIA, 18 Jan)

18 Jan 95 - Duma adopts a constitutional law "On Arbitration Courts in the Russian Federation" and a federal law providing for its implementation on 1 July 1995 (RIA, 18 Jan)

*20 Jan 95 - Duma approves a death penalty for large-scale violence, death, or severe damage done by illegal armed units; it also adopts corresponding changes and additions to the Criminal Code and Criminal Code of Practice (23 Jan 95, 21)

8 Feb 95 - Council rejects two laws concerning amendments to the punishment clauses of the penal code and the code of criminal procedure (9 Feb 95, 21)

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22 Feb 95 - Duma fails to override Yeltsin's veto on the law concerning amendments to the criminal code (23 Feb 95, 36)

*23 Feb 95 - Duma adopts a resolution to secure and protect funding for space projects; resolution also recommends government establish a national space policy and look into legal requirements (24 Feb 95, 24)

ECONOMIC POLICY

Budget, Taxes, and Banking

30 Dec 94 - Council approves a federal law "On the Russian Federation's State Foreign Loans and State Credits Granted by the Russian Federation to Foreign States, Their Corporate Bodies, and International Organizations" (4 Jan 95, 19)

30 Dec 94 - Council rejects a federal law "On the Budget of the Federal Compulsory Medical Insurance Fund in 1994"; Council instructs the Duma to amend Article 4 (4 Jan 95, 19)

30 Dec 94 - Council rejects in its entirety the federal law "On the Budget of the Russian Federation Federal Roads Fund in 1994"; no reason given (4 Jan 95, 19)

*11 Jan 95 - Rybkin reports to the Duma on his 11 January meeting with Yeltsin: both Rybkin and Yeltsin agreed that military reform needs to be speeded up; Yeltsin claims that the Duma did not properly supervise the budget and finances and therefore he would sign a decree to create such a supervisory body; Yeltsin also feels that the Duma has failed to ensure observance of human rights and one of its priorities should be to pass a law on the human rights commissioner (12 Jan 95, 35)

18 Jan 95 - Council approves the federal law "On Financing State Expenses and the Federal Budget in the First Quarter of 1995" which was approved by the Duma on 23 December (vote: 90 for) (RIA, 18 Jan)

18 Jan 95 - Council recommends the government prolong the procedure for use of money resources transferred to settlement accounts of enterprises and organizations throughout 1995 (RIA, 18 Jan)

18, 20, 30 Jan 95 - On 18 January Duma approves the federal law "On Raising the Minimum Pension and Rules of Indexing and Recomputing Government Pensions in the Russian Federation"; on 20 January Council approves; on 30 January Yeltsin vetoes it on grounds of the extreme budget deficit a pension of 54,100 rubles per month would generate and the fact that 1995 draft budget does not provide for it (31 Jan 95, 10)

21 Jan 95 - Duma passes tax legislation: the VAT is tightened, profit laws changed, and various tax breaks scrapped; law is to be enacted 1 April, amendments to the law on profit tax are retroactive to 1 January (25 Jan 95, 25)

25 Jan 95 - Duma initially rejects during a second reading the draft law "On the Federal Budget for 1995"; Agrarians and CPRF did not support main points of the draft because during the drafting they stated that their proposals were not taken into account; during a revote the law passes (vote: 268-88, 2 abstentions) (25 Jan 95, 24; 26 Jan 95, 40)

27 Jan 95 - Duma accepts proposal of Deputy Mikhailov (CPRF) to invite Central Bank head Paramonova, Minister of Finance Panskov, and Minister of Economics Yasin to testify on the ruble decline (vote: 234 for) (30 Jan 95, 26)

27 Jan 95 - Duma adopts law "On Introducing Changes and Additions into the RSFSR Law on the Central Bank" which substantially strengthens its regulatory and oversight functions (vote: 282 for) (30 Jan 95, 26)

8 Feb 95 - Council rejects various financial laws dealing with the Central Bank, the VAT, profit tax for enterprises and organizations, privileges for participants of foreign economic operations; sets up a conciliatory commission to rework the laws; Council passes, with reservations, the law "On Special Tax on Enterprises, Institutions, and Organizations for Financial Support of Basic Economic Sectors of Russia" (9 Feb 95, 21)

10 Feb 95 - Council adopts a law to increase the minimum wage (10 Feb 95, 14)

22, 24 Feb 95 - On 22 February during a prolonged discussion of the 1995 budget the Duma delays the third reading to 24 February (23 Feb 95, 35); on 24 February Duma approves it (vote: 268-93, 3 abstentions) (24 Feb 95, 23; 27 Feb 95, 17)

*23 Feb 95 - Duma adopts a resolution to secure and protect funding for space projects; resolution also recommends government establish a national space policy and look into legislative requirements (24 Feb 95, 24)

24 Feb 95 - Duma fails to override Yeltsin's veto "On an Increase in the Minimum Pension, a Procedure for the Indexation and Recalculation of State-Paid Pensions in the Russian Federation" (vote: 263 for; 32 less than required) (24 Feb 95, 13)

24 Feb 95 - Duma overrides Council's veto "On Certain Matters of Granting Preferences to Participants in Foreign Economic Activity" (vote: 332 for) (27 Feb 95, 17)

24 Feb 95 - Duma supports Yeltsin's amendments to federal law "On the Restoration and Protection of Russian Citizens' Savings" (vote: 306-1) (27 Feb 95, 18)

24 Feb 95 - Duma approves by two-thirds a law "On Changes and Amendments to the Russian Law 'On the Central Bank';" law was previously approved by Duma, but rejected by Council; law also sets out plans for establishing a National Banking Council (27 Feb 95, 19)

Social Welfare

20 Jan 95 - Duma rejects bill on adoptions; vote fell 26 short to override Yeltsin's veto of two months ago; Yeltsin objected to proposed ban on intermediary agencies (RIA, 20 Jan)

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*10 Feb 95 - Duma passes on third reading a law on the civil service (vote: 289-2) (13 Feb 95, 28)

RUSSIAN REGIONAL ISSUES

11 Jan 95 - Duma approves the agenda proposed by NRP for today's extraordinary meeting on Chechnya; at the same time it turns down the agenda proposed by Russia's Choice (11 Jan 95, 29); at the special session all speakers agreed that the hostilities should be halted, a settlement should be negotiated, and a special commission to investigate the causes of the conflict set up; in addition the deputies agree unanimous that the conflict is an inner Chechen conflict and not one between the Russian Federation and one of its members (12 Jan 95, 34; 13 Jan 95, 29)

11 Jan 95 - Duma rejects proposal by Deputy Stolyarov (NRP) to declare 13 January a day of mourning for those who have died in Chechnya (11 Jan 95, 29)

11 Jan 95 - Duma rejects proposal by Deputy Shakhrai (PRES) to consider draft law on the political settlement of Chechnya (11 Jan 95, 29)

13 Jan 95 - Duma rejects proposal of Deputy Tropin (DPR) to send a letter to Chechen leader Dudayev about a ceasefire, the surrender of weapons, and holding talks on POW exchange (vote: 108 for) (13 Jan 95, 14)

13 Jan 95 - Duma sets up a commission to investigate the reasons for the Chechen crisis; the commission is composed of 11 members headed by Ilyukhin (CPRF), Chairman of the Security Committee (17 Jan 95, 19, 28)

*13 Jan 95 - Duma adopts an amendment to the law "On Defense" which states that "the use of the Russian armed forces in tasks not related to their assigned role shall be done only on the basis of a decree of the Russian president approved by the Federation Council"; if additional funding is needed it shall be issued on the basis of federal law (17 Jan 95, 19, 30)

*13 Jan 95 - Duma approves a federal law giving more guarantees and compensation to servicemen serving in the Caucasus, the Baltic states, and Tajikistan; the law will be retroactive to 26 November 1994 when the Chechen conflict began (vote: 280 for) (17 Jan 95, 28)

17, 19 Jan 95 - Council decides to invite Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, Lobov, the power ministers, and Ilyushenko to discuss the situation in Chechnya (17 Jan 95, 28); on 19 January Council passes a declaration that the 18 January refusal of Yeltsin and key ministers to attend runs counter to the principles of democracy, discredits the executive branch, and undermines Russia's authority (RIA, 19 Jan; 23 Jan 95, 21)

*17 Jan 95 - Council's Security and Defense Committee rejects including on the agenda as a separate item Deputy Romanov's motion to dismiss Shumeyko for his stance on Chechnya; Committee Chairman Shirshov said that the issue of Shumeyko can be discussed within

the framework of the role of the Council which is already on the agenda (18 Jan 95, 25)

18 Jan 95 - Council adopts a resolution on Chechnya urging Yeltsin to "bring actions of the federal authorities in the Chechen republic in line with the constitution of the Russian Federation" and establishing a joint investigative commission with the Duma for the purpose of establishing responsibility for the violations of human rights (vote: 101-20, 2 abstentions) (20 Jan 95, 16)

18 Jan 95 - Council sends a proposal to Prosecutor General's office that it institute proceedings on the illegal division of military property and transfer of Russian arms to Chechen authorities (18 Jan 95, 16)

*20 Jan 95 - Duma rejects a resolution on Ilyushenko's request to open proceedings against Deputies Gaydar, Yushenkov (both of Russia's Choice), and Marychev (LDPR) for organizing illegal rallies in December against Russia's policy in Chechnya (vote: 31 for) (RIA, 20 Jan)

26 Jan 95 - Foreign Minister Kozyrev tells the Duma's Committee on International Affairs that in spite of the Chechen situation Russia's foreign relations remain on track, Dudayev has failed to gain international support for his separatist claims, and the issue of imposing economic sanctions on Russia has passed (26 Jan 95, 40; 27 Jan 95, 35)

27 Jan 95 - Duma requests the Committee on International Affairs to find out from the Foreign Ministry how Shamsetdin Yusef, the Chechen "foreign minister", obtained an entry visa for the United States; Duma members also expressed bewilderment at lack of U.S. response to Yusef's statements that they perceived as slanderous and threatening (27 Jan 95, 35); on 27 January U.S. Ambassador Pickering is called to the Foreign Ministry to discuss the issue and a demarche is also made by the Russian Embassy in Washington (30 Jan 95, 11)

27 Jan 95 - Duma rejects a resolution requiring Human Rights Commissioner Kovalev to submit a report on his activities associated with Chechnya (vote: 183 for); a later CPRF resolution condemns Kovalev's activities and calls for his dismissal; further discussion deferred to next plenary meeting (30 Jan 95, 25)

3, 7 Feb 95 - On 3 February Council fails to muster a quorum to hold an extraordinary session to consider extending the state of emergency in the territory of North Ossetia and Ingush Republic (only 96 of the required 118 members were present) (6 Feb 95, 19); on 7 February rejects the 4 February Yeltsin decree "On the Introduction of a State of Emergency on Part of the Territories of Northern Ossetia and Ingushetia" (vote: 76 for) (8 Feb 95, 19)

10 Feb 95 - Duma adopts proposal of Deputy Mananikov (Russia's Choice) to discuss a POW exchange with Chechnya (vote: 227 for) (10 Feb 95, 13); later on 10

February Duma passes a resolution requesting Yeltsin to arrange the exchange (13 Feb 95, 28)

10 Feb 95 - Duma rejects proposal of Deputy Zadonskiy (Russia's Choice) to discuss Chief of General Staff Kolesnikov's remarks that Dudayev must be killed (vote: 145 for) (10 Feb 95, 13)

20 Feb 95 - Committee organized by the Duma to probe the causes of the crisis in Chechnya begins hearings (21 Feb 95, 22; 22 Feb 95, 23, 32)

MEDIA ISSUES

13 Jan 95 - Yeltsin signs 15 December Duma approved law "On Introducing Changes and Amendments to the Russian Federation Law, 'On the Mass Media'" (26 Jan 95 supplement, 28)

26 Jan 95 - Duma adopts on the second reading the law "On TV and Radio Broadcasting" which bars federal, regional, and other local authorities from controlling programming policy; establishes the Federal Commission on TV and Radio Broadcasting; provides for the institution of an "emergency" broadcasting channel with the approval of the president, the government, and each house of the Assembly (27 Jan 95, 40)

10 Feb 95 - Duma passes a resolution to prevent monopolization of the mass media by the executive branch of power and individual "financial and political groups" (14 Feb 95, 28)

Abbreviations

CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
CPRF - Communist Party of Russian Federation
DPR - Democratic Party of Russia
FSK - Federal Counterintelligence Service
LDPR - Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
MIA - Missing in action
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRP - New Regional Policy
PRES - Party of Russian Unity and Accord
RSFSR - Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
POW - Prisoner of war
U.S. - United States
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT - Value-added tax

Regional Affairs

Chechnya's Dudayev Interviewed on Various Issues

NC1904160395 Baku TURAN in English 1158 GMT 18 Apr 95

["President Dzhokhar Dudayev of the Chechen Republic Speaks to TURAN Agency - April 14, 1995"—TURAN headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [TURAN] There is a lot of talk about the cooling of relations between Russia and the

West and particularly over Russian-American relations. Most people connect these talks with the war in Chechnya. We would like to hear your opinion about the current situation and also your forecast for these relations?

[Dudayev] It is well known that every policy is always based on long term, strategic and tactical interests. What are the interests of the US and priorities in relations with respect to Russia? It is natural that the security of the United States is the foremost priority for Washington. First of all, this means the elimination or maximum reduction of threat of a nuclear war. Second, it means economic security and prosperity and ideologic stability in the country and so on. An unstable nuclear power the like of Russia, in which totalitarianism still exists, of course, is a real and serious danger for the West, and this should be taken into account. For a country the like of Russia - where for the last three centuries the laws of imperialism continue to flourish, i.e. permanent military colonization of neighbouring states and subsequent pillage and genocide—cannot change in the course of an hour. This kind of domestic and foreign policy of a great-power and "great Russia" fits the traditions and customs of the Russians. One recalls what took place when the tsar and the Bolsheviks were in power in Moscow. And today's "Democratic Russia" under Yeltsin means the same. Russians have always been indifferent to who was in office: "the General Secretary of the communist party" or "an alcoholic president". They have not been taught how to participate in democratic elections. Even another fifty or seventy years will not change the face of imperialist nature of the Russians. Imperialism will determine the strategic and tactical behaviour of the Kremlin for a long time. The key point of Russian policy has always been "Rusification". If the Decembrists or Mensheviks had won, the situation today would not have changed radically. The ideology of the great-power, Russia, would be called "Decebrism" or "Menshevism".

Rusification is a special spiritual state, established over the ages by the servitude of the Russians. Only the form, that is the level and degree of the exploitation of the population has changed. The servile soul, obedience to the force, hard labour and a deteriorating attitude to other nations, mercenariism all make up a partial list of the features of Rusification. At the same time, political or economic freedom of an individual person, his or her culture on which humanism and democracy of modern West are based are quite antagonistic to Rusification. Such lackeys hate independent and proud people. That is why they do not like the Chechens. The masters of the Kremlin, regardless their nationality, German, Tatar, Jewish, Georgian or any other nationalities - as a rule, always very successfully employed Rusification. That is why the leader of the country accepts the rules of Rusification or he will taken out of the game.

The latest events surrounding Chechnya explain many approaches of such behaviour of Kremlin leaders. Neither sharp addresses by the publicity, nor the tears of

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soldiers' mothers, nor complaints of anti-constitutionalism on the part of the President of Russia, nor condemnation by the world community have had the slightest effect on Yeltsin. On the contrary, in order to support "Rusification", the Kremlin seeks all external or internal scapegoats. Such objects can be the Jewish people or the US, Muslims or traders, and the Chechens or "people of Caucasian nationality." Rusification does not accept peaceful co-existence of people with equal rights. If a "hostile object" is absent for a long time, if attacks of the adherents of a different faith are absent, then it is fraught with dangerous "revolt by slaves" against the ruling regime.

Regime has always been ruling in Russia. That is why even the West must admit that Yeltsin and his supporters have exhausted all the reserves of democracy which they used to seize power and now they are forced with a new kind of totalitarianism. Naturally, The West understands that today it is more beneficial to appease the "power appetite" of the Kremlin by offering sacrifice Chechnya or Tajikistan, than the USA or Great Britain. They choose the lesser of two evils.

Today all tragic consequences of the Russian-Chechen war are nothing compared with the danger of "Russian nuclear bear." Western experts understand well that until "Rusism" is overcome, Russia will always be dangerous for the people of the world. It is a determining criterion [as received] approach while assessment of the Russian-western or Russian-American relations. That is why the actions of the people in the West supporting Yeltsin and his policy in publicly and officially and particularly of the US, Germany are aimed at making Russia less strong. Being aware of the military potential of the Chechens, about their will and love of freedom about their ability to resist the Russian troops, the leaders of the western states very skillfully encourage the Chechen's gamble of the Kremlin, pushing Russia to the edge of the abyss.

[TURAN] What do you think about the specific interests of some countries in the West?

[Dudayev] For example, Germany, for which the 50-year ban for its own army expire, is building new strategic plans. Trying to occupy a firm position in the western world, a first priority is to turn Russia into weak appendix of Germany. Even today Germany has done a lot to make Russia dependent on Germany economically. Most of the Russian officers work for the Germany's military industry. In fact, for Germany it is an hour of bloodless revenge for the loss in the past war. France and Great Britain have their interests with respect to Russia. Concerning Japan, it is preparing and will present its deadly surprise for Russia. The Japanese are not the nation which forget and forgive, it can wait for the appropriate moment to strike back. I cannot say who will become the grave-digger of the great-power Russia, but I am fully convinced that China will also take part in the funeral team.

[TURAN] Do you mean that Russia is on the way to break-up?

[Dudayev] Of course, not. Russia wants to become economically more strong, but this time under the conditions of semi-socialism and semi-capitalism, of which it got out of the habit. Now this so called former super power must stand as a mere "nation among nations". The consequences of the tactical maneuvers of 1990-91 must be forgotten before the borders of the Union will be restored but at first without Baltic countries. This is the framework of the tactical plans. But a strategic task is the same as before - world hegemony. As you can see it runs counter to the interest of the West and causes political incompatibility at present and antagonism in the near future.

Federal Commander on Whereabouts of U.S. Relief Expert

LD1904151795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1304 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Nadezhda Chaykova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—The command of federal troops in Chechnya has no information on whereabouts of U.S. national Frederick Cuny, disaster relief expert, who disappeared in Chechnya on April 9, Colonel-General Anatoliy Kulikov told a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday [19 April].

According to the general, Cuny is not a journalist, and he did not request for accreditation or any other assistance.

Kulikov, commander of federal troops in Chechnya, is on annual leave since the start of April. The troops are temporarily commanded by Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov, first deputy interior minister.

Yegorov on Ousting Dudayev Supporters From Bamut

LD1904134895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1314 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOZDOK, April 19 (Interfax)—Federal troops on Tuesday [18 April] ousted from Bamut supporters of Dzhokhar Dudayev, but up to 1,000 militants consolidated their positions at the heights over this village. This statement was made on Wednesday [19 April] in an exclusive interview for Interfax by acting commander of the allied federal forces in Chechnya, Colonel-General Mikhail Yegorov.

According to Yegorov, Russian servicemen entered Bamut, the stronghold of Dudayev men in western Chechnya, however, later they were forced to leave the village "to preserve strength", because militants continued firing at the village from the adjacent heights using large-caliber machine-guns, 120mm mortars and small arms.

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The military reconnaissance also "detected" one tank belonging to Dudayev supporters.

To say that Bamut is fully taken under control will "only be possible when the territory around the village is cleared up", said Yegorov.

"General Antonov (commands the operation to capture Bamut—IF) told me that several hundred militants have been killed in the fighting," said the general.

"Russian troops use against the enemy all admissible means of warfare, including aviation and heavy artillery," he said.

The general also said that soon federal troops will have to conduct operations, similar to that in Bamut, in the villages of Orekhovo (3 km from Bamut) and Valerik (20km from Bamut). Yegorov explained this by the fact that up to 500 militants are also based in these villages.

The general said that the federal command, before going over to military operations, attempts to use all peaceful means, that is talks with the elders of those villages.

Speaking about the situation around the village of Ser-gen-Yurt (Shali District, 40 km south-east of Grozny), Yegorov confirmed that heavy fighting goes on in this district. There are casualties among federal troops.

Federal Commander: Main Group of Dudayev Fighters Destroyed

LD1904134395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1315 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—The main grouping of Dudayev supporters has been destroyed in Chechnya, and up to 9,500 militants have been killed. This statement was made at the news conference in Moscow Wednesday [19 April] by commander of the allied contingent of federal troops in Chechnya Anatoliy Kulikov.

Another 7,000 militants are staying in Chechnya. As many as 3,000 of them are well-trained, he said.

There are no reports on casualties among the civilian population, but Kulikov did not rule out that the number of those killed among the civilian population "far exceeds the number of the killed militants."

According to Kulikov, as of today, 80 percent of the Chechen territory where 90 percent of the population live, are liberated from the illegal armed formations.

The commander said that federal troops had captured 854 militants, and some of them were exchanged for the Russian servicemen taken hostage.

Kulikov said since the beginning of hostilities interior troops had lost 133 people killed (749 wounded), the armed forces - 1,338 (3,871 wounded), law enforcement bodies - 47 people (371 wounded).

Engaged at "the culminating moments" of hostilities in Chechnya, said Kulikov, were 39,000 armed forces servicemen, 25,000 interior servicemen and 3,500 officials of law enforcement bodies.

The commander said that the relative stabilization of the situation does not mean that the army should leave the republic. Kulikov said that 12-15,000 servicemen will remain in Chechnya from among the armed forces, 8-10,000 servicemen from among interior forces and 2,500 workers of the law-enforcement bodies.

Kulikov favored local elections in Chechnya, which, he believes, will "eliminate the social base" of the Dudayev regime and will help stabilize the situation.

Kulikov: 'Active Combat' in Chechnya Over

LD1904161095 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the Unified Group of Federal Forces in Chechnya, held a news conference in Moscow today:

[Correspondent Dmitriy Kochetkov] [Video shows news conference in progress, Kulikov addressing it and pointing to maps] The stage of active combat operations in Chechnya is over, Anatoliy Kulikov stated. The main force of fighters has been smashed, and our forces are in control of 80 percent of the republic's territory. Kulikov said that the village of Bamut has been under the complete control of federal forces since yesterday. The remnants of Dudayev's formations are trying to transfer the fighting to Dagestan, but the leaders of that republic will not permit it, the colonel general reckons. Many fighters have gone to the border with Ingushetia, through which arms are still being supplied. Taking the specific features of the area into account, it will be no simple matter to confiscate all the weapons in Chechnya, and so Kulikov thinks it possible that weapons may have to be bought back from the population.

Anatoliy Kulikov rejected reports of mass deaths of civilians in Samashki village. He said that (?Yves Darler), a representative of the International Red Cross, was allowed into the village immediately and had no complaints when he met the commander in Mozdok after his visit to Samashki:

[Begin Kulikov recording] In addition, his opinion is that prisoners were beaten up in Mozdok itself. [end recording]

[Kochetkov] The total losses of federal forces in Chechnya up to 19 April amount to 1,518. Asked why the losses at the beginning of the operation were so high, Anatoliy Kulikov said:

[Begin Kulikov recording] Everything is relative, in any military conflict. No living person can abstract himself from the grief and the tears, from the moral aspect. You

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probably cannot say they are big losses—the losses, although it is blasphemy—the death of a single person is a tragedy. [end recording]

[Kochetkov] In the commander's opinion, the soldiers did not expect such resistance on Russian territory.

[Begin recording] [Kochetkov, interviewing Kulikov] Do you have any information about Dudayev's whereabouts, whether he is dead or alive? There have already been several reports that he is dead or wounded.

[Kulikov] I would answer this way: Dudayev has not been showing himself anywhere for about four weeks now or even longer—not on television, and we have not heard him on the radio. This makes one seriously suspect whether he is there, whether he is alive. [end recording]

Government Press Service Statement on Chechen Situation

LD1904205895 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service* in Russian 1413 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 19 Apr—The press service of the government of the Russian Federation today issued the following report:

"According to a report by the Mobile Information Center, a general meeting of the editorial teams of the Chechen Republic took place in Grozny today. Ismail Munayev, deputy chairman of the information and press committee, set out the range of tasks facing journalists at this difficult time. He said that Dudayev had failed to set the people on to a path of partisan warfare; the people want peace and seek creative work. 'What we need today is truth,' the head of the journalists said, 'truth in the name of rescuing our society, which has been torn apart by contradiction and clan differences.'

"The information and press committee has devised an all-purpose program, 'Creation'. Three republican and three zonal newspapers are being prepared for publication and work has begun on setting up a news agency and a social research center. The hunger for information is now acute: local newspapers are still not being published because of the absence of a polygraphic base, and there are clearly not enough central ones.

"Preparations are underway in Grozny for a scientific-practical conference 'Reconciliation,' which has been planned for 21 April. Delegates from each region, elders, representatives of the intelligentsia, and the clergy will be attending it. Dudayev's fighters have also been invited to take part in the conference.

"The committee for national accord has adopted a decision on the resumption of the activities of trade-unions. The heads of ministries and departments, enterprises, organizations, and educational establishments have been detailed to ensure the activities of the unions. By a decision, the alienation of trade-union property by state bodies is forbidden, and normative acts to outlaw trade-union property, adopted since the end of 1991, are

annulled. An organizational committee to restore the trade-unions has been formed."

Dudayev: Bamut Operation Acquiring 'Protracted Character'

LD1904164395 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English 1546 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ARSHTY (Chechnya) [as received], April 19 (Interfax)—Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev believes that the Bamut operation is acquiring a protracted character for the federal troops.

He told the Council of Representatives of the Chechen Regions in the village of Vedeno in the south of Chechnya that the Chechen guards and militants were displaying feats of heroism and courage.

He also said that the federal troops' actions near Bamut were complicated by the local terrain.

Kulikov Responds To Ingush President's Statement on Arshty

LD1904164295 Moscow *INTERFAX* in English 1546 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, April 19 (Interfax)—"No air strikes were dealt on the Arshty village, but even if they were, then not on the residential area, but on its suburbs and only on militants," the commander of federal troops in Chechnya, Anatoliy Kulikov, said Wednesday.

Commenting on a statement by Ingush President Ruslan Aushev in an interview with Interfax, Kulikov said "not a single strike has been dealt on a civilian target." Prior to this, Aushev had blamed federal aviation for bombing the village and leaving three civilians dead.

"Let Aushev answer why today there is no border between Chechnya and Ingushetia and why he believes that the Arshty village is Ingush, while the Bamut village is Chechen. No one can tell, there is no border. What a unique republic we have, without a border with its neighbors. The Chechen call Arshty a Chechen village, while the Ingush say it is Ingush, though it is Chechen-populated," Kulikov remarked.

According to Aushev's staff, two Russian aircraft dealt a missile strike on Arshty, located several kilometers from Bamut, Tuesday at noon killing three women and wounding another seven persons.

Aushev said Wednesday he intended to "appeal to the world community," if "the criminal actions" like the air strike is repeated. "I regard the inaction in taking measures against those to blame a deliberate policy against a member of the Russian Federation," he said in his statement.

Aushev's staff explained in an interview with Interfax that the Ingush considered Arshty as their own because the republic had been maintaining the village for several years.

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Red Cross Prevented From Entering Samashki Until 11 Apr*LD1904201295 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[Report over video by correspondent Andrey Cherkesov]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cherkesov] Two weeks have passed since Interior Ministry forces carried out the first major operation to take the Chechen village of Samashki. Previously villages were freed with the help of the Army and then the Interior Ministry would clear the territory, but in Samashki the Internal Troops took the whole initiative. [video shows Russian troops in the countryside, helicopters landing, and an elderly lady carrying a white flag walking past a Russian road block]

The Interior Ministry command today told journalists that representatives of the International and Russian Red Cross were allowed into the destroyed village. However, doctors themselves say this is not true. [video shows Red Cross vehicles stopped by Russian troops]

You are looking at pictures taken by the American journalist Thomas Goltz. He, like many doctors, could not get to the village for five days. The Spetsnaz were blockading roads leading to Samashki. Workers from international organizations received only one answer to their request:

[Begin unidentified Russian officer recording, shown talking to Red Cross representatives] Military actions are going on there. Armor [word indistinct]. Helicopters are flying over. [end recording]

[Cherkesov] So, contrary to the statements by the Interior Ministry command, journalists say the first and only International Red Cross representative only managed to get into Samashki in the evening of 11 April. He was taken to the village for a couple of hours. The other doctors, the Russian Red Cross and correspondents, were not allowed in until Thursday 13 April. Throughout those days—from the 9th to the 13th—the military kept firing on the village.

The first thing the doctors who entered Samashki saw was destroyed houses and corpses. [video shows streets with some buildings totally destroyed, corpses under blankets uncovered for the camera, Chechen men burying their dead at a cemetery, a woman wailing in a destroyed house, and another prostrate on a grave]

It cannot be said that the village was destroyed completely; many districts of Samashki remain untouched. The Red Cross say that approximately 250 people died in the village; the survivors buried their relatives in gardens and a few days later dug them up and took them to the Muslim cemetery. This woman lost her husband, brother, and son. [video shows a Chechen woman] The Chechens say this burned girl was 18. [video shows a charred corpse] The Red Cross is indignant at the behavior of the Interior Ministry representative. They

say that the command violated all international commitments set down in the Geneva Convention.

Thomas Goltz and Andrey Cherkesov, NTV.

Chechen Armed Forces Claims Federal Attacks Repulsed*LD1904200595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1902 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sernovodsk (Ingushetia), April 19 (INTERFAX)—Chechen formations repulsed today several attacks launched by federal troops on the villages of Bamut and Orekhovo in West Chechnya, a representative of the Chechen Armed Forces Main headquarters told Interfax.

The official said the Russian command had been forced to bring the troops back to the initial positions.

The Dudayev official said the attack of federal troops on the villages of Serzhen-Yurt and Agishty (40 kilometers to the south-east of Grozny) on the southern front had also failed. He said the Russian troops had retreated to Shali-Avtury after suffering serious casualties.

Dudayev supporters have recently launched several acts of sabotage and terrorist acts in Gudermes, Shali, Argun and Grozny, the same source said.

Former Strategic Missile Facility Near Bamut Destroyed*LD1904211495 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 2022 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] General Kulikov, commander of the Federal forces in Chechnya, has reported that 14 Russian servicemen and about 400 of Dudayev's supporters were killed in the fighting for Bamut.

He also reported that the former facility of the strategic missile forces in the area of Bamut, where the militants were taking cover, was destroyed by a depth bomb. The facility was a two-story underground building.

Security Official Says Dudayev 'Most Likely Wounded'*LD2004063295 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0559 GMT 20 Apr 95*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Bagdatyev]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perm, 20 Apr—"Dzhokhar Dudayev is most likely wounded. He does not respond to radio contacts and holds no meetings with field commanders," Major General Aleksandr Mikhaylov, the head of the public relations center of the Federal Security Service, has said on 19 April. He leads a group of workers of the Federal Security Service that arrived in Perm on 18 April for meetings with the region's population. One of the aims of the trip, which will last until the

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end of the week, is to explain to the public the role played by the service in modern times and its tasks.

Moscow Orders Cease-Fire in Chechnya

LD2004093195 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 0856 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By *ITAR-TASS* observer Tamara Zamyatina]

[*FBIS Translated Excerpt*] Moscow, 20 Apr—The federal troops combat action in Chechnya should cease today. The *ITAR-TASS* observer learned that this Kremlin instruction has been passed on to the Army subunits and units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the Chechen Republic by the power ministers. It is evidently not a coincidence that the military reported that they had taken control of the village of Bamut where a large group of Dudayev's fighters were based on Wednesday, a day before 20 April.

Unfortunately, the planned end to combat action cannot in any way be explained by the complete suppression of armed bandit formations or by an awareness of the scale of bloodshed among the civilian population.

The long awaited cease-fire can be explained differently. As you may know, the U.S. President and the leaders of several European countries did not immediately give their official agreement to visit Moscow on 9 May, in connection with their invitations to the celebrations in Moscow for the 50th anniversary of victory. [passage omitted]

In parallel with the official invitation from the Russian Federation president, the Western partners received guarantees from Moscow of a cessation of combat action by federal troops in Chechnya between 15 and 20 April.

Thus, the great celebration of the 50th anniversary of victory has had a decisive influence on Russian internal policies. However, no one has yet given any guarantees that combat action will not resume after 9 May.

Fighting Continues Around Bamut Village in Chechnya

LD2004101995 Moscow *INTERFAX in English* 0924 GMT 20 Apr 95

[*FBIS Transcribed Text*] *MOZDOK* (North Ossetia), April 20 (*Interfax*)—As of Thursday afternoon detachments of federal forces occupy positions on the approaches to the mountain village of Bamut in Chechnya's west.

Representatives of the Federal Force Command in Chechnya reported to *Interfax* that "separate detachments of Russia's interior forces only periodically enter the village to fulfill the tasks of destroying fighters." Dzhokhar Dudayev's supporters have concentrated on heights above the village and fire on Russian detachments with small arms, heavy machine-guns and mortars.

According to the command, Russian forces will be able to take Bamut under control after all heights in close proximity to the village are cleared of fighters.

Bamut is the last major stronghold of Dudayev fighters in Chechnya's west.

Duma Commission Chairman Denies Children Killed in Samashki

MM1904160295 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian* 20 Apr 95 First Edition p 2

[*Report by Yevgeniy Skukin: "Army Not Shooting Children"*]

[*FBIS Translated Text*] The main event in the State Duma yesterday was the speech by Stanislav Govorukhin, chairman of the State Duma commission for investigating the reasons and circumstances of the emergence of the crisis situation in the Chechen Republic. At the previous session he had been angry that the "Memorial" society and Deputies Lev Ponomarev, Anatoliy Shabanov, and Sergey Kovalev had distributed what were in his view deliberate fabrications about the Russian soldiers' terrible crimes against civilian inhabitants when storming the Chechen village of Samashki, fabrications which should be given a legal assessment.

"I visited Chechnya," S. Govorukhin said, "not only as chairman of the commission but also as a Russian citizen. The moral sense of the Russian, S. Govorukhin believes, simply could not agree with the possibility of such deeds by the Russian Army which, on entering the village, is claimed to have shot the entire population, killing 32 children.

The meeting between the commission members and inhabitants of the village and the military showed unequivocally that such a story could be composed only in a drunken haze of Russophobia. Indeed, they found the original of the misinformation which had been concocted—a Dudayev leaflet which coincided almost word for word. "We have no complaints against Udugov and Dudayev," S. Govorukhin said. "They were doing their job. But for this kind of thing to be disseminated in Moscow? We did not know the like under Kaiser Wilhelm or Goebbels."

The commission's check with the participation of experts showed that Samashki had not been bombed (they bombed the forest where the gunmen were taking cover) or shelled. A tank shot just twice at a water tower where a sniper was sitting. Nor do "Memorial's" figures for destruction in the countryside and the number of civilian casualties correspond to reality. There are just 20 fresh graves in the cemetery yet according to "Memorial" 200-300 civilians alone died. The extra zero here is obviously excessive.

S. Govorukhin believes that the General Prosecutor's Office should institute criminal proceedings with regard

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to two instances: The death of civilians and the dissemination of fabrications which undermine the state.

Internal Troops Reportedly Enter Bamut

MM2004090295 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Nikolay Poroskov: "Troops Enter Bamut. Our Special Correspondent Nikolay Poroskov Reports from the Combat Zone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lying in a depression between the mountains, Bamut today seems to be deserted. But scarcely had Internal Troops subunits tried to enter the city than the nearby heights "belched fire." That is why no radical steps have hitherto been taken to capture the city in order to avoid losses. Only the Air Force and artillery have been at work—on the surrounding forests. Active talks are still under way with the elders but they have not as yet borne fruit.

There have also been certain changes in combat tactics. In the southwestern sector and in Chechnya as a whole, the guerrillas are operating in scattered groups since they have no unified center of leadership, according to counterintelligence information. Nor are they preparing for active operations. But there is no end to the internal struggle for power and influence. For instance, Aslan Maskhadov has complained to his leader—he says that it is time to abandon "naked" politics and take part in combat operations....

Guerrilla detachments have now mainly massed in the Bamut- Chemulga-Arshty triangle. The latter two population centers are in Ingushetia. President Ruslan Aushev ventured to protest the waging of hostilities on the republic's territory. Well, he does have a legal right to do so. But I must point out that the Russian helicopter bombardment is coming from Ingush and also from Dagestani territory. How is that to be viewed?

The situation in Grozny itself is also difficult. In response to the depersonalized reports of an amnesty, over 200 guerrillas have infiltrated here to perpetrate terrorist acts. I must also point out that the city's Russian population is also suffering discrimination following the change of authority. You will rarely see them receiving humanitarian aid. You will more often see them rummaging around in the garbage.

Around 200 Afghan mujahidin were discovered near Vedenov. From the outset they began to clash with the population. Ultimately the mercenaries were forced back into the forest. Major General Nikolay Kovalev, deputy director of the Russian Federal Security Service [FSB], who is in Chechnya, told your KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent that there are over 5,000 guerrillas in

Chechnya. And they are constantly receiving reinforcements. They also have an adequate supply of weapons. As you know, when "sovereignty" was established in Chechnya there were over 120,000 assault rifles alone in the republic. Moreover, there are weapons which have been brought in from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and elsewhere.

Military counterintelligence has arrested several guerrillas, who were sent on reconnaissance missions. They are interested in the federal troops' forces, facilities, and combat tactics. Mercenaries are also being caught. An incident that occurred four days ago is kind of unique: A mother of two children turned out to be a sniper with 20 notches on her rifle.... The FSB believes that many people are coming here to "earn a living" through poverty.

There are various views regarding the possibility of combat operations shifting—following the capture of Bamut—to the mountains and forests. Whereas for Internal Troops groupings the transfer of the fighting to the mountains is an uncontroversial issue, military counterintelligence is more cautious. It is thought that guerrilla warfare is hardly a possibility. In the opinion of the Chechens themselves, you cannot remain in the mountains for long. Many guerrillas have gotten accustomed to a different, more comfortable way of life.

...It became known toward the evening of 18 April that the Internal Troops had entered Bamut, meeting virtually no opposition, and went through virtually the whole city. The next few days will reveal what happens next.

Kulikov: No 'Speedy' Pullout as Hostilities End

MM2004085695 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 95 p 3

[Report by Vitaliy Strugovets: "Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov: Dudayev Is Trying To Embroil Dagestan in the War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel General Anatoliy Kulikov, commander of the Combined Group of Forces in Chechnya, began his press conference by announcing that the population center of Bamut had been liberated from Dudayev's guerrillas by 2000 hours 18 April. With the liberation of Bamut it can boldly be said, the commander continued, that the main grouping of Dzhokhar Dudayev's illegal armed formations has been defeated. According to up-to-the-minute information, today he has around 7,000 guerrillas left in the mountain Veden'skiy, Nozhayurtovskiy, and Shatonskiy Rayons. But at the same time it was noted that Dudayev lacks the social and economic base to continue the war.

By the morning of 19 April the federal forces were 15-20 km from the Dagestani border. Having lost control over a considerable proportion of the republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev is trying to shift the combat operations to

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Dagestani territory. But the Chechen diaspora in Dagestan and the republic's leadership are doing everything they can to prevent this.

As for Chechnya itself, Col. Gen. Kulikov said, the main role in restoring constitutionality is now being given to the newly formed organs of state power. With the end of active combat operations local organs should bear the full brunt of resolving the conflict. This will make it possible to transfer the military conflict to the sociopolitical plane, which will naturally take the wind out of Dudayev's sails once and for all. At the same time the commander noted that the end of combat operations does not mean the troops' speedy withdrawal. Some 12,000-15,000 Defense Ministry servicemen, 8,000-10,000 internal troops, and just over 2,000 internal affairs organ personnel will remain in Chechnya by early summer out of the current 55,000-plus Defense Ministry and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] enlisted men and officers.

Col. Gen. Kulikov spoke about the circumstances in which Samashki and Bamut were liberated, stressing the particular ferocity of the fighting. The internal troop losses, for instance, amounted to almost half of the losses sustained throughout the combat operations in Chechnya. The total losses sustained by the Combined Group of Forces in the period 11 December through 19 April are as follows: 1,518 dead, 4,891 wounded, and 250 missing. Some 40 servicemen are still being held hostage.

**Yeltsin's Press Service Does Not Confirm
Chechen Cease-Fire**

LD2004131495 Moscow 2x2 Television in Russian 1200
GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The representatives of the Russian president's press service do not confirm today's report by ITAR-TASS news agency alleging that by the Kremlin's order, the federal forces' combat operations in Chechnya have to be stopped as of today. In an interview given to a MTV 2x2 correspondent, an employee of the press service said that he does not have any information about such an order. [passage omitted]

Interior Ministry Denies Chechen Ceasefire Order

LD2004153495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1523
GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow April 20 (ITAR-TASS)—The Russian Interior Ministry denied a report of ITAR-TASS commentator Tamara Zamyatina that the Kremlin had issued an order to federal troops in Chechnya to stop combat operations.

The press service of the ministry said in a press release Thursday that the information "does not correspond to reality".

"No such instructions have been received from the leadership of the country. The army and interior units, participating in disarming illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen republic, continue to fulfil their tasks", the ministry said.

International Affairs**Udovenko Discusses Current Issues With Foreign Officials***WS2004094895 Kiev UKRINFORM in English 0721 GMT 20 Apr 95*

[From the "Current Events" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] As the press service of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry reported earlier, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko began a two-day visit to the United Nations headquarters in New York on April 17. On the same day, the Ukrainian foreign minister met with Canada's Foreign Minister Ouellete, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and the U.S. State Department's CIS co-ordinator Ambassador J. Collins, as part of the Ukrainian delegation's program.

During the meetings, Mr. Udovenko informed his interlocutors about the current economic situation in Ukraine, progress of the market reforms being implemented by President Kuchma, as well as about Ukraine's position on the issue of shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Mr. Udovenko's interlocutors also stated their nations' support for Ukraine's actions aimed at overcoming the current economic crisis and ensuring a smoother transfer to market economy. They were united in saying that the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada's [Supreme Council] decision to adopt the 1995 national budget was a great step towards achieving these aims. On the Crimean crisis, both the Canadian and the Chinese foreign ministers, as well as Ambassador Collins expressed their support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. On April 18, Mr. Udovenko addressed the participants at the United Nations conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [passage omitted]

Kiev Favors Indefinite Prolonging of NPT*LD1904164695 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1546 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 19 (Interfax - Ukraine)—Ukraine supports the idea of indefinitely prolonging the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty and believes that "there is no alternative to a nuclear-free world," Ukrainian Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko told the conference on the prolongation of the Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT] in New York on April 18. This news was revealed to Interfax - Ukraine by the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry's press center.

Udovenko said that Ukraine had joined the Nonproliferation Treaty following the declaration of its plans to become a nuclear-free state and to give up the world's third largest nuclear arsenal, all of which was expected to facilitate the success of the conference. He also urged the U.S. and Russia to ratify the START-2 treaty, and the other nuclear states - France, China and Britain - to join the talks on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons.

Udovenko believes that "out of all treaties controlling armaments and disarmament, the Nonproliferation Treaty is the key one, as it helps shape nuclear-disarmament policies." It also allows the nuclear-free states to maintain an efficient and equitable dialogue with the nuclear countries on measures to enhance the current nonproliferation regime and ensure general and complete disarmament.

Welcoming the U.N. Security Council's resolution on security guarantees to this treaty's member-states, Udovenko said that "Ukraine considers it to be one more step towards shaping a corresponding universal legal mechanism." "In this context," said Udovenko, "the world community might use a number of provisions of the Memorandum on Security Guarantees which Ukraine has secured from the nuclear states."

In the area of peaceful uses of atomic energy, Ukraine favors equitable relations of bilateral and multilateral partnership within the limits of the current international procedure of control over the exports of nuclear materials, said Udovenko.

Parliament To Condemn Continuing Blockade of Cuba*LD1904125595 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0840 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev—"We regard the continuing economic blockade of the Republic of Cuba as an encroachment on its natural sovereign rights," notes a draft statement on the economic blockade of the Republic of Cuba, which the Ukrainian Supreme Council is to discuss on 20 April.

The statement also notes that in principle, Ukraine opposes any economic sanctions against other states with the exception of aggressor states. It stresses that the imposition of economic sanctions is reflected on the economy of third countries and does not even benefit those who initiate blockades. The Ukrainian Supreme Council calls on the world community to find modern and civilized means for safeguarding human rights.

"The Ukrainian parliament confirms its respect for the people of Cuba who, despite its own difficulties, renders enormous assistance to Ukraine in overcoming the effects of the Chernobyl tragedy, and is convinced that the long experience of Ukrainian-Cuban cooperation will continue to multiply," says the draft statement.

Britain Pledges To Help Ukraine Join Council of Europe*LD1904165195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1245 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] New York—In the last few days the UN headquarters has become a place of active contacts between the heads of diplomatic missions from around the world. [passage omitted]

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On 18 April, Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko met Douglas Hurd, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs. They discussed the possibility of inviting Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma to a G-7 meeting in Halifax (Canada), where the issues of rendering assistance to Ukraine will be discussed.

Mr. Hurd also promised to use all the influence that Britain has in Europe to speed up Ukraine's entry to the Council of Europe.

On the same day the Ukrainian foreign minister met Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana Madariaga. During the conversation they discussed Ukraine's cooperation with NATO within the "Partnership for Peace" program, as well as in the context of closer cooperation on the basis of a special partner status. According to Mr. Madariaga, Spain will also promote Ukraine's integration with European structures, particularly the Council of Europe.

Hennadiy Udovenko also met Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko. They discussed prospects for cooperation within the CIS and on a bilateral basis.

The problem of nuclear nonproliferation and the expansion and strengthening of bilateral relations in various sectors were the subject of short bilateral discussions between the Ukrainian foreign minister and the foreign ministers of Finland, Nigeria, Lebanon, Egypt, Italy, Hungary, and Macedonia [FYROM—Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. [passage omitted]

Kuchma Expected To Visit Moscow on Victory Day

LD1904173895 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1520 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow—It is expected that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma will visit Moscow for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the victory [9 May], the Eastern Europe and Asia Department at the Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Ministry informed a UNIAR correspondent.

Official Criticizes Kozyrev's Remarks

LD1904183295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1638 GMT 19 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Presidential Chief of Staff Dmytro Tabachnyk is sceptical about the chances of a power sharing bill being approved as a whole.

Speaking at a news briefing in Kiev, he called for parliamentary approval of the bill in its second reading before its compilers decided what to do next.

He accused the Parliament Chairman of trying to emasculate the proposed law and senior parliamentary officials of attempts to put it off until this autumn.

Tabachnyk said that the parliament was still far away from constructive work. IF Note: Earlier President Kuchma threatened to address the nation if the parliament defeated the bill.

On Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's statement about a possible use of force to protect members of the Russian-speaking communities in other countries, Tabachnyk said "this is only the view of the minister but not of the Russian government". IF Note: The Russian minister made his statement at a meeting by the foreign policy council in Moscow. He also said Kiev must account for the will of Crimeans while trying to resolve the regional crisis.

Tabachnyk said Russian officials were often led by one-off considerations rather than the country's longer range interests. He believes Kozyrev's statement must be seen in the light of coming elections in Russia. Tabachnyk said that Kozyrev is a member of the State Duma and may be cherishing plans to continue his political career.

Referring to the current Moscow-Kiev talks and Acting Premier Yevhen Marchuk's meeting with the Russian leader, Tabachnyk said these prove that the views held by top Russian officials are largely at odds with Kozyrev's position.

Marchuk Comments on Talks With Yeltsin

LD1904214195 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1902 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 19 (Interfax-Ukraine)—Ukraine's acting Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk said "Boris Yeltsin confirmed that Crimea is an integral part of Ukraine" during their meeting in Moscow Tuesday [18 April].

Marchuk told Interfax-Ukraine Wednesday that Yeltsin "admitted that Russia had interests in Crimea, and would like to discuss forms of meeting them in a good fashion."

Commenting on statement by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev on Russia's readiness to use force to protect ethnic Russians abroad, Marchuk propositioned that Kozyrev had already "launched his election campaign."

Speaking on the Black Sea Fleet issue, Marchuk said he "did not regard the situation at the talks as a deadlock." He emphasized the importance of Ukrainian information getting directly to the Russian leadership.

Marchuk described the Russian leaders he had met in Moscow as "realists and pragmatists."

Marchuk said it took him "only five minutes" to lay out his arguments to Boris Yeltsin before the latter agreed to confirm the inviolability of Ukrainian borders in the bilateral treaty now being prepared.

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"He listened to them and made the decision we had been trying to agree on with Russian experts for six months," Marchuk said.

Marchuk Seeks Settlement of Black Sea Fleet Issue

LD1904214795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1859 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, April 19 (INTERFAX-UKRAINE)—Ukraine loses from the fact that the Black Sea Fleet issue remains unsolved more than Russia, Ukrainian Chief Negotiator for talks with Russia, acting Prime Minister Yehen Marchuk told Interfax - Ukraine in an exclusive interview today.

He said Ukraine was interested in resolving the problem not less and probably even more than Russia.

Marchuk stressed that Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma shared this point of view.

Marchuk said that the Black Sea Fleet issue was a complex problem, involving not only military but also environmental, social, political and technical aspects. He said that there would be no progress on the issue as long as military officials dominate the talks.

Speaking about the social aspects of the problem, Marchuk said there had been the practice in the USSR of officers from all fleets moving to Crimea for retirement.

He said it was a good doctrine to give those who had served in difficult circumstances an opportunity to live in a good place after retiring. Marchuk added, however, that Ukraine now has to deal with the issue of their social security.

National Affairs

Foreign Ministry Official on Implementation of CFE

WS1904134495 Kiev KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 13 Apr 95 p 4

[Report by Tetyana Silina: "About Flank Restrictions of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Experts Believe They Do Not Conform to Ukraine's National Security Interests"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Certain media have recently reported that Ukraine has apparently changed its stance on the implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). (This July, three years will pass since the treaty came in force). In the opinion of Volodymyr Belashov, acting chief of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry Directorate for Control Over Weapons and Disarmament, these rumors might have been prompted by the fact that Ukraine, while attempting to resolve the so-called flank problem, used one of the possibilities envisioned in the treaty this year.

Let us recall the essence of this problem. The principle of regional distribution of weapons in the area in which the treaty is in force (from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains) envisions the strict maintenance of relatively low numbers of certain types of weapons, in particular tanks, armored vehicles, and artillery systems with a caliber over 100 millimeters, in flank regions (according to the treaty, the area on which it is in force is divided into four zones—Central Europe, expanded Central Europe, rear region, and flank region). In its flank region, meaning on the territory of the former Odessa Military District—and it is almost 25 percent of our country—Ukraine is allowed to keep as little as 7-12 percent of the total number of its military equipment. Experts from our Foreign Ministry believe that flank restrictions are somewhat discriminatory toward Ukraine, and do not allow it to deploy weapons on its own territory in accordance with its national security interests. This results in an unjustifiably high concentration of weapons in other regions of our country, which, in turn, may provoke fully understandable anxiety of our neighbors.

Ukraine has been trying to resolve the flank problem, which also concerns the Russian Federation, in the Joint Consultative Group, set up in September 1993 to contribute to the implementation of the treaty. Still, after a year and a half the problem remains unresolved. Ukraine has thus decided to use the possibility of temporarily deploying weapons and equipment, envisioned in Article 5 of the CFE. As a matter of fact, however, as Volodymyr Belashov explained, Ukraine is not deploying anything (the term used in the treaty may be confusing). We will simply have reduced less weapons and withdrawn less equipment by 17 November, when the maximum numbers of weapons envisioned in the treaty will come in force. In the current financial situation, such prudence will save Ukraine substantial money.

"The fact that Ukraine is using the possibility of temporary deployment does not mean that it has changed its position," the chief of the Directorate for Control Over Weapons and Disarmament reiterated. "We would like, however, to resolve this problem definitely, and not temporarily." An international conference on the implementation of the CFE is to be held this May. Volodymyr Belashov does not rule out that Ukraine will raise the issue of flank restrictions at the conference. However, since this will bring about great difficulties, Ukraine, according to him, intends to resolve the flank problem within the framework of the treaty. By the way, Ian Lodal [name as transliterated], main adviser to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, who visited Kiev this week, said that his country's key task is to preserve the CFE in the current form. Having promised the treaty members assistance and cooperation, the high-ranking representative of the Pentagon emphasized that it is important that former Soviet republics fulfill their commitments. This reprimand has apparently been prompted by suspicious Russian threats to stop the implementation of the treaty in case of NATO's eastward expansion. Commenting on

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the current situation at KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI's request, Volodymyr Belashov noted that, speaking politely, it is incorrect that Russia links the future North Atlantic Union with the implementation of the signed and ratified treaty. "This, however, should be resolved by Russia itself. We believe that the treaty has already recommended itself as an effective and useful instrument for maintaining stability in Europe. And it is at least not farsighted to undermine its foundations," the Ukrainian expert for weapons control is convinced.

Kuchma Faces Obstacles in Power Bill Struggle
WS1904133095 Kiev INTELNEWS in English 0429
GMT 19 Apr 95

["Special to Intelnews" by Olha Ansimova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Procedural wrangling over the adoption of President Leonid Kuchma's Power Bill was the main cause of last weeks political collision between the president and leftist forces in parliament—beginning with Kuchma's demonstrative walkout and ending with the leftist blockade of the session.

The president's swift exit was caused more by the fact that parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz gave the floor to a leftist not listed on the agenda rather than the content of the speech itself, in which Communist Oleksandr Stashenko severely criticized the executive.

The speaker's behavior at the beginning of the hearing showed Kuchma that all attempts at compromise had been exhausted. Kuchma, having finally made certain that he lost, left parliament because he failed to find a way to exert pressure on Moroz.

The speaker had earlier demonstrated that he was ready to undermine the president's Power Bill. Right after the Presidium's report in parliament, a Socialist Party political council was held in which it adopted a resolution announcing its opposition to the ruling structures, the policy of which "leads to the destruction of Ukraine."

At the same time, the president, obviously calculating his future failure in parliament and hoping to work out countermeasures against the leftists' attack, immediately held a session of the regional council to discuss the Power Bill. We will discuss this later.

Let us return to the procedures of the Power Bill adoption. The legal collision is caused by the fact that much of the Power Bill contradicts the constitution. The constitutional committee proposed to adopt the entire bill, then discuss its articles and adopt amendments to the Constitution where necessary. According to parliament regulations, a document needs a simple majority to discuss it article by article. Thus, despite the leftist opposition, the bill could be adopted. As for further amendments to the Constitution (the procedures provide for a two-thirds vote for their adoption), the president's supporters could push them through by referring to the already-adopted Power Bill. In any case, if the

leftists had blocked the constitutional amendments, the president could have appealed to the people for support.

The leftists, however, set a political obstacle course, beginning with their proposal to adopt every article by the constitutional majority—which would fail since there is a leftist majority in parliament—and ending with the demand not to adopt the Power Bill because it contradicts the Constitution.

As a result of the debates and by the proposal of Speaker Moroz, parliament adopted the procedure whereby it would not vote on the bill in its entirety, instead discussing it article by article. Those articles on which they agreed could be adopted by simple majority, and the thorny ones postponed for a third reading. The document should then be put into effect either by referendum or constitutional amendment. Since the bill is not to be adopted as a whole, interested parties will be able to take or add to the Kuchma bill as they see fit, which means that the presidential bill may undergo serious changes if it ever makes it to the referendum foreseen by parliament.

One can already observe the latter supposition, particularly, in the leftist attempt to subordinate the executive to parliament by trying to give the legislature the right to block government resolutions. When this failed, parliament attempted to give this right to the speaker. The right-centrists have blocked this decision so far, but the question was postponed until a third reading.

But the right-centrists failed to oppose the left's attempt to widen the list of ways parliament can impeach the president. This question also was postponed for the third reading. There are some other examples of changes, proposed by the concord committee. Hot debates are expected, however, when parliament discusses provisions on the authority of the president and government.

The discussions of this question showed the passive position of the right-centrists, which was based on many factors: the failure in the beginning with the voting procedures; the attempt to put the responsibility for the future of the Power Bill on the leftists; and, the personal interests of the deputies. Former President Leonid Kravchuk himself, unofficially carrying out the policy of opposition to Kuchma, prompted Moroz to put the Power Bill into effect by referendum.

Not long ago, Kravchuk had said he was opposed to the idea of referendums of any kind, saying different political forces could use the referendum and initiate various solutions to problems, such as the renewal of the Soviet Union and the separation of Donbas and of Crimea from Ukraine.

The only solution for Kuchma in the current situation is to dismiss parliament. The president does not have the legal ground to do so, but he could initiate a referendum of confidence in the president and parliament. Taking into account the difficult reform process and the latest

increase of tariffs for municipal services, however, there is no certainty that people will support Kuchma.

That is why Kuchma chose a less risky maneuver. At a meeting with deputies last week, Kuchma announced his intention to conduct a survey on the Power Bill. A survey does not have legal force, but Kuchma could use its results to influence parliament.

In his survey and in further possible referendums of no-confidence in parliament, Kuchma expects the support of mayors and governors who are members of the Regional Council. The president's supporters have said several times they could collect enough signatures of local government leaders to initiate a referendum. One may suppose that the Regional Council session held behind closed doors on the eve of the parliamentary debates on the Power Bill was ready to devise ways out of the situation.

Even if Kuchma has gained the support of the Regional Council, there is still no way of knowing how local government leaders will act because their interests in the president's ideas vary. During the creation of the Regional Council, the governors supported Kuchma because they liked the idea of having control over local enterprises in all forms. The governors would have received the right to collect property taxes from private firms and enterprises, shielding the collection from political wrath by saying the money was needed for some ecological program or the like.

The current Power Bill, however, gives local authorities the right to control only state-run property. Moreover, the situation with the local governors, who were duly elected, is complicated by the bill, according to which the president has the right to discharge a local administration head. The governors, however, stand to receive considerable independence and authority if the local council system collapses the way Kuchma wants.

The problem today is whether Kuchma will be able to convince his allies that the system of councils cannot be destroyed without his intervention. After the Power Bill, parliament will hear the draft law on local self-governing bodies, where the left will probably try to take revenge.

Kuchma Signs World War Two Amnesty Edict

LD1904214395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1546 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, April 19 (Interfax-Ukraine)—President Kuchma has signed a decree on amnesty on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the victory in World War II.

Head of the president's administration Dmitriy Tabachnyk announced during a briefing on Wednesday [19 April] that amnesty be applied to participants in combat operations, individuals disabled during the war, and war veterans who have served one-third of their term or who are to serve less than five years before the end of the term.

Also, individual categories of prisoners who have served most of their term will be freed.

The amnesty will also be granted to the widows of veterans of the Great Patriotic and Afghan wars, and other military conflicts outside Ukraine.

Tabachnyk said that amnesty would not apply to the recidivists and to the criminals who caused the death of several people.

Local governments have been instructed to make lists of amnestied people and exercise control over their conduct.

Tsekov Denies Reports on Dissolving Parliament

LD1904151095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1258 GMT 19 Apr 95

[By Lev Ryabchikov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Simferopol, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Chairman of the Crimean parliament Sergey Tsekov today denied reports that fifty of the Crimean parliament's 98 members had voted on Tuesday [18 April] in favour of dissolving the parliament of the autonomous republic of Crimea and forming a new body of representative power. A report sent to Kiev lists 59 Crimean parliament members who had not signed an appeal to the Ukrainian parliament on this matter.

Those who initiated the appeal to the Ukrainian parliament no longer say that they are backed by a majority. Their appeal disavowed Sergey Tsekov's recent address to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia's federal parliament and proposed forming a new parliament in Crimea. One of the signatories, Aleksandr Korotko, told ITAR-TASS today that more than fifty people had supported the appeal on Tuesday but no more than 46 deputies backed it on Wednesday.

Meanwhile, some Crimean parliament members are collecting signatures under an appeal to the people of Crimea prepared by the "Russia-Unity" faction. The appeal says that a group of Crimean parliament members headed by the Kurultay faction leader Rifat Chubarov and his supporter Vasilii Shpilkin had "surreptitiously scribbled a petition to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine". The petition is described as "a political informer's report against parliament chairman Sergey Tsekov."

The Communist Party of Crimea today expressed a resolute protest in connection with the appeal to Kiev of a group of parliament members. "The deputies who signed that appeal are trying to substitute themselves for the entire Crimean parliament and thus grossly trample on the expression of the will of all voters," the communists said in their statement. "Only the people of Crimea have the right to decide the fate of their supreme body of representative power," the statement said.

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Official Kiev, however, continues to assert that a majority in the Crimean parliament had appealed to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine to disband the autonomous republic's legislature. The Ukrainian President's Chief of Staff Dmitro Tabachnyk called the appeal "a lawful reaction to Sergey Tsekov's politicking", ITAR-TASS learned in Kiev. Tabachnyk stressed that "the president and the parliament of Ukraine acted within the framework of the Constitution, which was, at long last, viewed positively in Crimea".

Sources in the Ukrainian parliament's provisional Commission for the Investigation of the Political and Legal Situation in Crimea told ITAR-TASS that commission members had prepared a draft law concerning the suspension of the Crimean parliament's authority and the calling of new elections. According to the sources, the Crimean issue would be considered by the Ukrainian parliament next week.

Crimea: Possibilities of Agreement With Kiev Exhausted

LD2004104195 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0830 GMT
20 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Simferopol, [no date as received]—"We have exhausted all the possibilities of reaching agreement with Ukraine," noted Serhiy Tsekov, chairman of the Crimean parliament, in a speech during the morning session of the Crimean parliament.

He considers that the only possibility left is "to appeal to the international community"—this was the explanation he gave for his speech at a session of the Russian Federation State Duma.

"My task is to bring the unprecedented actions adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Council and those violations which the Ukrainian leadership permitted to the attention of the world community," Tsekov said.

Serhiy Tsekov also noted that it is impossible to carry on working without clarification of the decisions adopted by the Supreme Council and the Ukrainian president on 17 and 31 March.

According to him, experts already gave their assessment of these decisions. To tell the truth, they refused to put their signatures to the acts because they were afraid that "appropriate measures would be taken" against them.

After the break deputies continued to discuss the legal and political situation in the Republic of Crimea. The issue of an appeal from a group of Crimean deputies to the Ukrainian Supreme Council is also on the agenda of the session.

A considerable majority of deputies are not present in the chamber because according to Volodymyr Klychnykov, deputy chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, 28 deputies who signed the statement left for Kiev this morning.

Crimea Crisis Seen Certain To Recur

954F2093A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in
Russian No 22, 2-9 Apr 95 p 6

[Article by Vyacheslav Savchenko, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI correspondent, Simferopol: "Journey to Statehood"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The current round in the fight for influence in Crimea has brought success to Kiev, but it is not the last round. The deprived Moscow, Simferopol, and Kiev politicians are preparing for a continuation of the fight. But, in the meantime, the Crimean confrontation gave an unusual result: the discrediting of the statehood of the peninsula and the complication of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Analysis

The desperate decisions adopted at the beginning of April by the Supreme Council of Crimea, the usual appeal to world public opinion, and the appeal to their Kiev colleagues, only indicate the complete impotence of the current deputy corps. It would have been possible to talk about the failure of the idea of Crimean statehood if it were not for the unwarranted toughness of the actions of the Ukrainian side.

It has already been five years that Crimea and Ukraine have been trying to regulate their mutual relations. The history of the problem dates from April of 1990, when the question "on increasing the state status of Crimea" was raised for the first time by the oblast party committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine. It was only after several months that Communist Yuriy Meshkov and the nonparty Boris Kizilov "voiced" it at a session of the oblast soviet, where their proposal was put into effect owing to the support of the communist faction Unity. Then there was the general Crimean referendum of 20 January 1991, the Republican Movement of Crimea, with its sensational rallies, and no less sensational hunger strikes and ostentatious banquets, and the pre-election bloc Rossiya, and the dual victory in the elections—parliamentary and presidential.

All this time, Ukraine treated Crimea as an unreasonable child is treated by an even more unreasonable teacher. The autonomy of the peninsula was recognized, but at the same time Ukraine continued to build a unitary state. New absurdities grew from this. For example, Crimea was permitted to have a constitution, but it was not permitted to have a Constitutional Court; that is, the mechanism for the Constitution's implementation.

Strategic miscalculations were supplemented by tactical miscalculations. It could generally appear from the outside that Leonid Kravchuk, with the assistance of Nikolay Bagrov, the former Crimean speaker, was subtly and carefully paving the way to the authority of Yuriy Meshkov and the Republican Movement of Crimea. The hasty appointment of a representative of Ukraine to Crimea on the eve of the parliamentary elections was

really something. With this move alone, Kravchuk canceled the dissatisfaction that had already started to arise among Crimeans with Yuriy Meshkov and literally pushed them to the ballot boxes. And having received their ballots, they were forced to vote for the loud-mouthed candidates of the Russia bloc: No other political force existed at that time on the peninsula.

As a result, Kravchuk himself "lost" Crimea. While in the first round of the first presidential elections, Kravchuk received two-thirds of the votes of the Crimean voters, then in the second elections he did not even collect 10 percent.

But Leonid Kuchma, it seems, will surpass even these results. He is conscientiously and quickly repeating the errors of his predecessor.

In his time, Kravchuk's team made the Crimea a tsar's gift: It left all of the taxes that are collected here at the disposal of the Crimean authorities, continuing at the same time to finance many structures (the apparatus of the administration, militia, television, and much else). It was believed that thereby Kravchuk was beating one of the main trump cards of the "republicans" concerning the plundering of Crimea by Ukraine. Well, and so what? The Crimeans continued to talk about theft at rallies and over television and radio, and to write about it in newspapers. Thus, the Crimeans did not acknowledge the president's tsarist gift.

Kuchma also came to an agreement about this with Anatoliy Franchuk, the Crimean prime minister. And with absolutely the same results: The Crimeans do not know anything about this and, judging by everything, they will not learn about it. But, after all, if they found out, they would involuntarily think about it. In such a situation, they should live better than any oblast in Ukraine, and they live incomparably worse.

The Union for the Support of the Republic of Crimea in its time headed the agitation for Kuchma in the period of the preelection campaign, and even now it remains the only one that almost unconditionally supports the Ukrainian president.

According to March data of the Crimean Center for Humanitarian Studies, only one-half percent of the Crimean voters are prepared to support this party. But, after all, as recently as the summer of last year, nine-tenths of the Crimeans voted for Kuchma.

And so now, already under Kuchma, the institution of president and the constitution were taken away from Crimea. And even if one assumes that the Crimean voters are already disappointed in one and the other, the behavior of Kiev inevitably provokes their protest.

Of course, Crimea did everything in order to push Kiev into such tough steps. And it is not just that the Constitution of Crimea was not implemented in accordance

with the legislation of Ukraine. One can also recall the badgering of the government, which the deputies themselves formed less than a half year ago. But what need was there for Yuriy Meshkov literally several hours before the examination of the "Crimean question" to send a telegram to Yeltsin and Grachev with a request not under any circumstance to withdraw the coastal defense division of the Black Sea Fleet from Simferopol?

The arrival of Konstantin Zatulin also added bellicosity to the deputies. Especially his declaration about the actual nonrecognition of "borders that never existed before in history of a state that never existed before in history."

The institution of the presidency... the constitution... Crimean statehood. Alas, there is nothing, nor has there ever been anything, behind these fine-sounding words. Back in Nikolay Bagrov's time, a group of highly placed officials for its own purposes simply used the natural hostility of the Crimeans to the ideology of Ukrainian nationalism and their aspiration not to disrupt ties with Russia. And the objectives were simple: to create a "black hole" on the peninsula in order "to dispose" freely of the wealth of Crimea. Meshkov also tried to achieve this with his own confederates, with the only difference being that they opposed Ukrainian nationalism with Russian nationalism, and they got wealthy clumsily and, therefore, insolently.

But the Ukrainian authorities also behaved in an unjustifiably tough way, eliminating the institutions of the presidency and the Crimean Constitution. And it was not an accident that so much was said about property at the time of the adoption of the decision of 17 March within the walls of the Ukrainian parliament. In fact, the whole debate was and is about one thing: What group of bureaucrats will get rich at the expense of Crimean property. The sanatoriums of the southern shore smell of billions of dollars. It is exactly for them that the fight is going on.

But if it were otherwise, could it really not be noticed in Ukraine that, in fact, the Republican Movement of Crimea, the Republican Party, and the Russia bloc are all only different names for the same soap bubble. They even went to the elections hurriedly, robbing different parties and movements. For example, the slogan "Crimea is the bridge between Ukraine and Russia" was stolen from the Union for the Support of the Republic of Crimea, an idea that was born in the USSR—among the communists, etc. The promised team of "highly-placed professionals" also proved to be a bluff: After the departure for home of the unsuccessful minister reformers headed by Yevgeniy Saburov, parliament was compelled once again to return to their ministerial offices the very same officials whom Nikolay Bagrov cherished.

If anyone could lodge a complaint against the Meshkov-Tsekov team, it is the Russian Federation—for discrediting the name of Russia. Ukrainian politicians should only have been happy. The journey to statehood with their aspirations turned into a pitiful farce for Crimea, and into poverty and despair for the Crimeans.

Now Kiev has taken the responsibility onto itself, at the same time even further painfully hurting the pride of the Crimean voters. And the consequences will not be long in coming. The ex-president has already adopted the pose of a political martyr, and the parliamentarians are only rehearsing the pose. The familiar song is just on the point of beginning to resound: "The Crimea was a step from full well-being, but the gentlemen from Kiev did not allow us to achieve it."

The idea of Crimean sovereignty was saved through the endeavors of Ukrainian authorities. So, its new apologists, more intelligent and more subtle, are already advancing. There will be no eccentric leaders among them, and they will not be financed as clumsily as was done by Impeks-55. And the new generation of Ukrainian politicians will still have to persuade them to adopt the idea of federalism, official bilingualism, and any degree of economic and political freedoms—everything, just so that a redivision of the borders and war should be avoided. This is in the best case. In the worst case, they will do without agreements.

New Launch Vehicle in Progress in Dnipropetrovsk

AU2004091795 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 15 Apr 95 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Anniversary of the 'Zenit'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Collectives of the design office "Pivdenne" [Southern] and the "Southern Machine-Building Plant" in Dnipropetrovsk are marking the 10th anniversary of the start of the world renowned launch vehicle "Zenit" [zenith].

"The launch was planned for the Astronautics Day," recalls Stanislav Konyukhov, general designer at the "Pivdenne" Design Office. "However, the weather caused a revision: A blizzard storm raged in the Baykonur area, and some sections at the launch site got frozen. It was decided not to put the promising 'first-born' at risk and postpone the launch by 24 hours. The new date that fell on the 13th [April] made people feel somewhat uneasy. But despite the superstitions, the launch was excellent, and today, the 'Zenit' remains one of the world's most economical, high-precision, reliable, and ecologically safe launch vehicles."

At present, in accordance with the Russian-Ukrainian interstate programs, a three-stage variant of "Zenit"—a launch vehicle of the 21st century—is being designed at the Dnipropetrovsk Design Office. It will make it possible to put future spacecraft on new orbits.

Belarus**Experts Meet To Set Up CIS Atomic Energy Center***WS2004083795 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0700 GMT 20 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The establishment of an Interstate Center for the Use of Atomic Energy, Nuclear and Radiation Safety and Mutual Aid in the liquidation of consequences of radioactive contamination is the subject of a two-day sitting of experts of the CIS member-states, which started at the CIS Headquarters in Minsk on 19 April.

At the same time, another group of experts is to complete the elaboration of the draft statute of an Interstate Fund for Aid in Emergency Situations of natural and technogenic character.

Foreign Minister Attends NPT Conference in New York*WS2004093095 Minsk BELAPAN in English 0700 GMT 20 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Uladzimir Syanko, Belarusian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who heads the Belarusian delegation at the conference for the review and prolongation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] in New York, met with UN Secretary General Butros Butros-Ghali. He handed a message from President of the Republic of Belarus Alyaksandar Lukashenka, which contained the request to render assistance to Belarus in the process of demilitarization in the country. As a BELAPAN correspondent was informed at the press and information department of the Belarusian foreign office, Mr. Syanko is expected to voice Belarus' position with respect to the NPT at a plenary sitting. It will be recalled that Belarus insists on its open-ended prolongation. Mr. Syanko will also meet with the ministers of foreign affairs of a number of states. The Belarusian foreign minister will also hold talks at the U.S. Department of State and at the U.S. National Security Council.

Lukashenka's Ban of Investment Funds Viewed*WS1904140095 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1100 GMT 19 Apr 95*

[Commentary by Nadezhda Lanskaya: "Is Privatization Going Backward?"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] One can assert without exaggeration that among the events of the last week, the greatest social reaction was caused by the stopping of the activity of investment funds sanctioned by the Presidential Administration and its subsequent reverberations.

The edict of the president of the Republic from 27 March 1995 No. 47 stopped the activity of all 38 specialized investment funds [SIF] of the Republic for an indefinite period, "until the president of the Republic

approves a decision on the inspection" of their activity, which the Cabinet of Ministers has been charged to carry out within a month.

Moreover the results of the first auction of state shares in the capital of joint-stock companies for inscribed privatization vouchers, or checks, the so-called "cheque auctions," which took place on 30 March—where more than a half of the shares had been acquired by investment funds—were, in fact, annulled.

According to the terms of the auction, payments from the winners of purchases must be carried out within a month from the time of holding an auction. There was no time to calculate the number of public vouchers, the winners of the auction had, because the very next day on 31 March, the Savings Bank of the Republic of Belarus received an order from the Ministry of Management of State Property and Privatisation on the halting of the "actions, giving all funds licenses to deal with inscribed privatization vouchers and the stopping of operations to open funds and voucher accounts, apart from operations involving depositing of vouchers in them."

The leaders of several investment funds held an extended press conference on 4 April, at which Alyaksandr Samankow, chairman of the Board of the First Investment Fund, called the edict of the president "the first step in the disruption of popular (that is by vouchers) privatization in the Republic." In his opinion, the approval of a series of documents, which will also limit the activity of other dealers in non-state forms of property should be anticipated in the near future. According to the organizers of the press conference, the edict contradicts the existing legislation of Belarus, in particular: Article No. 20 of the Law "On Securities and Stock Exchanges"; Item 15 of the Provisional Regulations on the licensing of activities of specialized investment funds accumulating vouchers; Articles No. 3, 16 and 28 of the Law "On Joint-Stock and Limited Liability Companies"; Articles No. 90-92 of the Law "On Enterprises"; Articles No. 11, 12 and 13 of the Law "On Inscribed Privatization Vouchers in the Republic of Belarus"; Article No. 28 of the Civil Code and Article No. 1 of the Constitution of the Republic.

The leaders of investment funds sent appeals to the president with the request to repeal the edict, to the Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform, the Achievement of Economic Independence, and the Sovereignty of the Republic, and to the Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation with the request to assess legally the edict, and, if there are suitable grounds, to appeal to the Constitutional Court of the Republic.

A special appeal was sent by investment funds to international financial-credit organizations. In it, in particular, it is said: "Investment funds of Belarus draw the attention of international organizations to the fact that in the Republic of Belarus the process of privatization has practically been stopped by a presidential edict. Many months of work on the decree on the stimulation

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of privatisation, approved by the president somewhat earlier (21 March 95), after six days after publication were practically brought 'to naught'. As a result the confidence of citizens of the Republic in market reforms in general and in privatisation has been significantly undermined.

In the said edict, the violation of the rights of the owner-citizen is clearly envisaged. Being owners of vouchers, the citizens of Belarus turn out to be shunned from the future process of privatisation.

At present, around 40 investment funds have been registered and have begun their activity, to whom more than 150,000 citizens have entrusted their vouchers. A securities market is being formed. However, the pace of the issue of securities in Belarus has not kept up at all with the pace of privatisation. In 1995, not a single enterprise was privatised in the Republic. Shares were released on the exchange to the total value of 1.5 million vouchers, which amount to 0.2 percent of the value of property liable to gratuitous privatisation. In our view, the edict of the president on the stopping of the activity of specialized investment funds creates a moral detriment to the idea of privatisation and the authority of funds as an institutional participant of privatisation, and places a serious obstacle to reforming economy.

An unexpectedly widespread public response caused by the edict on the stopping of the activity of investment funds made the president to speak out on this question. In an interview on Belarusian Television, broadcasted on 8 April, in the information and analytical program "Rezonans," he said that the reason for the appearance of the said edict was the results of the inspection of investment funds conducted by the Control Service of the Presidential Administration and the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic, who revealed "sheer violations, from their establishment to their activity." The reaction of the president to steps, undertaken by investment funds in their defense was unambivalent: "These investment funds have gone too far. They have already started to appeal to the world community, to the IMF, announcing that privatisation has been disrupted. They have undertaken the road of damaging the state." Further the president announced the following: "I do not want similar companies as 'MMM' and others inherent in fraternal Russia to appear in the Republic of Belarus. I think that common people also do not want this. But the president will not allow the violation of even loose laws, which were passed by the Supreme Soviet in the time. I understand what is happening. I predict what will happen here in connection with the unbridled activity of these diverse dealers in the market economy, not only specialized investment funds, but also other market dealers, if this way is not stopped, not called to a halt right now." Nothing was added to what the president said on television. I would like, however, in conclusion to say a few thoughts based not so much on my own assessments as on those of independent experts who are not personally affected by the SIF problems. Numerous

inspections of investment funds, including those conducted by the Prosecutor's Office of the Republic and the Control Service of the Presidential Administration, did not reveal scandalous violations of the law, however convinced the inspectors of the necessity to improve legislation and the normative base in this sphere, to accelerate the privatisation of state property. Asserting the unsatisfactory financial condition of three of the investment funds under inspection—the First Republican Investment Fund, "Suprimeks," and "Saturn-Invest"—due to the lack of opportunities to deposit accumulated inscribed privatisation vouchers in shares of privatised enterprises, the Presidential Administration, nevertheless, prepares an edict for one more inspection, not only depriving them of the opportunity to deposit citizen's vouchers, but also annulling, in essence, the results of the auction deals of 30 March. SIF's lack of real opportunities to openly use citizens' vouchers to acquire privatised property makes them look for diverse methods, such as, for example, the participation in the acquisition of large packages of shares in enterprises via private individuals. However, to qualify such activity of investment funds as unlawful, according to Vasil Dalhalew, chief of the Control Service of the Presidential Administration, is not possible due to the lack of normative documents regulating the activity of voucher investment funds. What measures, in the opinion of the Presidential Control Service, can put the matter right? Together with commonplaces, such as "to ensure efficient control" and "to bring to justice," it is suggested to animate the Belarusian stock market, organizing on it the sale of shares belonging to the state in return for financial resources and privatisation vouchers. I dare to suggest that the formation and development of the stock market in the Republic will be supported by the adherents of market economy, as they provide the possibility for drawing the financial resources of most of the population into circulation. For it is the population, if experts are to be believed, who are the main investor in the economy of their country, whose resources, together with foreign investments, allow the recovery of industry and market transformations to be carried out in countries undergoing a transition period of the economy.

Political Situation in Parties, Movements Viewed

WS1904140195 Minsk BELAPAN in English 1000
GMT 19 Apr 95

[Commentary by Lew Krivitski: "In Parties and Movements"—from the "Analyses, Commentaries, Forecasts"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Executive Committee of the United Democratic Party of Belarus [ADPB] has made a statement concerning the presidential decree "On the Provision of Equal Opportunities for Citizens in the Preparation and Holding of Elections." In the statement, the decree is defined as crude violation of existing legislation. Its aim is to hide the position of alternative candidates from voters and press through the largest

possible number of pro-presidential candidates. The limitation of preelection agitation by the local press, the control over printed material is another clampdown on the press. Being in sharp opposition to the existing regime, democrats demonstrate a high competence in the area of legislation. The strong administrative center of the ADPB almost immediately reveals flaws and ruses in legislative acts intended to preserve the authorities' complete control over the country.

At the fourth congress of the Belarusian Popular Front [BNF], which took place on 9 April, its leader Mr. Paznyak delivered a report "On the Political Situation in Belarus and the Tasks Facing the Popular Front," and the leader of the BNF shadow cabinet Mr. Zablotski presented a report "On the BNF Preelection Stance." According to Mr. Paznyak, the slogans, with which the BNF entered the 1990 parliamentary elections, have become even more topical. These slogans are: "Let's Vote for Belarus!," "Independence. Well-being. Peace," and "Consolidation on the Basis of Statehood and Independence!" The participants in the BNF congress approved the preelection stance and introduced corrections in the tactics of the preelection struggle, taking into account the experience of previous election campaigns. This time, national-democratic forces are coming out on a united front.

In Belarus, the publication of three new communist newspapers began simultaneously, while very recently communists could scarcely scrape enough money for the publication of the single newspaper of Viktor Chykin "WE AND TIME." In the first edition of the newspaper "VPERYOD," the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [Bolsheviks] on Nina Andreyeva's report was placed on the front page. Later, there was an article "The Genius and Invincible Commander," dedicated to the 115th anniversary of the birth of Stalin. Doctor of Economics Mr. Vaytsyakhowski proves on the pages of the newspaper the advantages of the planned distribution system and the necessity to return to it in Belarus. In the newspaper "TOVARISHCH," the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Communists of Belarus Vasil Novikaw argues that everything today in Belarus and other countries of the CIS was instigated by the strategic premeditation of internal counterrevolutionary and world undercover agents for the definitive destruction of the fraternal republics and the insolent robbery of nations. The newspaper "BYELORUSSIA" also started to come out, which in the conception of its editor Ihar Asinski, should continue the tradition of "SOVIETSKAYA BYELORUSSIA" in the period up to his dismissal as chief editor. In the article "Does the Health of Society Depend on the Health of Politicians?" the correspondent of "BYELORUSSIA" in Berlin, the wife of the chief editor Lyudmila, points out Lukashenka's paranoid syndrome, when he sees enemies in his friends. The communists have nothing to offer the election campaign, apart from the most negative emotions and a cowardly

nonacceptance of change. Extreme bitterness and querulousness characterizes the tone at both their meetings and in their publications. However, their mood may be consonant with the feelings of the lumpenized part of the population, the electorate will vote for personalities. And the communists have practically no popular political figures.

Government, Employers, Trade Unions Sign General Agreement

WS2004103695 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] For the first time the wage increase rate has exceeded the inflation rate. The average wage currently amounts to 654,400 rubles. The wage gap [razryw u zarabotnay platsye] between public sector workers and workers of material sectors has shrunk. The government has managed to regulate prices in relation to expenditures and to approximate them to prices in neighboring states. Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir reported on this at the 19 April roundtable, in which representatives of the Cabinet of Ministers, of the Belarusian Scientific-Industrial Association, of the Belarusian Union of Entrepreneurs and Leasers, and of the Trade Union Federation participated.

The prime minister stated that there are—as before—serious problems with selling finished industrial products and foodstuffs. The movement toward the market, however, is becoming more clear cut.

The Belarusian Government, the Belarusian Association of Employers, and trade unions signed a general agreement for 1995. Measures to improve the system of payments in the national economy, proposals of leaders of the Belarusian Association of Employers and of trade unions regarding economic strategy and social partnership, drafting a new concept of the program for the development of the Republic, performance of relevant bodies in the Economic Ministry, and support for price increases were discussed.

Moldova

Lebed: 14th Army Withdrawal Within 3 Years 'Impossible'

AU2004110495 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 19/4/1995—The delegation of the European Parliament, on visit to Moldova at present, met with leaders of the self-styled Dniester Republic today. Tiraspol officials presented their opinion on the roots of the Dniester conflict, and on the ways they thought the problem could be solved. In particular, they complained about the practical cessation of negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol because Moldova still fails to appoint a new head of its expert team instead of the former First

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Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Osmochescu. Dniester President Igor Smirnov and Parliament Chairman Grigore Maracuta said at today's meeting that the Dniester region receives nothing from Moldova-obtained foreign credits. In their belief, this is a serious obstacle to the Dniester settlement. They asked the European Parliament to help Dniester establish economic cooperation with European countries.

Also on Wednesday, the delegation met with Lieutenant General Aleksandr Lebed, commander of the Russian 14th Army. He confirmed his earlier statements that it is impossible to withdraw the Army within a three-year period due to the absence of appropriate political and economic conditions, including due to the violation of one crucial principle on which the Army Withdrawal Agreement is based: synchronization of the conflict settlement and the Army removal.

EU Parliament Delegation Says Lebed 'Procrastinating'

AU2004110695 Chisinau INFOTAG in English 1930
GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau INFOTAG, 19/4/1995—The delegation of the European Parliament, who paid an official three-day visit to Moldova, have highly praised the democratization processes and economic reforms conducted in the republic. Speaking at today's press conference, the head of the delegation, Elizabeth Schroedter, stated that "the delegation is returning from Moldova with very pleasant impressions, and sees no obstacles either for ratifying the Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Parliament and the Moldovan Parliament, or in admitting the republic to the Council of Europe."

She said, Moldova did make many mistakes during the four years of independence, but correct conclusions were drawn from them. In particular, the delegation emphasized the tactful approach of the Moldovan leadership to solving the national minorities problem. The guests believe that the way the Gagauz problem has been solved may become a positive example to be followed in tackling similar situations elsewhere, including the one in Dniester.

"We are convinced of Moldova's firm intention to settle the Dniester problem. However, many people in Tiraspol are not interested in that. They are waiting, dragging time, and hope for revival of the Soviet Union," Elizabeth Schroedter stressed.

The ex-chairperson of the Council of Europe, Catherine Lalumiere, a member of the delegation, who had first visited Moldova two years ago, has stated today that "Moldova's evolution is evident, and this inspires optimism."

She pointed out that she could not visit Dniester in 1993, soon after an armed conflict there. And now the delegation made a very useful trip to the region. In her opinion,

progress in democratic reforms is evident, as well as in solving the national minorities problem—an issue which is very acute in all post-socialist states. As for economic problems, the progress here is maybe not so triumphant as desired, she said. There are low wages and pensions, and unemployment is growing. But this is typical of all transition-economy countries. However, it is definitely clear that Dniester is far behind the rest of Moldova economically, Catherine Lalumiere emphasized.

"The Dniester problem settlement requires a firm political will and wish to be shown by both sides. We have an impression that many politicians are satisfied with the present-day state of things, and they do not wish to settle the problem. I am convinced that disputes can be solved by using exceptionally political means," Catherine Lalumiere said at today's press conference.

Elizabeth Schroedter has stated that the problem solution should advance in small steps, but consecutive and complex-like.

Answering INFOTAG's question about what will be Dniester's participation in the Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation, to be ratified soon, Elizabeth Schroedter said that the Treaty applies to the Republic of Moldova as an integral state. She stressed that the European Parliament will seek to create an atmosphere of trust between Chisinau and Tiraspol, including for the sake of political settlement of the conflict, and for attracting foreign investment both to the western and eastern sides of the Dniester.

She said, their "meeting with Aleksandr Lebed was very important. The Army commander understands the problem and realizes his responsibility before his servicemen. But he is not interested to remove the Army from the region. His arguments are aimed at procrastinating the withdrawal process. It is necessary to attract international experts to estimate the armaments, because much of the munition is very old and presents danger. Transit via the Ukraine has to be taken into consideration, too," she pointed out. The head of the delegation expressed hope that the solution of the Dniester problem and the Army withdrawal will be promoted by the forthcoming meeting of the Russian and American presidents, because nowadays "Russia is in such a mess that it is difficult to negotiate with it and make it implement the signed documents."

President Snegur Departs For Budapest Visit

LD1904122095 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1138
GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kishinev, April 19 (ITAR-TASS)—Moldovan President Mircea Snegur left for Hungary on Wednesday [19 April] for an official visit at the invitation of his Hungarian counterpart. A friendship treaty is expected to be signed during the visit, alongside with a number of cultural, investment and taxation agreements.

Organized Crime Allegedly Controls Underground Economy

AU1904163095 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1830 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 17/4/1995—During the transition to the market economy, the underground economy has reached extremely large proportions and has increased during the last years, its share being estimated at 25-50 percent of the legal economy. A report by the Economics Ministry indicated that "underground activities specific to transition, such as illicit privatization, illegal employment of state assets for individual benefit, tax evasions, racketeering, are thriving." According to the report, most profitable enterprises and businesses, in particular in cities (trade, enterprises exporting for hard currency, interstate deals) are in hands of organized crime which extorts a share of

profits by providing security to management, industrial espionage and counter-espionage services. Along with state enterprises officially or unofficially are functioning private, cooperative or limited liabilities enterprises headed openly or disguisedly by state enterprise managers who earn profits from that. According to ministerial experts, all big wealth was derived from state assets "when official structures lost control over state assets thus becoming 'none's property'." According to the Privatization and State Property Administration Ministry, in 1994 some 200 enterprises, most of them engaged in trade, were liquidated and later legally reconstituted. This situation determined many economists to favour legalization of the underground economy. At the same time, trade unions demanded urgent adoption of the law on disclosure of incomes and combat of underground economy.

Kazakhstan

Joint Talks Begin on Reducing Troops on China Border

LD1904173695 Kazakh Television First Program
Network in Russian 1400 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] In Almaty, the 15th round of negotiations have started between a joint delegation of the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, and Tajikistan, and a government delegation of the People's Republic of China, on mutually reducing armed forces and strengthening confidence in the military sphere in the border areas.

Nurlan (Danenov), first deputy foreign minister of Kazakhstan, met representatives of the delegations. He briefed the guests on the sociopolitical and economic situation in the republic and told them about the significance of the upcoming referendum in detail. Paying attention to the importance of the multilateral negotiations, the deputy foreign minister said that issues discussed by the delegations were regarded in Kazakhstan in the context of the implementation of President Nazarbayev's initiative to call a meeting on cooperation and confidence-building measures in Asia.

Nazarbayev Interviewed on Referendum Plans

MM2004105895 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18
Apr 95 p 5

[Interview with President Nursultan Nazarbayev by Gennadiy Bocharov; date, place not given: "President Nazarbayev in Resolute Mood. Kazakhstan on Eve of Referendum"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[FBIS Translated Text] The political spring in Kazakhstan has been uncommonly stormy: Parliament has been dissolved, the government has resigned, and a nationwide referendum is scheduled for 29 April. The republic's inhabitants will have to answer one question: "Do you agree with the extension of President N.A. Nazarbayev's powers through the year 2000?"

This turn of events has given rise to a whole stream of commentaries and statements both within Kazakhstan itself and far beyond its borders. Political observers are repeating in various ways: Nazarbayev has decided to follow the example of his Central Asian neighbors. As is known, the presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have already ensured their rule until the end of the 20th century.

This was IZVESTIYA's first question to Nursultan Nazarbayev:

[Bocharov] Many political figures and journalists are saying bluntly that Nazarbayev, in preferring a referendum to elections, is thereby demonstrating a lack of democratic principles. What is your personal assessment of what is going on?

[Nazarbayev] People who are not professionally involved in politics, and especially if they are far from the center of the events they are trying to judge, often fall victim to schemes suggested to them by others. The word "referendum" is being bandied about by everybody and it is rare for journalists not to talk about the usurpation of power—while nodding toward our neighbors—but few will recall the chain of events that preceded the decision on the referendum. A decision which, incidentally, surprised me too.

Here is the chronology of events. On 7 March our Constitutional Court declared a number of Central Electoral Commission documents, published immediately before the elections, unconstitutional. The legal consequences of this ruling were very grave: The Supreme Council was illegitimate and all laws and decrees passed by it were illegal, the cabinet of ministers approved by it was also illegitimate.

The next day, 8 March, I sent the Constitutional Court my objections to its decree. I admit that I was counting on the fact that somehow the conflict would be defused. But far from it—the Supreme Council now had the bit between its teeth: Deputies of the effectively dissolved parliament hastily amended the Constitution. And they "wound up" the Constitutional Court until July. The upshot was that we had a full-scale parliamentary crisis.

What was the president to do? Put the court in its place? Take parliament in hand? How exactly? This is what I think: If the president believes in democratic principles, if he really intends to be the guarantor of constitutional legality, then he has no choice—he must follow only the law. I acted in full accordance with the law: Based on the Constitutional Court's findings, parliament was dissolved, the government's resignation was accepted, and the legislative authority previously delegated to me passed to the president. [sentence as published]

[Bocharov] But why did you opt for a referendum rather than elections? Because then nobody could criticize you.

[Nazarbayev] Whom do you mean by "you?" The push for the decision on the referendum was provided by the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan.

(For the record: Two hundred and sixty of the 305 delegates were elected by small assemblies—oblast assemblies—and the rest were delegated by ethnic cultural centers. All nationalities living in the republic, as well as all its administrative territories, were represented in the assembly—author's note).

It was the assembly that recommended that this way of resolving the crisis be chosen for the sake of preserving stability in society. Following the dissolution of parliament, legislative powers passed to the president according to law. This required the confirmation of a vote of confidence from the people, that is to say a referendum. Yes, in this situation elections are also possible—if the legislative basis exists. We do not have

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it. Furthermore, a full-scale election campaign would inevitably inflame the situation.

In order to understand why we are acting in this and not some other way, the president said, it is necessary to know the peculiarities of Kazakhstan, its extremely mixed ethnic composition whereby the indigenous population is not in the majority. Therefore, according to Nazarbayev, the most important thing is to ensure social stability and national accord. Against the background of the ethnic inter-racial conflicts rocking many parts of the CIS and the fear that they will be repeated in Kazakhstan, which has representatives of 120 (!) nationalities living in it, the president's constant returning to this thought does not seem importunate.

Here are some figures from his program speech at the assembly. In 1930 5.873 million were living in the republic. By 1933 the population had fallen to 2.493 million. Around 1.5 million Kazakhs were killed and 1.3 million left the USSR. It is not the Kazakhs' fault, the president says, that for them the 20th century was a century of tragic events which turned them into a minority in their own homeland. Everybody who now dares to doubt this people's right to statehood do not know or do not want to know the depths of its drama.

I am convinced, the president stressed, that the Kazakh nation is no less deserving of statehood than any other. It has suffered for it throughout its history!

Having a unique polyethnicity (which is rooted in the tragedy of many peoples who ended up in Kazakhstan through no will of their own—Ukrainians, Poles, Germans, representatives of North Caucasian peoples, Turks, Crimean Tatars, Koreans, and Greeks), Kazakhstan avoided the sad fate of its closest neighbors. "I am sure," the president said, "that we will continue to be able to preserve peace and interethnic stability in the state."

[Bocharov] What is your assessment of the situation in the republic immediately before the referendum? Is there cause for concern?

[Nazarbayev] One thing is of concern at this time: Kazakhstanis have died on the Tajik-Afghan border. As to the situation in the republic, I have grounds for optimism. There are hopes for the acceleration of reforms: The tenge has been stable against the dollar for eight months, inflation is under 5 percent, and national income has increased 60 percent. If we succeed in improving people's lives, social passions will subside.

[Bocharov] And the passions "over the referendum?"

[Nazarbayev] There has been no avoiding them either. Initially the decision on the referendum was adopted by some former deputies and various political forces in the face of hostile opposition (special unwillingness to adopt it was demonstrated by certain leaders of the "Azat" civil movement, the "Lad" Slav movement, and the "Alash" party—author's note). More moderate

approaches now prevail even among the most irreconcilable opposition. Suffice to say that a few days ago five influential parties unequivocally supported the idea of a referendum.

According to information passed to IZVESTIYA by Tair Mansurov, Republic of Kazakhstan ambassador to the Russian Federation, these are the "People's Unity of Kazakhstan," the "People's Congress of Kazakhstan" (Olzhas Suleymenov's party), the "Revival of Kazakhstan Party," the "Socialist Party of Kazakhstan," and the "People's Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan." At the last moment the "Russian Union of Kazakhstan" also came out in support of the idea of a referendum.

Despite all the broader support (few doubt that the referendum will end in his favor), Nazarbayev is acting increasingly dynamically. He has launched a tough crime-fighting campaign which is naturally meeting with a favorable reaction from the population, which is tired of lawlessness. "It is necessary," Nazarbayev says, "to overcome the amorphous nature of parliament, which has left us without vitally important laws. My people are now working day and night to make up for what has been neglected by legislators. In April we had planned to prepare and adopt 17 new laws, including the Criminal Code. And I will sign them in April."

The executive branch's complaints against the legislative branch and vice versa have already become commonplace. Virtually all CIS countries have been fatally unlucky with their first parliaments, starting with Khasbulatov's. Confrontation with the executive branch has rocked and is rocking the entire area—from Belarus to Kazakhstan. Everywhere legislation is being ignored and there is a purely Soviet instinct to grab what you can for yourself. Here is just one example typical of the morals of the dissolved Kazakhstani parliament. After visiting their Russian colleagues, several deputies returned home with information that every State Duma deputy has his own personal car, is paid the same as a Russian minister, and so on (by way of a joke, the guests had been slipped the draft of a failed law). On the basis of this practical joke the Kazakhstani parliament adopted an official decision: To purchase a car for each of its deputies, to make pay the same as ministers' pay, plus a 50-percent premium, and so on. This decree was implemented without delay: Parliament purchased 190 foreign-made cars. In the course of a year over 1 billion tenge (around \$20 million) was spent on keeping deputies. One witty official joked that for the same money you could keep 85,000 prisoners for a year.

...The last question for the president:

[Bocharov] If your powers are extended in the referendum, what do you hope to do in the five years allotted?

[Nazarbayev] I do not want to set priorities. There is Nazarbayev with his political experience, his practical experience. I will not change. Blood has not been spilled on my soil. And I will do everything possible to prevent

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this happening in future. Not a single person has been imprisoned for dissidence. Not a single newspaper has been closed down for political reasons, although the opposition press does not do us any favors. Although the opposition never gives the authorities an easy ride it is necessary because it is advantageous to the people. We are going down the road of democratic market reforms and are not contemplating anything else for ourselves. We will achieve integration into the CIS and the world community. I will not tire of repeating that our strategic line is very close cooperation with Russia.

Such is President Nazarbayev's position on the eve of the referendum. It sounded even tougher in a recent speech: "If I am fated to be at the helm of state I must be guided by correct sailing directions. They tell me that any stops or delays would be disastrous for the country and society.... I must lead people sometimes against their will where they do not want to go now but where it is objectively necessary to go. Since we are on the subject of our country's future I too am in resolute mood, and maybe in a tough mood."

The words quoted were preceded by others—those of philosopher Foma Akvinskiy, whom Nazarbayev quoted: "If a sea captain's foremost aim were to preserve his ship, he would keep it permanently moored."

Avturkhanov Appointment Reported, Analyzed

954F2106A Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 21, 28 Mar—2 Apr 95 p 10

[Report by Dmitriy Balburov under the rubric "Chechnya": "Following Shakhray's Course"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week Boris Yeltsin approved the Committee of National Accord of Chechnya [KNS], created on the basis of the Provisional Council. Everything Umar Avturkhanov had been asking for practically from the moment the Russian troops went in has materialized.

The idea of the creation of the KNS was conceived by anti-Dudayev "opposition" figures back in January, when the Provisional Council [VS] was subjected to massive obstruction, first and foremost by the Chechens loyal to it. The Znamenskoye crowd became aware that the VS would never be able to hold elections, as had been previously planned. Umar Avturkhanov probably only has the confidence of the federal government, but not of the population. And then a shrewd move was made: The VS was expanded to 40 members by including deputies of the former Supreme Soviet of Chechno-Ingushetia and the most authoritative figures in the republic still willing to work with the "opposition." The idea was that the new body of authority would not be associated in the eyes of Chechens with the Provisional Council, which had brought federal troops into the republic, since its leaders Beslan Gantemirov, Ruslan Martagov, Ruslan Madiyev, Zaindi Choltayev, and Eli Alaudinov were left out.

Nikolay Semenov was indeed able to attract rather famous people to participate in the KNS. Among them are Chechno-Ingushetia's former deputy prime minister, Gersolt Elmurzayev; political scientist Dr. Zhabrail Gakayev; Shamil Beno, formerly minister of foreign affairs in Dudayev's government, later dismissed from it; and writer Vakha Datsayev.

Despite the fact that delineation of powers is envisaged between the committee and Salambek Khadzhiyev's government, the current prime minister of Chechnya was included in the KNS, as well as the republic's procurator, Bek Baskhanov; Russian MChS [Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Recovery From Natural Disasters] representative Balrudi Dzhamalkhanov; head of the FSK [Federal Counterintelligence Service] branch in Chechnya Grigoriy Khoperskov; and ministry on ethnic affairs adviser Isa Aliroyev. The explanation for this composition is that the committee's proclaimed main task is national reconciliation. Therefore, also among its members are Shamil Beno; Vakha Dakayev, Dudayev's chief of the bread products administration; and Imran Dokhshukayev, minister of economics in the same government—the people who have walked out on the Chechen president but have not become his enemies. Among KNS members is even such a person as Lecha Umkayev, former co-chairman of the OKChN [National Congress of the Chechen People], who together with Dudayev, Yandarbiyev, and Soslambekov carried through the "revolution" of 1991 and has a reputation of rabid nationalist.

To give the new body respectability, some other figures have been brought in as well—Kuri Musayev, chairman of the committee on tourism under Zavgayev; well-known scientist Dr. Vakhid Mezhidov; and journalists Said Lorsanov and Lecha Saligov.

Avturkhanov's appointment as KNS chairman indicates that the federal government continues to follow Sergey Shakhray's course. It is unknown what considerations guided the Kremlin, considering that the very personality of the Provisional Council head may keep the republic population from participating in the elections, and dissatisfaction with Avturkhanov is brewing in the VS itself.

Forgotten in forming the committee were "Moscow Chechens" Yaragi Momodayev, who now represents only his "government of popular trust," and Yusup Soslambekov, the ideologist of mountain peoples' solidarity. Neither were Beslan Gantemirov and Ruslan Khasbulatov included in the KNS.

After the Russian troops took Grozny, Gantemirov again became the city mayor. He immediately got into disagreements with Avturkhanov and Khadzhiyev. Perhaps this is the reason Gantemirov has found himself "out of the game," while his deputy and close friend Ulamali Tashtamirov became a KNS member. As to Khasbulatov, he himself expressed the desire to work on the committee, but apparently still remains on the Kremlin's list of undesirables.

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Nikolay Semenov and Umar Avturkhanov's idea is for the committee to self-disband after the general elections. Some Chechen leaders, however, have doubts regarding the expediency of the latter. In the conditions of the continuing war and devastation, free expression of the popular will is simply impossible.

Interestingly, the top two figures in Soviet Checheno-Ingushetia—Doku Zavgayev and Lecha Magomadov—have not given their final consent to participate in the KNS and were included in it in haste. Most likely, the experienced masters of behind-the-scenes games either are waiting or already know that the committee is doomed to become a king for an hour.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Wants Parliament To Decide on Referendum

LD1904183795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1638 GMT 19 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, edited by Vladimir Shishlin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Askar Akayev denied that he was unwilling to face a referendum on extension of his term until the year 2000.

He told parliament that this issue was up to the country's top legislature and that he would endorse any parliament's decision. He did not, however, believe that the referendum is an urgent matter or that parliament should start its work with this issue.

Parliament faced another crisis Wednesday. The upper house, the Legislative Assembly, voted against the Constitutional Court [CC] taking an oath whereas the lower house, the People's Representative Assembly, had voted for it the day before.

Akayev called on the deputies to resolve this issue shortly.

Members of the Legislative Assembly feared that once it takes an oath, the Constitutional Court is likely to rule that parliament is illegitimate and has to be dissolved, as was the case in Kazakhstan. They accused the CC of keeping silent when the Supreme Soviet, the previous parliament, was dissolved and early elections were called.

The CC chairperson Chopon Bayekova said that the court cannot take up any case unless an official complaint is filed. "Because neither the president nor the prime minister nor MPs filed any complaints, the court could not consider this case," she explained.

The deputies came to an agreement on the power sharing between the houses of parliament, in particular as far as adoption of the budget and government formation are concerned.

A conciliatory commission decided that the final approval of the budget will be the responsibility of the lower house which will not be a permanent body. The budget will be approved by three quarters of the lower house.

The structure and composition of the government will be approved by a simple majority, 50 percent plus one vote, of the two houses holding a joint session.

Defense Ministry To Mine Arms Depots, Fuel Tanks

LD2004084395 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0822 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By Boris Maynayev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bishkek April 20 (ITAR-TASS)—The Kyrgyz Defence Ministry intends to begin mining arms depots and fuel tanks in Kyrgyzstan. Informed sources said this will be done to prevent attacks on units of the national Army aimed at seizing arms, fuel and military property.

Major Aleksandr Kim, chief of the press service of the Kyrgyz Defence Ministry, confirmed that there are frequent attempts to seize arms and plunder depots. He said that several days ago a guard in a military unit stationed in a suburb of Bishkek had to use arms as protection against bandits and killed one of them. A serviceman of another unit stationed in Balykchi also had to use arms. "It is necessary to take adequate measures to prevent any attempts of bandits to seize arms and ammunition", Aleksandr Kim said.

Tajikistan

UN Observers Visit Tajik Opposition in Afghanistan

LD2004110795 Voice of Free Tajikistan, in Tajik 0325 GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] As you heard in reports on Tuesday, the joint cease-fire observer commission in Tajikistan arrived in Taloqan in the Islamic State of Afghanistan at the invitation of Prof. Sayyed Abdullo Nuri, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, to see the area damaged as a result of Russian warplane air raids on the morning of 13 April. Our colleague in Taloqan, Muboriz Nekvard, has a report on the course of the commission's visit:

[Nekvard] The visit by the temporary cease-fire observer commission between the communist state of Tajikistan and the Islamic opposition to Taloqan started with a meeting between the delegation and officials in Takhar province of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. [passage omitted]

Members of the joint UN cease-fire observer commission between the communist state of Tajikistan and the

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Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, who came to the city at the invitation of the latter to investigate the Russian air force air raids on Taloqan, continued their observations until the evening of 18 April.

In the course of their observations, the UN observers visited a hospital where those injured by the aggression of the enemies of the faith are being treated. It was decided that the joint commission on the cease-fire in Tajikistan will send its report on the Russian warplane air raids on Taloqan to His Excellency Butrus-Ghali, the UN secretary-general.

Premier Announces Russian Border Guards To Stay

LD2004100695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0931 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By Galina Gridneva]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Dushanbe April 20 TASS—Russia's government fully supports the Tajik leaders seeking for political and economic stability and guarantees that Russian border guards, including the 201st Motorised Rifle Division, together with other CIS troops, will stay in Tajikistan to protect the border with Afghanistan, Tajik Premier Jamshed Karimov said on national television.

Commenting on the results of his recent talks with the Russian Government in Moscow, Karimov said that Russia had promised to provide Tajikistan a 60-billion-rouble credit as well as to render a concrete military help. In the near future, the two countries plan to sign a number of bilateral agreements aimed at a wider integration in the economic and military spheres.

Tajikistan favours the closer union with the Russian Federation and the results of the Moscow talks testify that the interests of the two countries coincide, Karimov added.

Opposition: Tajik Moscow Delegation 'Incompetent'

LD2004095895 (Clandestine) Voice of Free Tajikistan in Tajik 0325 GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Yesterday, consultative talks between the communist regime of Tajikistan and the political opposition started work under the auspices of the United Nations in Moscow. However, a threatening speech by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev directed at the Tajik opposition was the reason for the refusal by the opposition delegation led by Haji Akbar Turajonzoda to continue the talks, as a sign of protest.

It is reported that the Tajik Government sent an incompetent delegation led by Mahmadsayid Ubaydulloyev, the first deputy prime minister, to the Moscow talks. This was at a time when the Dushanbe regime was talking about preparing higher-level members for the delegation.

According to a report from our correspondent in Bada-khshan, a member of the negotiating delegation of the Islamic Movement of Tajikistan, Sayid Sharif, is still in Khorog and cannot go to Moscow.

Tajik Government Requests Extension of Forces

LD2004090995 Moscow Russian Public Television First Channel Network in Russian 0800 GMT 20 Apr 95

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Tajik Government addressed the leadership of the CIS states with a request to extend the period of the stay of the collective peace-making forces in the republic until 31 December 1995. Naturally, the issue of a commander for this period arose. Gen. Valentin Bobryshev was nominated and his candidature should be approved by the CIS council of the heads of state on 26 May. Until then Col-Gen Patrikeyev will continue to command the collective peace-making forces.

Changed Government Delegation Likely To Hamper Moscow Talks

MK1904115095 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 19 Apr 95 p 2

[Report by Oleg Panfilov under the "Tajikistan" rubric: "The Composition of the Governmental Delegation at Inter-Tajik Negotiations Has Been Changed. Will Russia Have To Deal With Military Problems?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As news agencies have reported, today in Moscow consultations are to be held between the Tajik governmental and opposition delegations and the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry, personal representative of the UN secretary general, and, possibly, the leadership of the Federal Border Service. For that purpose, Khodzhi Akbar Turadzhonzoda and Mukhammadsharif Khimmatzoda—Tajik opposition leaders—have come to Moscow. The composition of the opposition delegation has not changed: It includes representatives of various parties and movements, and nonparty members—Otakhon Latifi, chairman of the Democratic Forces Coordination Center's board; Professor Abdunabi Sattorzoda, chairman of the Democratic Party's organizing committee; former Foreign Minister Khudoberdy Khaliknazarov, member of the Democratic Party's organizing committee; Zayd Saidov; and former Transport Minister Bozorali Safarov.

In the governmental delegation, however, there have been significant changes. Reports saying that the meeting will be held between top officials are not true. Moreover, the composition of the governmental delegation is less representative than at any of the previous rounds of talks. The delegation is headed by Mamadsaid Ubaydulloyev, 43, deputy chairman of the government, who formally oversees law-enforcement organs at the Council of Ministers, a former Communist Party functionary, who was appointed deputy chairman of the

Kulyab Oblast Executive Board in 1990. Another new member is Deputy General Prosecutor Khaknazar Shodiyev, former head of the Investigative Directorate of the Kulyab Oblast Prosecutor's Office. Still another new member is Ramazan Mirzoyev, Tajikistan ambassador to the Russian Federation, former first secretary of Kulyab oblast's Dangara CPSU Rayon Committee. Three persons were members of the previous delegations: Said Salimov, chairman of the Kulyab City Trade Union Council; Bakhodur Abdullayev, deputy security minister; and Usmon Kholdorov, director of the Pamir Botanical Gardens.

Like members of the recently appointed government, the parliament leadership, and the president's staff, the governmental delegation consists largely of Kulyab oblast natives. This is indicative, on one hand, of the degree of support given to the Dushanbe authorities by other regions. On the other hand, however, this can be interpreted as the unwillingness of Kulyab natives to allow all society strata and other regions to take part in the political settlement. As believed by independent observers in Dushanbe, no official explanation of Abdumadzhid Dostiyev's absence from the delegation has been given, but still there is one realistic reason: On 17 April, Emomali Rakhmonov left for Kuwait. Therefore, there was no one else left to whom the republic could be entrusted: As suggested recently by NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, Safarali Radzhabov, new parliament head, is nothing but a mere figurehead. The second important person—Dzhamshed Karimov, head of the government—does not want to deal with politics; in addition, he represents the republic's northern region. Thus, the new composition of the governmental delegation will hardly be able to make any political decisions, being aware of the fact that it is the Russian side that will be charged by Tajikistan with the settlement of military problems, anyway.

Reports from Badakhshan say that for five days there have been neither military conflicts nor any attempts to come to a political settlement. A session of the Badakhshan Council, which has been twice adjourned, has not started its work yet; and, according to reports from the self-defense forces headquarters, young people still continue to join the ranks of the opposition.

Uzbekistan

Kamilov, Iranian Envoy Discuss Expanding Ties

LD1704121295 Tehran IRNA in English 1111 GMT 17 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Moscow, April 17, IRNA—Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov in a meeting with Iranian Ambassador to Tashkent Mohammad Hashemi Gulpayegani Monday emphasized the need for expansion of ties and cooperation between the two countries.

In the meeting, the two sides also discussed relations between the two countries and exchanged views on regional issues.

The Uzbek foreign minister expressed satisfaction with the recent developments in bilateral relations and called for further promotion of mutual ties.

He expressed hope that in his forthcoming trip to Islamic Republic, in response to Velayat's summer visit to Tashkent, ways of broadening bilateral cooperation would be explored.

Commentator Views Russian Ethnic Policy

LD2004090195 Tashkent Radio Mashal in Uzbek 1000 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Here is our political commentator Husniddin Shofayzi. Please, Husniddin.

[Shofayzi] Thank you, good afternoon dear radio listeners. Today the radio station Radio Liberty broadcast information that a force is emerging that is encroaching on the lives of the CIS countries. [passage omitted]

Mukhtorbek, we always thought that these kind of threats could come only from such a braggart as [Russian Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir] Zhirinovskiy. Am I right?

[Unidentified studio announcer] Yes, you are right.

[Shofayzi] Our discussion today shows that these kinds of people can easily be found in Russia's official circles.

[Announcer] And [Russian Foreign Minister Andrey] Kozyrev is not a man in the street with nothing to do but kick up dust.

[Shofayzi] That is right. He acts and speaks within the parameters drawn by state leaders. So the idea that if someone offends Russians outside Russia, then their uncle will come and defend them is nothing less than an idea lying at the heart of the Russian leadership. Why does Russia express this idea with a threat? To my mind, this issue must be the internal affair of any state trying to maintain its authority in the world. And here not only must the interests of ethnic Russians be protected, but equally those of all other ethnic minorities too. For example, in Uzbekistan not only Uzbeks but representatives of all other nationalities have equal rights. This rule is laid down in our Constitution, and this law is strictly observed in our republic.

So that is why, I would like to say, it would be better for such politicians as Kozyrev to study the matter in-depth before demanding anything from others.

[Announcer] Of course.

[Shofayzi] Of course, it is true that problems of this kind exist in such areas as the Baltic republics, the Dniester region, the North Caucasus and in the Crimean peninsula. But the cause of such problems is the wrong step

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taken by the former Soviet Union, or more precisely by Russia, at the time, and the dirty tricks it is currently undertaking against these countries, is it not? For example, in the Baltic there was treachery against the indigenous population, as was unveiled at the time, wasn't there? Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania with great difficulty freed themselves from the Russian grip. Armed provocations and economic punishment measures were applied there to hold these counties in check. And I think above all that the Russian authorities are to blame for all these things.

[Announcer] Because....

[Shofayzi] Because formerly all the republic in the former Soviet Union served Russia's interests. But, we must admit, at the early phase of independence in the Baltic republics wrong steps, as in the saying robbing Ali to pay Vali, were also taken there. It would not be wrong to say that, in the interests of restoring national values, the interests of other ethnic groups, including Russians, were infringed there to some extent.

[Announcer] This is in Baltic states.

[Shofayzi] You are right. These problems are being resolved with the cooperation of international organizations.

Russia's failure to withdraw its troops from the Dniester region is continuing to affect the difficult situation there. It looks as if Russia is trying to keep this region in its grip. Of course, it will not be able to hold it, it's only a matter of time, is it not?

Everyone knows how Russia is defending its interests in the North Caucasus. There one cannot put state interests above the people's interests. If we say that Russia is ready to wipe out the Chechens for this reason, we would not be wrong. The evidence for this is reports from the foreign media about the casualties suffered by the Chechen defenders, which Russia is trying to underplay. For example, about a week ago the foreign media reported that more than 200 Chechens were killed during an attack in Semashki. Russia reduced this figure to 20-30 people.

If we talk about Crimea, then Russia has also taken open and underhanded measures there to remove this region

from Ukraine's territory. In a word, it will be a good thing if the situation does not lead to bloodshed. The peoples of Ukraine and Russia are historically like brothers. But it looks as if the elder brother—Russia—is committing treachery against its younger brother. Instead of letting the Crimean people decide the issue, Moscow officials are, in various ways, adding fuel to the fire. The invitation to Crimean Supreme Council representatives led by its chairman to the Russian State Duma last week, and the broad discussion of the situation there, are nothing but confirmation of the above.

If you take all these facts into consideration, then you can imagine how Russians' interests are being protected in the regions of the former Soviet Union. But, as Kozyrev is now threatening military interference, then this is evidence that a policy of violence is taking shape instead of brotherhood. In this context, we would like to recall once more Uzbek saying to violators: he who digs a pit for someone else will himself fall into it.

Academy Created for Construction of State, Society

LD1904171795 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Russian 1430 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Islam Karimov, president of the Republic of Uzbekistan, today signed an edict on setting up the Academy for the Construction of the State and Society, which comes under the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

It says, among other things: Taking into consideration the need for a fundamental improvement in political, cultural, moral, and professional training, and in the training anew of senior officials in organs of authority, ministries, departments, administrative organizations, and representatives of the public, as well as for the coordination and deepening of scientific research on studying the prospects of the construction of the state and society of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Academy for the Construction of the State and Society is to be set up under the president of the Republic of Uzbekistan.

The full text of the edict will be published in the press.

Armenia**Yerevan Reports Peaceful Situation on Front Lines**

NC1904174995 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1530 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] We have been informed by the Armenian Ministry of Defense that no incidents have taken place on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan since last night. However, we wish to recall that Azerbaijani military units fired on the defense positions in Bergaber in Ijevan District with mortars and other firearms two days ago. One military serviceman was wounded in the incidents. The Armenian border guards returned the fire to silence the enemy gun emplacements.

The situation on the Nagorno-Karabakh front line is peaceful at the present time. Both sides continue to heed the cease-fire agreement.

Russian Parliament Hearings on Karabakh Issue

NC1904145295 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1139 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 14/04/95 NOYAN TAPAN—On April 11, the Russian Parliament held hearings devoted to the Karabakh problem. It was pointed out that the hearings were held on the eve of the 80th Anniversary of the Genocide of Armenians and the Committee for CIS issues prepared a draft of a statement by the Federal Assembly and the State Duma condemning the Genocide of Armenians committed by Turkey in 1915-22. In the foreseeable future this draft will be presented for confirmation of the State Duma.

Unlike the Azeri Ambassador to Russia, his Armenian counterpart Yuri Mkrtumian was present at the hearings.

Two days before the hearings took place the speaker of the Azeri Parliament Rasul Guliyev telegraphed the State Duma the indignation of Azerbaijan in regards of the hearings. In Guliyev's opinion, the hearings have a pro-Armenian tendency and it is impossible for Azerbaijan to participate in them.

The Russian President's Special Envoy Vladimir Kazimirov said that it is not necessary to apply for mediation of international peace-keeping forces for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict, moreover that "it is impossible to do within the framework of the OSCE, since they don't envisage the problem quite well there." He also reported that out of 136 observers in Georgia only 3 were from Russia and 8 from Bulgaria. Kazimirov insisted that a Russian General be appointed the Commander of peace-keeping forces in Karabakh.

Replying to a question about the number of Russian servicemen killed at the Karabakh frontier, Kazimirov said that there is no Russian army deployed in Karabakh and no Russian soldier has been killed there. In his

opinion, the peace-keeping contingent will enter the conflict zone no earlier than August 1995, if ever. He said that when the theoretical aspects of the problem are discussed, everybody is ready and willing, but discussion of particular actions and especially the funding causes a general retreat. No country is willing to send its military forces, but everybody agrees to provide observers and communication workers. Kazimirov emphasized that Russia has to take care of the main burden.

The second part of the hearings was devoted to the issues of the conflict's relation to the oil problem. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Chernyshev reported the situation. It was suggested that the events connected with the oil problem may have an immediate effect on the processes going on in the conflict zone.

Further Details From Karabakh Official's Speech

NC1904143995 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English 1139 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 14/04/95 NOYAN TAPAN—"Russia, having withdrawn its troops from Mountainous Karabakh in 1992, let us down and left us face-to-face with the 7-million Azerbaijan. But, despite all apprehensions, we managed to survive, moreover, we have become stronger. We decided our problems, built our statehood, restored economy, established army and battled, by the way, not bad. But an interesting situation has been created. The whole world community saw Russia's shadow behind our actions. From newspapers and various analytical sources, including Russian ones, as well from talks with diplomats and journalists we learned with surprise that we are being guided by Moscow and that Russians are fighting in our army. All are confident that our geopolitical interests coincide with that of yours. Sometimes we also tend to think so. But, unfortunately, from the viewpoint of Russian-Azeri relations Mountainous Karabakh has been and is viewed as a sort of appendix. The same with Crimea in Russian-Ukrainian relations and Abkhazia in Russian-Georgian relations. This role does not attract us, moreover, it is obviously outdated for us. We consider that we have the right to hope for such a place in Russia's policies, which would correspond to the role of partners who implement mutually-beneficial agreement.

"I can see apprehensions connected with the availability of such-like problems in Russia, in particular, Chechen problem. I am not going to prove the difference between Chechen and Karabakh problems from the positions of history, politics and international law. Though I should say that the proof will be quite convincing. I am going to approach this issue from another viewpoint.

"Why Turkey can defend Azerbaijan on the issue of Karabakh openly at the time when it has to face the same problem on Cyprus? Why Azerbaijan, which has the problem of Karabakh can assist Chechnya? Why Pakistan can assist Baku but at the same time defend the right of Kashmir to self-determination? The answer is evident.

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Everyone has its own interests. And it seems that Russia has no political interests in the region, otherwise it is difficult to explain these quests for truth".

Prime Minister's News Conference on Economy
NC1904170595 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1403 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 18/04/95 NOYAN TAPAN—On April 18, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Grant Bagratyan held a press-conference dedicated to economic and structural reforms conducted in Armenia. The Prime Minister emphasized the following four aspects of the economic policy of Armenia:

1. Reforms for stability and structural reformation;
2. Privatization;
3. Reforms in social sphere;
4. Reforms in the spheres of trade and finances.

Speaking on the program for stabilization of the economy, Hrand Bagratian pointed out that the purpose of this policy was stabilization of the market situation and the rate of the national currency as well as creation of favorable conditions for legal entities. He emphasized only two aspects of this policy:

The inflation rate and the changes in the currency rates for the first three months are considerably less than quotas set by the agreement with IMF. In January the inflation rate constituted only 3.9 percent against 14.7 percent provided by the agreement, in February it was 0.7 percent against 2.5 percent and the respective indicators for March were 1.3 percent and 2 percent.

The Prime Minister said that he did not expect high inflation rates in April. According to him, the rise of state-subsidized prices for bread and transportation services had a short-lasting effect on the consumer market. For the first four months of the year average salary was raised by 20 percent. The dram rate did not change significantly during the first three months of the year despite the fact that the program provided for a slight change. Bagratian explained this saying that the economy is in progress and particularly pointed out the considerable increment in export and import.

Among the dangerous tendencies of this period he especially emphasized the fact that only few debts of 1994 were paid out of the state budget. Currently there are problems with budget liabilities.

Speaking on privatization, the Prime Minister said that 3,000 small enterprises and 900 businesses are to be privatized in accordance to social-economic policy waged by the Government. Currently, 605 small enterprises have been privatized, 24 state enterprises are in process as well as 1,009 business producing 80 percent of gross industrial production of the Republic. These 1,009 were transformed by 20 percent free privatization into non-state companies which will gradually become private establishments.

Bagratyan emphasized the importance of accelerating the privatization process. In his opinion, the impediment of this process is pregnant with perilous consequences. He also reported that starting June 1 there will be no more direct state subsidies.

Many foreign firms expressed willingness to invest in the Armenian economy, a considerable part of the shares sold was bought by foreign legal entities.

"The economic situation remains complex, however it is better than a year ago and much better than two years ago. I think we have succeeded somehow to get out of precipice. Our economic policy will retain its positive tendencies, if centralization of the funds of domestic and foreign investors for development of the industry, on which we rest our hopes," - the Prime Minister said.

Regarding the issue of privatization certificates, transactions with them have not yet gained wide-spread character, about 85 percent of the population keeps its vouchers and there is a shortage of them on the market.

What concerns the matter of resumption of the work of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant, Bagratyan said that this will allow to provide a 6-hour-long supply of electric energy to the population. Alongside with the opening of the Nuclear Power Plant the waters of Sevan lake will not be used any more. "Currently 2 mln cubic meters of the Sevan's water is being used. If the Plant is opened the energy supply will increase by 200-250 MWt," - Bagratyan continued.

Azerbaijan

Gasanov: OSCE Not Trying To Solve Conflict
NC1904171895 Yerevan NOYAN TAPAN in English
1324 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 18/04/95 NOYAN TAPAN—The Azeri Foreign Minister Gasanov blamed the leadership of the OSCE Minsk group for not making sufficient efforts to resume negotiations on settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict. According to information of IMA-Press received on April 18, Gasanov said that Baku excludes any pre-conditions and will agree to discuss the issue of giving Armenian community of Mountainous Karabakh a status of a separate side to the conflict only on condition that all forces are pulled out of the Azeri territories, including Shushi and Lachin. Gasanov voiced hope that the Finnish diplomat Heikki Talvitie, who starts performing his duties as a Co-Chairman of the Minsk Conference beginning on April 21, will take concrete steps to continue the process of negotiations. The Azeri Foreign Minister also reported about the readiness of his country to conduct direct bilateral negotiations.

Gasanov: New Minsk Group Envoys Better Than Old

NC1904201495 Baku TURAN in English 1951 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 14) TURAN—New co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk group Heikki

Talvitie and Rene Niberg, which will start their activity on April 21, will work out some measures, promoting the resume of the Armenian-Azeri negotiations, Hasan Hasanov told journalists.

According to Head of the Foreign Ministry present co-chairmen of the OSCE Kazimirov and Bjorner do not make efforts for the resume of the negotiations and are led by the Armenians. It became the reason for the impasse at the negotiations.

Speaking about the new co-chairman Gasanov said that Azerbaijan supports the candidate of Finland which have enough experience of communication with the countries with conflicting situations. According to Gasanov the question of substitution the Russian co-chairman is not in the agenda.

Aliyev Urges EU Assistance, Says Situation 'Under Control'

BR1904125795 Brussels BRTN-TV1 Television Network in Dutch 1730 GMT 18 Apr 95

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Azeri President Geydar Aliyev was in Brussels today to urge the EU to provide assistance for the teetering Azerbaijani economy. Our reporter, Stefan Blommaert, met with President Aliyev and discussed his country's problems.

[Blommaert] Azerbaijan, a predominantly Islamic state, is generally known in our country for the long-lasting war in Nagorno-Karabakh, a region inhabited mainly by Christian Armenians. Since last year, a fragile cease-fire has been in force which must eventually lead to a durable settlement, the Azeri president said.

[Aliyev, in Russian with superimposed Dutch translation] "According to us, a peace accord must provide for the withdrawal of all Armenian armed groups from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, secure the territorial integrity and the inviolability of its borders, and, of course, an autonomous status for Nagorno-Karabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan."

[Blommaert] Azerbaijan has large oil reserves. Last fall, the country concluded a contract worth 1 billion [currency not specified] allowing eight Western oil companies to exploit oil fields in the Caspian Sea. This is an important contract, Aliyev said.

[Aliyev] "This contract opens the ways to foreign investments but, more importantly, it makes it clear that we adhere to the principles of a market economy."

[Blommaert] During the Soviet era, Aliyev was a member of the highest state leadership. Critics say that he rules in an authoritarian manner and that there is not enough democracy in Azerbaijan. The president himself denied those criticisms. There were several coup

attempts last year, but they were completely defeated each time. This is now history, according to the president.

[Aliyev] "I think that the situation in the Republic is stable. The state has all its regions under control. We taught the putschists a lesson. This will deter those who may think about seizing power through violent means for many years."

Report on Aliyev Reviewing Brussels Visit

NC2004113495

[FBIS Editorial Report] Baku Azerbaijan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri at 1630 GMT on 19 April carries a 30-minute recorded interview with Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev by Seyyad Akhbabali on board a plane on Aliyev's return from Brussels. Reception is fair.

Asked to comment on the results of his brief working visit to Brussels, Aliyev says the European Union [EU] is a prestigious organization with enormous potential and political and economic influence. "Therefore," he notes "forging close ties between the European Union and Azerbaijan is essential for our republic." Aliyev states: "The goal of my visit to Brussels was to create the opportunity for Azerbaijan to establish closer ties with the EU." He adds: "This is why I made this trip and I am very satisfied with it." He goes on to say that "very important and fruitful talks" were held with European Commission President Santer and other officials on various problems. He says that in view of Europe's interest in democratic reforms he briefed EU officials on economic and democratic reforms in Azerbaijan. Aliyev says: "I also expressed my gratitude for the assistance provided by the EU to our republic thus far." Aliyev then notes increased EU economic assistance to Azerbaijan. He says the EU has decided to dispatch 300,000 tons of grain and flour, 2,000 tons of cooking oil, and 2,000 tons of meat and has allocated credits worth 68 million ECU to Azerbaijan. He adds: Azerbaijan could get an additional \$170 million in credit from Europe. He says a EU delegation will visit Azerbaijan in May to discuss these issues and inspect the economic and democratic reforms. Aliyev concludes by saying: "In short, I am very pleased and satisfied with my talks with EU officials and I think that this will form a good foundation for our cooperation."

Asked to comment on economic issues, Aliyev says measures should be taken to increase industrial production to reduce the budget deficit. He said he will soon take serious initiatives in this direction and the negligent and corrupt officials and factory directors will be "punished" or "removed from their posts."

Reminded that some see his measures in this direction as Aliyev's "iron hand" in action, Aliyev said: "Those people who do not know what democracy means are

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creating anarchy in the Republic by hiding behind slogans of democracy. This is only natural. Of course, democracy should be established and developed. But, a healthy democracy, a real democracy, should be established. There should be no place in our society for those people who commit ugly deeds under the cover of democracy. We must achieve democracy. There should be, henceforth there will be, no place in our society for those people who use the cover of democracy to commit crimes, work against the state, and resort to coups d'etats. They will be punished. The latest incidents showed that nothing goes unpunished. Many of these people occupying positions of authority have learned to be irresponsible in recent years. They think they can go on occupying their posts by acting irresponsibly and abusing their power and committing crimes. They are harming our society. We have the mass of the people and then we have some officials who have enriched themselves illegally and through crime. This is injustice. I cannot tolerate this injustice. The people cannot and will not tolerate it. I too will not tolerate it. I already stated, and I am saying it on television, that I will not tolerate such things. Only those who serve the people loyally, honorably, and with a pure heart and conscience will work with us."

Asked to comment on opposition criticism that the government lacks a reform policy, Aliyev said: "They do not know what they are talking about. What do they know about domestic affairs? Laws have been adopted on reforms. Was it easy to adopt these laws? Who made such reforms possible? These same people who raise a hue and cry now were once in power. Why did they not launch these reforms?" He says that after leaving the government these people are "singing the same song and shouting that nothing is happening." Aliyev continues: "Reforms are taking place in Azerbaijan and democracy is being instituted." He states that a law on elections is being drafted and the elections will be held in October. He argues that the government is accomplishing all these things despite three coup attempts in six months.

Aliyev goes on to say he also held talks with the Belgian prime minister. He says he hopes the ties with Belgium will be developed and, for this purpose, he adds, he appointed an ambassador to Belgium.

Asked about extending his term when it ends four years from now, Aliyev replied: "Let people not be uneasy. I have a long time to serve. Elections will be held when my term ends. If the people want, I will be elected again. I believe the people will not abandon me."

IMF Allocates First \$46 Million Credit

LD2004110895 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0823 GMT 20 Apr 95

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Azertadz Alla Baula]

[FBIS Translated Text] Baku, 20 Apr—At the end of April the IMF will grant a \$46 million credit to Azerbaijan. This will be the first instalment of a larger amount to be allocated to the republic.

The decision was taken at a meeting of the IMF board of directors in Washington on 19 April. It means that the IMF has endorsed the republic's program for macroeconomic stabilization and consistent reforms. The toughening of budget, banking and credit, taxation and customs policies, a further liberalization of prices, and foreign economic activities have already produced positive results. Emission has declined, the National Bank has set up necessary currency reserves, tax rates and customs duties have been revised and inflation has fallen. While in December last year inflation was running at 55 percent [as received], in March it fell to 2.5 percent. The manat rate has stabilized, and price rises in the consumer market have noticeably slowed down.

Agreement Signed Transferring Oil Share to Exxon

NC1904193495 Baku Azerbaijan Radio Televiziyasi
Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The agreement on transferring 5 percent of Azerbaijan's share to the U.S. firm Exxon within the framework of the contract concluded with the Western oil consortium was formally signed in a ceremony at Gulistan Palace today.

The ceremony was opened by Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev. After stressing that cooperation with Exxon is important for both sides, he proposed the signing of the agreement.

The agreement was signed by the representative of Exxon and the president of the Azerbaijan State Oil Company.

The American guests stated that they consider it a great honor and responsibility to join the contract of the century, which brings together firms that are partners in many regions, and that U.S. President Bill Clinton highly appreciates this cooperation.

U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary William White noted that the sacrifices of the American and Azerbaijani oilmen 50 years ago saved mankind from fascism. Today's cooperation could be considered the continuation of that tradition. White concluded by saying there is no doubt that Exxon, the largest oil firm in the United States, will make effective use of every means to consolidate bilateral relations.

Closing the ceremony, Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev said there are now five U.S. oil firms taking part in the agreement signed with the Western oil consortium. The head of state expressed his conviction that cooperation with Exxon, the biggest oil firm in the United States and second largest in the world, will help introduce new technology in oil exploitation to the Republic, revive the Azerbaijani economy, and, most of all, consolidate peace and security in the region.

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SOCAR Chief Predicts Decision on Pipeline Route*NC1904193695 Baku TURAN in English 1951 GMT 18 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 14) TURAN—"The resolution on the export oil pipeline is yet to be adopted and the optimal variants of its laying are being considered at present. We prefer the route of the oil pipeline through the territory of Turkey going out to the Mediterranean Sea", the President of SOCAR [State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic], Natig Aliyev, told TURAN's correspondent.

He expressed hope that "the consortium will take into account Azerbaijan's interests when adopting final resolution on this point"

Asked if the interests of Russia, which insists on laying of the oil pipeline through the North Caucasus to the port of Novorossiysk, will be taken into account, Natig Aliyev said "when one speaks about Russia's interests, I ask to what extent? Moscow can insist on anything, but the resolution is adopted by the owners of the oil, that is Azerbaijan and the consortium, and not by any other country".

Natig Aliyev says that 2.5 years (that is 30 months) must be spent for construction of the oil pipeline since the moment of the adoption of the resolution. "Under the terms of the contract, within 54 months (4.5 years) since the moment of signing of the contract the pipeline must be put into action", he said.

The words of Natig Aliyev show that under the contract the pipeline must be put into action not later than March 1999.

The President of SOCAR thinks two years will be spent to study the issue and co-ordinate the intergovernmental resolutions and 2.5 years will be spent for construction of the oil pipeline.

Kazakhstan Official Cited on Caspian Sea Position*NC1904200395 Baku TURAN in English 1951 GMT 18 Apr 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 15) TURAN—Besides the economic point, the definition of the Caspian status is also of political as well as of military interest for the pri-Caspian [littoral] states. The recognition of the Caspian as the sea, gives the opportunity for the military men to sail everywhere. As was earlier reported, Iran and Russia insist on recognition of the Caspian as the sea. Presently there is no agreement among the pri-Caspian states on the Caspian division, all facts are based on the old treaty signed between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1940. However, this treaty cannot serve the international juridical base, since presently there are five newly founded independent pri-Caspian

states, the Advisor of Kazakhstan's Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Nurzhanov Polat, told TURAN's correspondent.

He also said that it will be difficult to find agreement on the Caspian status, since each of the pri-Caspian states will have its own aims—oil extraction, fishing as well as geopolitical interests. However, the Advisor of Kazakhstan's Ambassador said that one can achieve agreement on this issue. Presently specialists from different Kazakhstani Ministries are involved in the Caspian problem. However, it is early to speak what will be at the end, since Kazakhstan is not agree with Russia's proposals. The Irani party is not agree with Azerbaijani proposals. Azerbaijan adheres to strict position of division of the Caspian into sections, that is each states acts in its section independently of the others. Polat Nurzhanov says: "The pri-Caspian region can turn into a large unrest area, since in the near future the Caspian status will not be defined. As far as Kazakhstan is concerned, Polat Nurzhanov said that Kazakhstan like Azerbaijan adheres to division of the Caspian sea into sections. However, for successful settlement of this issue, we must conduct bilateral then trilateral talks and then we can speak about the summit among the pri-Caspian states. All five states will not find agreement, but the initiatives of two or three parties can be further developed. The Advisor of the Ambassador thinks that after the statement of Irani Foreign Minister Velayati, the settlement of the problem with the Caspian division will accelerate. If earlier the events developed passively, now the situation changed. Iran speaks from the same position as Russia. Being debarred from the oil consortium, Iran played the role of the catalizer in the definition of the Caspian status issue." "I think that this fact will accelerate the settlement of the problem with the Caspian status by the pri-Caspian states, or new unrest area will arise here", the Advisor of the Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan said.

Prosecutor: No Political Party Implicated in Coup Attempt*NC1904203595 Baku TURAN in English 1951 GMT 18 Apr 95*

["Eldar Gasanov: 'The Investigation Did Not Find Confirmation of Participation of Any Political Party in March Events'"—TURAN headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 14) TURAN—A press-conference of the General Prosecutor of the Republic Eldar Gasanov on the events of March 13-17 which took place in Baku, Kazakh and Akstafa regions was held on April 13. Deputy Prosecutor Nazim Allahverdiyev, head of the investigation group for the events in Baku Layig Mehtiyev and head of the investigation group Akstafa- Kazakh Tahir Kazimov took part at the press-conference.

According to General Prosecutor 45 people died during the events (25 military men, 7 civilians and 11 members of OPON) [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] and

117 were wounded (62 military men, 5 policemen and 47 civilians). According to him, 322 people are under investigation on the case (88 members of OPON, 11 unofficial employees of OPON, 142 deserters, 16 employees of police and 65 other citizens), and 23 people are wanted.

According to the General Prosecutor the coup began even on October 2, 1994 when the Javadovs' brothers captured the building of the Prosecutory Office. He also noted that the participants of the October coup attempt were not brought to trial for the purpose not to make the social and political situation unstable. The fact that they were not punished has brought to the new attempt of coup. He noted that in both cases the employees of the Interior Ministry took an active part in the attempt of coup.

Head of the investigation group for Baku's events Layig Mehtiyev told journalists that "the investigation did not find facts of participation of any political party in the coup, and the participation of any members of the party does not mean the participation of the whole organisation in the coup."

The Prosecutor himself noted that he had not facts confirming the participation in the coup of Musavat Party, but he added that the members of the Akstafa branch of the Azerbaijan's Popular Front and "Boz Gurd" party had been arrested on the case.

Gasanov said that the citizens of several states, including Turkish citizens Kenan Guner (is under arrest) and Farman Demirkol had been arrested on the case. According to him, their guilt had been proved, but that does not mean Turkey's participation in the coup. Gasanov also said that participation of Tofiq Gasimov, former Foreign Minister in the coup is also inquired.

Layig Mehtiyev said that the fact that after rising the white flag on the base of OPON the governmental troops continued fire was confirmed.

Responding the question if the life of Rovshan Javadov could be saved the General Prosecutor said that the examination for the delivery of Rovshan Javadov to hospital was appointed and all details will be known after the investigation. Gasanov said about some facts of conduction the illegal searches and other violations by employees of the Interior Ministry those days. Thus, a group of employees of the Interior Ministry conducted a search in the flat of Rovshan Javadov's father without sanction. "Some of them were arrested and the others were dismissed," said General Prosecutor. Concerning the attempt of coup 1994 in Ganja Gasanov said that 180 people had been arrested on the case and soon the cases will be sent to the court.

'Special Battalion' Placed Under President's Direct Command

NC1904150695 Baku TURAN in English 1947 GMT 18 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku (April 18) TURAN—A Special Battalion of the Defence Ministry will be placed

under the command of the security service of the President of the republic, according to reliable sources. The battalion will be a backbone of a new special subdivision which will be called "a presidential special division." Presently only one military formation, a presidential guard, is subordinated to the President.

We should remind that that Special Battalion played a main role while capture by the governmental troops the head-quarter of OPON [Special Purpose Police Detachment] in the 8th kilometre. The commander of that battalion colonel Eldar Agayev was awarded the rank of National Hero of Azerbaijan for the successful conduction of the operation.

Georgia

Iranian President Arrives for 3-Day Visit

LD1904131895 Tbilisi IPRINDA in Russian 1300 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi [no date as received]—In the second half of the day on 19 April a government delegation from the Islamic Republic of Iran led by the country's president, 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, arrived in Tbilisi for a three-day official visit. The eminent guest was met at Tbilisi airport by Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze, Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia, and other officials. The two countries' leaders will meet behind closed doors at 1830 hours today.

Rafsanjani, Shevardnadze Hold Meeting

LD1904161895 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1331 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Tbilisi—Today, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, His Excellency 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, arrived in the Georgian capital for an official visit. A ceremony was held at Tbilisi airport to welcome the eminent guest. Mr. Rafsanjani was met by Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze. The national anthems of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Georgia were played.

The eminent guest greeted members of the Georgian Parliament, government, and the public who came to meet him. At the end of the ceremony, Mr. Rafsanjani delivered a speech, thanking Georgian head of state E. Shevardnadze for the invitation to visit Georgia and expressing the hope that the visit would promote bilateral relations and cooperation between the two countries.

The Iranian president and officials accompanying him on the trip went from the airport to the government guest house.

Later, the eminent guest and accompanying officials visited the Cabinet of Ministers and started the first round of talks. Also today, a one-on-one conversation

was held between Georgian head of state Eduard Shevardnadze and Hashemi-Rafsanjani. At the same time, Iranian ministers were meeting their Georgian counterparts.

The wife of 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and other members of His Excellency's family also arrived in Tbilisi today. They were met by Mrs. Nanuli Shevardnadze.

Tehran Reports Rafsanjani Talks

LD1904185895 Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network in Persian 1630 GMT 19 Apr 95

[Report by Central News Unit Correspondent in Georgia]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Hashemi-Rafsanjani arrived in the Georgian capital of Tbilisi this afternoon on an official three-day visit after concluding his visit to India. He was officially welcomed by the country's President Eduard Shevardnadze. [passage omitted]

Mr. Hashemi-Rafsanjani carried out the first round of bilateral talks at the Georgian cabinet premises this evening. At the talks, attended by several officials from both countries, the need for the expansion of cooperation between the two countries—based on safeguarding mutual interests and the longstanding friendly and historic relations of the two nations—was stressed.

Our country's president held exclusive talks with Georgian President Shevardnadze, and he attended a dinner reception which was organized in his honor.

Iranian President, Wife Praised

LD1904193395 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] His Excellency 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, arrived in Georgia today on a three-day official visit. The president is accompanied on the visit by his family.

As Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze has stated, the visit to Georgia by the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran has symbolic significance as well. It is not accidental that the president of Iran is to visit the ports of Poti and Batumi. According to the head of state, if order is restored in the republic, the amount of transit cargo passing through Georgia may reach five to ten million tonnes in the next one and a half years.

Respect for age and position is the main principle of Islamic faith. Therefore, the president of the republic is not only the first figure, but is also an example for millions of traditional families. His wife is also an example for women in the Islamic Republic of Iran. They make up half of the country's population and, in

the words of His Excellency President Rafsanjani himself, have enormous potential in the revival of the state.

Mrs. 'Effat Rafsanjani arrived in Tbilisi with her husband and two daughters. Her busy itinerary, which includes meetings with Georgian women, will probably serve to share the useful experience of representatives of the fair sex in the Islamic Republic of Iran, who are free of unnecessary problems and are regarded in their homeland as champions of progress, rearers of mankind and, above all, the driving force of the revolution—a force that is totally free of the unnecessary burden of emancipation.

Cooperation Agreements To Be Signed

LD1904205395 Tehran IRNA in English 1925 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tbilisi, April 19, IRNA—Iran and Georgia will sign six agreements on Friday [21 April], this was announced today during the first round of the talks between Iranian and Georgian presidents.

President Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani who arrived here Wednesday morning on a 3-day visit at the official invitation of his Georgian counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze, held the first round of talks with Georgian president this afternoon.

Rafsanjani expressed hope that Georgia's problems would be settled gradually.

Describing Georgia as a country with potentials for progress, he said that there are numerous grounds for cooperation between the two countries.

Turning to the closure of Georgia's northern routes, Rafsanjani said that Iran can serve as a good and reliable path for the transit of Georgian goods.

He added that Iran can help Georgia in the technical field and production of water and electricity power. He said Iran has good experience in the construction of water power stations.

Shevardnadze described the arrival day of the Iranian delegation led by President Rafsanjani to Georgia as an unforgettable day for the Georgian people and said that the two nations had had age-old friendly ties. He added that in fact they had been separated from Iran some 200 years ago.

He termed Rafsanjani as a politician and a prominent statesman and praised Iran's stands vis-a-vis Georgia.

The Georgian president said that speaking about the stability and security of Caucasia is meaningless without taking the role of Iran into consideration.

Voicing his country's readiness to utilize the existing potentials in Iran and its transportation facilities, he said that the issue of transportation is vital to Georgia.

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The two presidents held a session behind the closed-doors after the meeting.

Meanwhile, Deputy Iranian Foreign Minister for Euro-America Affairs Mahmud Va'ezzi announced in a report that joint trade companies will be set up and the two countries start on banking cooperation and strengthen it in future.

Turning to the finalization of the cultural agreement between the two countries, he said that Iran and Georgia have reached agreements in agricultural field and held desirable discussions on transportation.

He also said that six documents on cooperation in various fields have been prepared which will be signed.

Present in the talks were Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister of Roads and Transportation Akbar Torkan, Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs Mohammad-Khani, Commerce Minister Yahya ol-Eshaq and their Georgian counterparts.

The Georgian television aired a special programme on the occasion of the visit to Tbilisi of the Iranian delegation and broadcast short parts of Iranian literature and glimpses of classical Iranian art.

Shevardnadze Meets U.S. Official, Discusses Energy Crisis

LD2004103295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1007
GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, April 20 (Interfax)—U.S. Assistant Secretary on Energy William White, who arrived in Tbilisi on Wednesday [19 April] evening, confirmed the United States' readiness to render comprehensive assistance to Georgia in surmounting its energy crisis.

Eduard Shevardnadze, leader of this Transcaucasian republic, declared after his meeting with White on the morning of April 20 that "very beneficial cooperation which will help resolve Georgia's pressing problem lies ahead."

Shevardnadze also reported that one of the routes under consideration for an export oil pipeline from Azerbaijan "lies through the Georgian territory." "However, I would like to speak about this with a certain amount of cautiousness," Shevardnadze noted.

For his part, White declared that if the pipeline from Azerbaijan runs through the Georgian territory then the republic "would receive additional profit from it and a substantial number of jobs."

Estonia

Officials Visit China Over Possible Arms Purchase

WS1904140495 Tallinn BNS in English 1200 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, Apr 19, BNS—Estonian Defense Ministry Chancellor Tarmo Molder and an adviser to the country's Central Staff, Juri Valge, are on a visit to China to find out what weapons and at which price Estonia could buy from that country, officials in Tallinn told BNS on Wednesday [19 April].

But the visit doesn't mean that there is an arms deal under preparation, said Enn Tupp, the country's former defense minister. He said Estonia was looking carefully into all offers of weapons and ammunition.

"The visit by our specialists doesn't mean that we would buy something from China. All depends on the price and quality of the goods," he said.

Tupp added that Estonia had received offers over the past year to purchase arms from several countries. Serious offers have come from Russia, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, the United States, South Korea, South Africa and China, he said.

The ex-minister said Estonia above all was interested in purchasing light firearms, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. "We certainly won't be buying tanks or aircraft," he told BNS.

Estonia in 1992 bought Kalashnikov combat rifles from China, then the only country to sell weapons to the Baltic nations that had recently regained their independence from the Soviet Union.

Ministry Calls on Russia 'To Practice Moderation'

WS2004084095 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release in English 1449 GMT 19 Apr 95

[Statement issued by the Press and Information Department of the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 April—received via Internet]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is following the deepening of undemocratic tendencies in Russian foreign policy with growing concern, especially in connection with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's statement yesterday about the condition of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic states and the CIS member states. The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has directed the Embassy in Moscow to ask for explanations of this latest statement. The Russian Foreign Ministry has so far avoided giving any explanation.

Threatening the use of force against sovereign states is not in accordance with international standards of behaviour. A further cause for concern is the fact that Russia

continues to ignore all the positive assessments of the human rights situation in Estonia by international observers as well as the recent poll conducted by Russian experts which also disproves Russian accusations.

The Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that the Russian Foreign Minister has spoken about the need to use force to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population at a time when Russia—under the same slogan of defending the rights of a Russian-speaking population—has already killed tens of thousands of civilians in Chechnya.

In connection with the above, the Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls upon Russian politicians to practice moderation and to adhere to international standards of behaviour in foreign policy.

Response To Russian Foreign Minister's Remarks

LD1904134595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1240 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, April 19 (INTERFAX)—"Against the background of the events going on in Chechnya Estonia cannot view Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's statement on the possible use of force by Russia to protect the Russian-speaking population abroad as another bare threat," declared press secretary of the Estonian Foreign Ministry Mari-Ann Kelam.

In an interview with Interfax Wednesday Kelam pointed out that leaders of "great powers should understand that their statements arouse great concern on the part of smaller states and especially neighboring ones."

Kelam noted that such statements "do not promote the normalization of Estonian-Russian relations towards which we strive."

She reported that Estonia's Foreign Ministry would probably react to Kozyrev's statement.

Addressing the sitting of the Foreign Policy Council in Moscow Tuesday, which was devoted to the situation concerning ethnic Russians in CIS countries and the Baltics, Kozyrev pointed out that "there exists a wide range of options to defend compatriots living abroad, beginning from expression of a slight dissatisfaction by an anonymous representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry and ending with sanctions of a political and economic nature."

Listing these options he also named use "of a direct armed force" in some cases.

"Another thing is how to use this range of options. It is not worth taking these options as absolutes, including that of the use of force," Kozyrev underlined.

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Latvia

Birkavs Responds To Kozyrev's Statement

LD1904174895 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
1700 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The words of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev about the use of force to defend the interests of Russians abroad were commented on today by Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs and Aleksandrs Kiršteins, the chairman of the Saeima Commission on Foreign Affairs. The latter said that these words are to be regarded as the personal statements of a politically unstable diplomat, to please the Russian chauvinist forces, and again try to use the residents of Russian nationality abroad as a political weapon. But here is Valdis Birkavs' view.

[Begin recording] [Birkavs] Well, let us say that just what he said has not been recorded. What has been recorded is a bit further on in the text that I received—not using the issue of human rights for political speculations. And it seems that it is right in this case, because Russian Ambassador Rannikh was summoned today, and he explained that in the text that we have he [Kozyrev] was not thinking of the Baltic countries, but problems within the CIS states. And yet, I have always said that we must be very attentive, we must follow every gust of wind from Russia. Anyway, we expressed our concern by summoning the ambassador and demanding an explanation.

[Correspondent] Do you think it is realistic for Russia to use military force against Latvia?

[Birkavs] In the present international situation, of course it is not realistic, but this political speculation is being used to influence the political [word indistinct, transmission cut off]. [end recording]

Commission Chairman Reacts To Kozyrev Statement

LD1904115495 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian
0901 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At a session of the Council for Russian Federation Foreign Policy in Moscow on Tuesday, 18 April, Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev mentioned that Russia did not rule out the possibility of using military force to defend Russians living in the former Soviet republics. In this connection a Latvian radio presenter asked Aleksandrs Kiršteins, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission, to comment on the origin of such a statement.

Kiršteins said the following over the telephone:

[Begin Kiršteins recording] Speaking in the Saeima about the foreign policy concept, I already mentioned the fact that two sessions had been held in Russia, at which problems of the leadership of Minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev in 1992 and 1993 were discussed. Then,

let us say, the theory that force cannot tackle all issues but in certain cases military force can solve certain problems very well was quoted precisely and also published in such magazines as DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK. So first of all, this statement is nothing new. Secondly, we have been constantly directing our government's attention to that.

Speaking about this concept, I was reproached that, look, I did not analyze threats and that I was saying that our only enemy was perhaps in the east. We have always been saying that good relations have to be maintained with the Russians—with businessmen, with economic relations. But we should be careful as regards statements by individual politicians.

Specifically speaking now about this statement, I consider it to be a statement by a person whose political career is currently in danger. As you know, the issue of the candidacy of a new foreign minister is currently being circulated in Russia. In this situation it is best to bet on, let us say, a kind of national and patriotic card and threaten military sanctions—Mr. Kozyrev is currently doing that. That is all we can say here. [end recording]

The Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to issue a statement in the afternoon expressing the Latvian Government's view on the statements made by Kozyrev in Moscow.

Russian Embassy: Kozyrev Statement Concern Ungrounded

WS2004114795 Tallinn BNS in English 1030 GMT 20 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] RIGA, Apr 19, BNS—Latvia's concern in connection with Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's statement on possible use of direct force to defend Russians abroad is ungrounded, says Russian Embassy in Latvia.

Russian Ambassador to Latvia Aleksandr Rannikh discussed Wednesday this and other issues with Latvian Foreign Ministry's State Secretary Maris Riekstins.

Rannikh stressed that Russian politicians have rights to discuss any questions in forums of their organizations, including possible use of force to defend ethnic Russians.

As reported, when addressing Apr. 18 in Moscow the Foreign Policy Council's meeting, dedicated to Russians' situation in CIS and the Baltic states, Kozyrev admitted a possibility to use direct force to protect compatriots abroad.

In addition, the embassy's announcement to press says that the Latvian legislation is discriminating in regard to Russian-speakers in some cases.

In turn, Latvia thinks that Kozyrev's statement is not adequate to the current situation, says the Foreign Ministry's press center release, and Latvia considers that it can negatively influence relations and dialogue between both the states.

During the meeting, both sides also discussed possible prolongation of temporary stay permits to those Russian servicemen who were retired after 1992 as well as problems, related to separate militaries' rights to permanently reside in Latvia.

According to the agreements on army withdrawal, signed in Moscow in 1994, Russian servicemen who were retired after Jan. 28 of 1992 had to leave Latvia by Aug. 31, 1994.

Rannikh noted that, until now, no security guarantees have been provided for the functioning of the Skrunda radar station. Russia is especially concerned about the issue in connection with Latvia's plans to blow up the new unfinished facility of the radar station on May 4.

Foreign Ministry Prepares Draft Agreement on Refugees

WS2004092595 Tallinn BNS in English 1611 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, Apr 19, BNS—Latvian Foreign Ministry have prepared a draft agreement on taking back of refugees who have no rights to stay in another neighbor state's territory, Ministry Deputy State Secretary in juridical and consular issues Atis Sjanits told BNS.

The draft agreement will be discussed by all three Baltic states' Foreign Ministry delegations on April 27 in Riga. Officials from the Immigration Police and Citizenship and Immigration Department will also be invited to participate.

Sjanits said that Estonian Foreign Ministry has prepared its own draft agreement and it will also be discussed during the meeting to agree on final contents of the project.

As reported, Latvian Foreign Ministry has sent notes also to Russia and Belarus proposing to begin talks on illegal migration issues.

Both states, however, have failed by Wednesday to respond to Latvia's proposal on beginning talks and signing an agreement on return of illegal refugees, said Sjanits.

Regardless of Russia's and Belarus' "being silent", Foreign Ministry International Agreement Department has prepared draft agreements which are currently under review of the delegation approved by Prime Minister Maris Gailis.

The delegation comprises representatives from Foreign, Justice and Finance Ministries' departments, Interior Ministry Immigration Police and Citizenship and Immigration Department, Borderguard brigade and Welfare Ministry Health department.

Sjanits noted that Latvia has seriously to analyze how to rouse Russia's and Belarus' interest in beginning talks

and signing an agreement. "The talks will be complicated, for international-legal practice has proved that if both sides have different interests then it is difficult to agree."

Lithuania

Foreign Ministry Responds To Kozyrev's Statement

LD1904123795 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1134 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VILNIUS, April 19 (Interfax)—Lithuania's Foreign Ministry demanded that Moscow present explanations due to the recent statement of Russia's Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev regarding possible use of force by Russia to defend rights of Russians in CIS countries and in the Baltic states. Secretary (deputy minister - Interfax) of Lithuania's Foreign Ministry Albinas Januska declared about this during the meeting with Russian Ambassador Nikolay Obertyshev Tuesday [18 April].

The press service of Lithuania's Foreign Ministry reported that Russia "repeatedly threatens to use and even uses military force" solving inner and foreign political problems, Januska said, this is incompatible with norms of international law and principles of good neighborhood.

Obertyshev declared that Kozyrev's statements "do not concern Lithuania" and promised to present an official explanation of Russia's leadership.

Slzevicius Addresses Parliament on Economic Situation

LD1904185395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1638 GMT 19 Apr 95

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The inflation level over 1995 should not exceed 25

, believes Prime Minister Adolfas Slzevicius. Addressing on Tuesday [18 April] the plenary session of the Lithuanian parliament with a report on the government's measures aimed at the law observance, he said that over the past two months of the current year inflation amounted to 9.9 percent, while last year the figure was 45.1 percent.

He said that before the end of the year the average wages must increase by approximately 31 percent, and real wages by 5 percent (by preliminary estimates, over 1994 the growth rate stood at around 1.5 percent—IF) The average old-age pension in 1995, by the prime minister's forecasts, must rise by 55.9 percent as compared with last year.

The prime minister said that since the beginning of land reform in Lithuania, 126,300 inhabitants (42.1 percent

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of all who wish) received 1160 thousand hectares of land, which is 48.3 percent of the total areas subject to return. Property rights for land have been restored for around 100,000 owners.

He said that returned to former owners and their descendants in Lithuania were 150,000 hectares of forests (30 percent of the forests subject for return).

The prime minister noted that over the past two years "much has been done in making plots of land private property of rural inhabitants": 372,700 land users out of 413,400 contenders have received such plots. (In line with Lithuanian laws, those who have no right to receive land as the property return, may buy it on special terms, 2-4 hectares for each family—IF).

Besides, 62,000 inhabitants wish to receive compensations instead of the land plots subject to be returned (423,000 hectares). According to Slezevicius, local self-government bodies took decisions to allow this to around 29,000 people. The work in this sphere becomes more difficult because most people wish to receive money compensations in exchange for land, while the state and the local self-government bodies have not enough money for this purpose—at the moment 332.2 million litai (\$83 million) are needed for compensations.

According to Slezevicius, it is planned to accumulate around 7.1 million litai (\$1.8 million) for the compensation fund for 1995. That is why the prime minister asked that parliament approve as early as possible the amendment to the Constitution, which allows to sell land to foreigners, which, according to the prime minister, "will help replenish the compensation fund".

Tube Containing Radioactive Uranium Found in Vilnius

LD2004100795 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 19 Apr 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] In a grove near a residential district of Vilnius, an inhabitant found a lead tube. Upon examination it appeared to contain 357 grams of radioactive uranium.

Lithuanian TV reports that the police do not rule out the possibility that the object might be connected with the nuclear [fuel] cassette declared missing at the Ignalina nuclear power plant at the end of 1993.

Despite the efforts of the prosecutor's office, the case of the missing nuclear [fuel] cassette remains shrouded in mystery to this day.

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